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Abstract 
 
I argue for a realist interpretation of the quantum state. I begin by reviewing and 
critically evaluating two arguments for an antirealist interpretation of the quantum 
state, the first derived from the so-called ‘measurement problem’, and the second 
from the concept of local causality. I argue that existing antirealist interpretations 
do not solve the measurement problem. Furthermore, I argue that it is possible to 
construct a local, realist interpretation of quantum mechanics, using methods 
borrowed from quantum field theory and based on John S. Bell’s concept of ‘local 
beables’.  
 
If the quantum state is interpreted subjectively, then the probabilities it associates 
with experimental outcomes are themselves subjective. I address the prospects for 
developing a subjective Bayesian interpretation of quantum mechanical 
probabilities based on the Quantum de Finetti Representation Theorem. Epistemic 
interpretations of the quantum state can be divided into those that are epistemic 
with respect to underlying ontic states, and those that are epistemic with respect to 
measurement outcomes. The Pusey Barrett and Rudolph (PBR) theorem places 
serious constraints on the former family of interpretations.  I identify an important 
explanatory gap in the latter sort of interpretation. In particular, if the quantum 
state is a subjective representation of beliefs about future experimental outcomes, 
then it is not clear why those experimenters who use quantum mechanics should be 
better able to negotiate the world than those who do not. 
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I then turn to the task of articulating a positive argument for the thesis of quantum 
state realism. I begin by articulating a minimal set of conditions that any realist 
interpretation must meet. One assumption built into the PBR result is that systems 
prepared in a given quantum state have a well-defined set of physical properties, 
which may be completely or incompletely described by the quantum state. 
Antirealist interpretations that reject this assumption are therefore compatible with 
the PBR result. A compelling case for quantum state realism must therefore be made 
on more general grounds. I consider two concrete examples of phenomena 
described by quantum mechanics that strongly suggest that the quantum state is 
genuinely representational in character. 
 
Keywords:  
Philosophy of physics, foundations of quantum mechanics, the measurement 
problem, philosophy of science, quantum state, realism, confirmation theory, 
philosophy of probability
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Introduction 
 
Why Does Quantum Mechanics Need an Interpretation? 
 
If the success of a scientific theory is measured by its capacity to accurately predict 
the outcomes of physical experiments, then quantum mechanics is undoubtedly the 
most successful physical theory ever developed. Yet for all of its empirical success, 
quantum mechanics raises novel interpretive difficulties for the philosopher of 
science. It has often been remarked that any mature physical theory ought to contain 
within itself its own theory of measurement. This is not merely a consequence of the 
physicality of measurement; it is due to the fact that the assignment of values to 
physical quantities, a procedure which undergirds the evidentiary basis of any theory, 
is mediated by theoretical assumptions.  
 What theoretical assumptions are brought to bear on measurement processes 
in quantum mechanics? According to the standard view, the quantum wave function is 
a mathematical representation of the physical state of a quantum system. The state 
evolves in time according to the linear Schrödinger equation, and the state at any 
given time can be used to assign probabilities to potential experimental outcomes 
according to a law known as the ‘Born rule’. The probabilistic predictions of the 
theory are then subject to empirical confirmation. The so-called ‘quantum 
measurement problem’ is concerned with the fact that if an experimental apparatus is 
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treated as a quantum system, then a typical quantum state at the end of an experiment 
will be a sum or ‘superposition’ of terms corresponding to different experimental 
outcomes. If the quantum state description is taken to be complete and correct, then it 
seems that there are no definite experimental outcomes, which is problematic. To deal 
with this problem, the so-called ‘collapse postulate’ is introduced into the standard 
formalism; according to this postulate, when a measurement is performed, a quantum 
superposition ‘collapses’ into a definite state corresponding to one of the terms in the 
superposition, via a mechanism that is not governed by the Schrödinger equation. This 
state of affairs has led John S. Bell to famously remark that ‘either the wave function, 
as given by the Schrödinger equation, is not everything, or it is not right’. The 
significance of this tension between the Schrödinger evolution and the determinacy of 
experimental outcomes, and the status of the collapse postulate, has been the subject 
of intense debate since the formalism of quantum mechanics was first developed. 
 One possible attitude to take is that despite the obvious difficulties posed by 
the measurement problem, there are still good grounds for adopting a realist 
interpretation of the quantum state. Realists share a commitment to the idea that the 
quantum state represents the real state of a system, both before and after a 
measurement. On the face of it, this is a difficult view to maintain, given the apparent 
role of collapse in the theory. Realists may choose one of the horns of Bell’s dilemma, 
or, in the case of the many worlds interpretation, reject the dilemma altogether. 
According to the De Broglie-Bohm interpretation, the quantum mechanical 
description of reality is correct as far as it goes, but must be supplemented by further 
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deterministic ‘hidden variables’ that ultimately guarantee, given initial conditions, 
that the outcomes of measurements will always be determinate. Other realist 
approaches have elected to seize the other horn of Bell’s dilemma, modifying the 
dynamics of the Schrödinger equation to allow for the possibility that wave functions 
may undergo spontaneous collapses into definite post-measurement states. Finally, a 
third option that retains realism is provided by the ‘many worlds’ interpretation, 
which argues that every time a quantum experiment with different outcomes with 
non-zero probability is performed, all of those outcomes are realized, each in a 
different world.  
 All of the above interpretations share a commitment to quantum state realism, 
and attempt to address the measurement problem within a realistic framework. A 
completely different kind of strategy for dealing with the measurement problem 
involves embracing an antirealist interpretation of the quantum state. Antirealists 
avoid the measurement problem by denying that the quantum state description, 
whether of the measurement apparatus or any other phenomenon, is an objective 
representation of physical reality. If the quantum state does not track real features of 
physical systems, then the probabilities it furnishes are subjective. This makes it 
possible to describe the ‘collapse of the wave function’ in subjective terms, perhaps as 
an example of the sort of information updating or belief change we associate with 
information acquisition in non-quantum contexts. 
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Motivations for Quantum State Antirealism 
 
As with realist interpretations, the phrase ‘quantum state antirealism’ captures a 
number of interpretations. The idea that the formal apparatus of quantum mechanics 
does not describe an observer-independent quantum reality has a venerable history. 
The so-called Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, associated mainly 
with the Danish physicist Niels Bohr, but also with Wolfgang Pauli, Werner 
Heisenberg, and Max Born, was probably the first serious attempt to understand the 
relationship between quantum mechanics and the phenomena it describes in an 
antirealist framework, and remains highly influential to this day. Bohr, for example, is 
reported to have said: 
 
There is no quantum world. There is only an abstract physical description. It is 
wrong to think that the task of physics is to find out how nature is. Physics 
concerns what we can say about nature.1 
 
With recent developments in the field of quantum information theory, a new variation 
on this antirealist theme has emerged which tries to interpret the quantum state as a 
representation of the subjective information of agents interacting with quantum 
systems, rather than a description of physical reality. The most radical wing of this 
                                                        
1 As quoted in Petersen [1963]. 
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new school argues that the probabilities assigned to measurement outcomes by the 
quantum state are in all cases entirely subjective.2  
 If the case can be made that quantum states are states of information rather 
than states of reality, then the fact that the quantum state undergoes a discontinuous 
transformation on measurement is given a straightforward explanation: the so-called 
‘collapse of the wave function’, in which a superposition is reduced to a state 
corresponding to a determinate measurement outcome, can be interpreted as a 
change of belief rather than a physical transformation in the system not governed by 
the Schrödinger equation. 
 Furthermore, a successful account of the collapse of the wave function in 
subjectivist terms would seem to have advantages that go beyond addressing the 
measurement problem. A second apparent difficulty posed by measurement events 
relates to the issue of locality and the problem of assessing the compatibility of 
quantum mechanics with the special theory of relativity. It is a peculiar feature of 
quantum mechanics that two systems with separate quantum states may interact in 
such a way that their states become ‘entangled’, meaning that the overall quantum 
state of both systems is no longer reducible to the individual states of the previously 
separate systems. Erwin Schrödinger famously described the phenomenon of 
entanglement as the essential feature of quantum mechanics that distinguishes it from 
classical physics: 
                                                        
2 See Fuchs [2003], Caves, Fuchs and Schack [2001]. 
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When two systems, of which we know the states by their respective 
representatives, enter into temporary physical interaction due to known forces 
between them, and when after a time of mutual influence the systems separate 
again, then they can no longer be described in the same way as before, viz. by 
endowing each of them with a representative of its own. I would not call 
[entanglement] one but rather the characteristic trait of quantum mechanics, the 
one that enforces its entire departure from classical lines of thought. By the 
interaction the two representatives [the quantum states] have become 
entangled.3 
 
Part of what enforces this departure from classical lines of thought is that 
entanglement may extend over arbitrary distances. This entails that the quantum 
state associated with an entangled system has a manifestly nonlocal character. 
Measurements of entangled systems will in general immediately transform the 
quantum state associated with those systems; consequently, interacting with one part 
of an entangled system will generally change the quantum state associated with the 
entire system, regardless of its spatial extent. This state of affairs famously led 
Einstein to conclude that the quantum mechanical description of physical systems 
must be incomplete: 
 
                                                        
3 Schrödinger [1935], p. 555. 
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I incline to the opinion that the wave function does not (completely) describe 
what is real, but only a (to us) empirically accessible maximal knowledge 
regarding that which really exists [...] This is what I mean when I advance the 
view that quantum mechanics gives an incomplete description of the real state 
of affairs.4 
 
Einstein’ attitude is later cited with approval by Chris Fuchs, who writes: 
 
Einstein was the first person to say in absolutely unambiguous terms why the 
quantum state should be viewed as information [...]. His argument was simply 
that a quantum-state assignment for a system can be forced to go one way or the 
other by interacting with a part of the world that should have no causal 
connection with the system of interest.5 
 
Harrigan and Spekkens [2010] echo this sentiment when they write that ‘Einstein 
showed that not only is locality inconsistent with [the quantum state]  being a 
complete description of reality, it is also inconsistent with  being ontic’.6 
                                                        
4 A. Einstein, Letter to P. S. Epstein, 10 November 1945, extract from D. Howard [1990] p. 103. 
Einstein’s argument will be taken up in greater detail in chapter 2. 
5 Fuchs [2002]. 
6 I will consider Einstein’s argument for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics in some detail in 
chapter 2. 
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 Given these considerations, it might well be wondered why so many 
commentators have taken it for granted that the quantum state is ontic. In fact, 
antirealist arguments notwithstanding, the present work will argue that there are 
very good grounds for interpreting the quantum state realistically. Much of the 
evidentiary basis of quantum mechanics is derived from relative frequency data that 
is compared to the predictions of the theory. The role of the quantum state in this 
procedure is to furnish probabilistic predictions that are subject to test in the context 
of repeatable experiments. At a minimum, a realistic interpretation of the quantum 
state will have it that i) there exist states of reality which it is the business of our 
physical theories to describe; ii)  different quantum states correspond to different 
states of reality. The injective case takes into account the possibility of 
supplementary variables, as in the de Broglie-Bohm theory.   
 Some antirealists, such as Chris Fuchs, deny that states of reality are in 
principle amenable to a dynamical description, and so align themselves with the 
view expressed in the quotation from Bohr above. Other commentators, such as Rob 
Spekkens, accept that reality is amenable to physical description, but deny that 
quantum mechanical states can be mapped one-one into states of reality or ontic 
states. Fuchs’ view, as we shall see shortly, is hard to square with the evidentiary 
basis of quantum theory. More modest antirealist or epistemic interpretations that 
maintain the descriptive role of physics face a different set of challenges. The 
recently discovered Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph (PBR) theorem places considerable 
constraints on the space of possible ontic models of quantum mechanics, on the 
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assumption that the quantum state is epistemic.7 These arguments will be 
considered in more detail in the chapters to follow. I turn now to a brief outline of 
the structure of the dissertation. 
 
Outline of Thesis Structure 
 
If the case for a realistic interpretation of the quantum state is to be made 
compelling, arguments for the contrary view must be addressed; it is therefore a 
central burden of the present work to critically evaluate the arguments for an 
epistemic interpretation of the quantum state. In chapter 2, entitled ‘Critical 
Examination of Two Arguments for Quantum State Antirealism’, I consider two 
related arguments that have recently been put forward in defense of quantum state 
antirealism.  
 The first argument stems from the measurement problem, which has already 
been alluded to above. If we interpret the quantum state as representing information 
about a system rather than a state of reality, then quantum state ‘collapse’ no longer 
requires a physical explanation, but is perhaps better thought of as an instance of 
rational belief change in the context of information acquisition. I consider two recent 
proposals for addressing the measurement problem in a subjective Bayesian 
framework, the first due to Jeff Bub [2007], the second due to Chris Fuchs [2003, 
                                                        
7 Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph [2011]. 
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2008]. I argue that neither of these proposals successfully addresses the 
measurement problem, on the grounds that the transition to post-measurement 
states cannot be modelled in entirely subjective terms, but represents a (non-
unitary) physical process. 
 The second argument I consider is based on locality. As I have already 
suggested, one of the main challenges facing a realist interpretation of the quantum 
state is the apparent tension between taking the quantum state to be a real, on the 
one hand, and the locality assumption of special relativity. The worry is that 
quantum entanglement may extend over arbitrary distances, apparently implying 
that quantum state collapse, regarded as a physical process, is non-local in character. 
Proponents of an antirealist interpretation of the quantum state, including Harrigan 
and Spekkens [2010] and Fuchs [2010], [2003], have argued that locality is in fact 
inconsistent with a realist or ontic interpretation of the quantum state. The 
aforementioned authors all assume that locality presupposes a principle of 
separability: that systems can be regarded as having separate existence insofar as 
they occupy different regions of space.8 One reason to regard separability as a 
necessary condition for locality derives from the principle of local interaction, 
according to which any adequate interpretation of quantum theory must include 
local beables in its ontology. It might be thought that nonseparability is incompatible 
with the existence of such local beables. This presents a prima facie difficulty, since 
                                                        
8 This view is also advocated in Norsen [2009]. 
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the principle of local causality is a cornerstone of quantum field theory, and the 
existence of quantum entanglement shows that separability fails in general for 
quantum systems. Nevertheless, it can be shown that the requirement of local 
causality does not presuppose separability, and the case can be made that quantum 
field theory, as standardly formulated, is locally causal. 
 Chapter 3, entitled ‘Evidence, Explanation and Ontic State Realism’, addresses 
the prospects for developing a subjective Bayesian interpretation of quantum 
mechanical probabilities. I begin by reviewing the classical subjectivist 
interpretation of probabilities due to de Finetti [1937], focusing in particular on de 
Finetti’s famous Representation Theorem. Crucial to de Finetti’s original proof of the 
theorem is the assumption of exchangeability, which says that the probabilities 
associated with a series of trials such as coin tosses are permutation symmetric.9 The 
de Finetti representation theorem guarantees that an agent who judges a sequence 
of coin tosses to be exchangeable will bet on the outcome of future coin tosses as if 
the coin has an objective but unknown probability. De Finetti famously interpreted 
this result as demonstrating the dispensability of the concept of objective chance.  
 It turns out that there is an analogous result pertaining to quantum mechanical 
experiments known as the ‘Quantum de Finetti Representation Theorem’. The 
Quantum Bayesians Caves, Fuchs and Schack [2002a] argue that the latter theorem 
                                                        
9 In fact, the exchangeability assumption can be relaxed to so-called ‘Markov exchangeability’, and the 
result still obtained. I will have more to say about the significance of this point in chapter 3. 
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shows that the concept of an unknown quantum state is itself dispensable. I identify 
an important explanatory gap in the Quantum Bayesian account. In particular, an 
important question presents itself: if the quantum state does not track physical 
states, then why are those experimenters who use quantum mechanics better able to 
negotiate the world than those who do not? According to Chris Fuchs, quantum 
mechanics places empirical constraints on the space of possible probability 
assignments, rather than determining those probabilities outright. Fuchs interprets 
the Born rule as an ‘empirical addition to Bayesian coherence’.10 From a realist 
perspective, the constraint on probability assignments is straightforward: it is 
derived from the fact that the objective quantum state assigns probabilities to 
experimental outcomes within that restricted set. This sort of explanation is 
obviously not available to the Quantum Bayesian; from an antirealist perspective, the 
constraint seems mysterious. 
 In chapter 4, ‘The Case for Quantum State Realism’, I attempt to articulate and 
defend the thesis of quantum state realism. I begin by defining the problematic as 
one of attempting to correctly identify the relationship between the mathematical 
formalism of quantum mechanics and the phenomena that the theory describes. An 
important recent result due to Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph [2011] places significant 
constraints on the space of epistemic or antirealist interpretations of the quantum 
state. While the PBR result does not show that antirealist interpretations are 
                                                        
10 Fuchs [2008]. 
13 
 
 
 
incompatible with the predictions of quantum mechanics, it does show that 
surprisingly modest assumptions are required to bring epistemic interpretations 
into conflict with the predictions of the theory. 
 One of the assumptions built into the PBR result is that systems prepared in a 
given quantum state have a well-defined set of physical properties. Antirealist 
interpretations that reject this assumption are therefore compatible with the PBR 
result. I argue that a compelling case for quantum state realism must therefore be 
made on more general grounds. I consider two concrete examples of quantum 
phenomena that strongly suggest that the quantum state is real. The first example 
concerns the phenomenon of interference in the famous two-slit experiment. The 
second example is derived from quantum chemistry and quantum crystallography.  
The examples are intended to illustrate the fact that changes in the wavefunction 
representing quantum systems in general correspond to physical changes in the 
systems in question.  
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Chapter 2: Critical Examination of Two Arguments for 
Quantum State Antirealism 
 
 
Collapse is something that happens in our description of the system, not to the system itself. Likewise, the time 
dependence of the wavefunction does not represent the evolution of a physical system. It only gives the evolution 
of our probabilities for the outcomes of potential experiments on that system. This is the only meaning of the 
wavefunction.11 
       Chris Fuchs and Asher Peres 
 
Introduction 
 
The purpose of the present chapter is to critically examine two kinds of argument that 
have been put forward in support of an antirealist interpretation of the quantum state. 
Broadly construed, quantum state antirealism is the thesis that the quantum state 
represents the beliefs or states of knowledge of observers, rather than objective 
features of a physical system. In the history of the debate over quantum foundations, 
antirealist interpretations have occupied a central position. Niels Bohr, for example, 
argues that quantum phenomena enforce a reexamination of the kinds of knowledge 
obtainable from physical systems. Such a reexamination is militated by the interaction 
between quantum objects and the macroscopic instruments used to conduct quantum 
                                                        
11 Fuchs and Peres [2000], p. 71. 
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experiments. Bohr notes that scientific knowledge can only be gained under 
‘reproducible and communicable conditions’, and given that, according to Bohr, such 
conditions are necessarily described by classical concepts which are the ‘refinement’ 
of the everyday concepts that make communication possible, we must also describe 
the results of actual experiments using such concepts. Bohr concludes that 
 
Just this circumstance [the necessity of classical description] implies that no result of an 
experiment concerning a phenomenon which, in principle, lies outside the range of  
 classical physics can be interpreted as giving information about independent properties  
 of objects.12 
 
Bohr’s antirealism is motivated by epistemological considerations. In Bohr’s view, the 
theoretical description of physical phenomena necessarily has recourse to classical 
concepts, despite the status of quantum phenomena as ‘lying outside the range of 
classical physics’. Such phenomena are ‘essentially determined by the interaction 
between the objects in question and the measuring instruments necessary for the 
definition of the experimental arrangement’.13 Knowledge of quantum systems is not, 
in Bohr’s view, divorceable from the experimental arrangements used to investigate 
them; in this sense such knowledge is inherently contextual. 
                                                        
12 Bohr [1938], p. 26. 
13 Ibid. 
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 Contextuality of itself does not entail that experimental results cannot be 
interpreted as giving information about independent properties of objects; such 
properties may be essentially non-classical in character. The premise that classical 
concepts are necessary for the description of phenomena is essential to Bohr’s 
conception of independent properties. The above quotation appears to imply that, for 
Bohr, classical concepts presuppose a sharp distinction between ‘the behavior of 
objects and the means of observation’14, and that such a distinction is incompatible 
with the ascription of independent properties to quantum systems. 
 Given that we have run up against phenomena that are essentially non-classical 
in character, we might wonder whether Bohr’s epistemological stance with respect to 
the privileged status of ‘classical’ concepts is too restrictive. Does the existence of 
quantum phenomena not militate against the retention of a strictly classical 
conceptual framework? Bohr famously answered this question in the negative, and 
concluded that the description of quantum phenomena can never be interpreted as 
providing genuine information about independent properties of quantum systems. 
Other physicists were less dogmatic, and open to the possibility of adopting a new 
conceptual scheme to describe the new physics. It is possible to interpret the 
inadequacy of classical concepts for the description of quantum phenomena such as 
the uncertainty principle as good grounds for seeking out new, non-classical concepts. 
This non-classicality need not commit us to an antirealist attitude toward quantum 
                                                        
14 ibid. 
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mechanical descriptions of phenomena. In correspondence with Bohr, Erwin 
Schrödinger writes that  
 
If you want to describe a system, e.g., a mass point by specifying its p and q, then you find that this 
description is only possible with a limited degree of accuracy. This seems to me very interesting as a 
limitation of the applicability of the old concepts of experience. But it seems to me imperative to 
demand the introduction of new concepts, in which this limitation no longer occurs. Since what is 
unobservable in principle should not at all be contained in our conceptual scheme, it should not be 
representable in terms of the latter. In the adequate conceptual scheme it ought no more to seem that 
our possibilities of experience are restricted through unfavorable circumstances.15 
 
This suggests that the quantum state description, which does not ascribe a definite but 
unknown position and momentum to a quantum system, may nevertheless be 
complete  if we abandon the idea, held dogmatically by Bohr, that quantum systems 
must be given a classical description.16 It is only the adherence to classical concepts 
that leads to the conclusion that there are features of reality not accessible to 
experience.  Bohr’s response invokes once again the necessity of ‘old experiential’ 
concepts: 
 
I am scarcely in complete agreement with your stress on the necessity of developing “new” concepts. 
Not only, as far as I can see, have we up to now no clues for such a re-arrangement, but the “old” 
                                                        
15 Bohr [1985]. 
16 This is the view defended in chapter 4 of the present work. 
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experiential concepts seem to me to be inseparably connected with the foundation of man’s power of 
visualizing. 
 
The invocation of ‘man’s powers of visualizing’ might suggest a psychological 
justification for the “necessity” of experiential concepts that is surely on dubious 
epistemological ground. How exactly are the limits of man’s powers of visualizing to 
be demarcated? Bohr was certainly aware of the existence of non-Euclidean 
geometries and their obvious utility in the formulation of relativistic space-time 
theories. The existence of such conceptual frameworks demonstrates that the 
generalization of concepts which are ‘visualizable’ (the concepts of Euclidean 
geometry) can be scientifically and explanatorily fruitful.17 Whether Bohr would have 
regarded non-Euclidean geometries as visualizable in the relevant sense is perhaps 
unclear; in any case, the history of the development of the special and general theories 
of relativity, and the 19th century geometry which undergirds the mathematical 
structure of these theories, is an object lesson for those philosophers who 
championed the necessity of existing concepts.  
 An enduring feature of Bohr’s treatment of the philosophy of quantum 
mechanics is the prominence given to the role of observation, understood as a 
macroscopic process receiving a classical description, in discussions of quantum 
                                                        
17 I do not wish to prejudge the question of whether or not, according to Bohr, non-euclidean 
geometries can be visualized in the relevant sense.  
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phenomena. Observation is implicated, for example, in the necessity of the interaction 
between quantum systems and the macroscopic measuring instruments necessary for 
the ‘definition of the experimental arrangement’.18 The use of everyday concepts, 
‘perhaps refined by the terminology of classical physics’, is mandated by the need to 
gain knowledge under reproducible and communicable conditions. The fact that there 
is an unavoidable interaction between quantum objects and the experimental 
apparatus implies that there is also an absolute limit, in Bohr’s view, to the extent to 
which it is possible to describe quantum systems in a manner independent of the 
means of observation. 
 It is reasonable to expect that the result of an observation may depend not only 
on the state of the system but also on the overall disposition of the apparatus. 
‘Measurement’ of an observable need not yield the same result independently of 
whether or not some other observable is measured simultaneously.19Nevertheless, 
Bohr’s antirealist attitude towards quantum systems, and his focus on the possibilities 
and limitations of observation, finds a modern echo in contemporary antirealist 
                                                        
18 Bohr [1938], p. 26. 
 
19 John S. Bell famously discusses, and criticizes, the non-contextuality assumption in von Neumann’s 
‘no hidden variables proof’ in Bell [1966]. See also von Neumann [1932] and Mermin [1993]. 
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interpretations of the quantum state.20 Many contemporary supporters of antirealist 
interpretations of the quantum state have made important contributions to the field of 
quantum information theory, and the information-theoretic constraints implied by 
quantum mechanics figure heavily in contemporary foundational discussions. What 
are the arguments in favor of quantum state antirealism that have emerged from this 
program? 
 In this chapter, I will critically examine two prevalent arguments for an 
antirealist interpretation of the quantum state. The first argument draws inspiration 
from the problem of measurement, and is hinted at in the quotation from Fuchs and 
Peres at the beginning of this chapter. The second argument derives from the 
phenomenon of quantum entanglement, and builds upon the famous Einstein, 
Podolski and Rosen (EPR) argument for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics.  
Chris Fuchs calls this ‘‘the cleanest argument I know that the quantum state is solely 
an expression of subjective information- the information one has about a quantum 
system’.21 It will be argued that neither of these arguments provides a compelling case 
against quantum state realism. 
 
                                                        
20 Cf.  Fuchs [2003], Caves Fuchs and Schack [2002], Fuchs and Peres [2000], Spekkens [2007]. For 
reasons to be discussed in chapter 4 of the present work, I do not consider Rovelli’s [1996] relationalist 
program to be antirealist. 
21 Fuchs [2003], p.  
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2.1 The Measurement Problem as Motivation for Quantum State 
Antirealism 
 
Antirealist interpretations of the quantum state do not so much solve the 
measurement problem as dissolve it altogether; the problem simply does not arise if 
the quantum state is not taken to represent objective features of physical systems. The 
measurement problem arises if one attempts to treat a measurement apparatus, like 
the things it measures, as a quantum system. Given that laboratory equipment is 
composed of particles that obey the laws of quantum mechanics, it seems reasonable 
to expect that such a treatment should at least in principle be possible.22 But if we 
describe the apparatus as a quantum system, its state at the end of an experiment will 
typically be a sum of terms corresponding to different experimental outcomes, with 
corresponding probabilities. To make this claim more precise, suppose that a 
quantum system is initially in the state . Typically, this state will be a linear 
superposition of different eigenstates of some observable. For simplicity, we assume 
that the observable in question can be represented by an operator in two-dimensional 
                                                        
22 Bohr would disagree that measuring devices can be treated as quantum mechanical, since the 
description of quantum phenomena that such devices provide necessarily has recourse to classical 
concepts . As we will see shortly, Bohr’s (I think ultimately incorrect) attitude finds a contemporary 
voice in the writings of Jeff Bub. 

S
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Hilbert space. It is a condition of adequacy for measurement that the post-
measurement state of the system correspond to an eigenstate of the observable in 
question: 
 
  
kkok
iioi
MSMS
MSMS


     (1) 
 
where iS and kS  are eigenstates of the corresponding operator. The initial state of 
the measuring apparatus is given by . The initial state of the combination of 
system and apparatus is therefore represented by the product vector: 
 
      (2) 
 
After a finite period of interaction, on the assumption of linear evolution of the 
combined system (2) according to the Schrödinger equation, the final state of the 
combined system and apparatus will in general be a superposition of different 
measurement outcomes: 
 
      (3) 
 

M0

initial  (a Si b Sk ) M0

final  a Si  Mi b Sk  Mk
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According to the standard collapse postulate, the actual outcome of the experiment 
will be either 

Si  Mi  or 

Sk  Mk  , with corresponding probabilities and , 
respectively. Such a ‘collapse’ to one or the other eigenstate involves a non-linear 
projection in violation of the linear Schrödinger dynamics. On the other hand, if the 
dynamics is taken to be complete and correct, then it seems that there are no 
determinate measurement outcomes as in (3), a state of affairs that seems prima facie 
irreconcilable with our experience.   
 Quantum state antirealists avoid the measurement problem by denying that 
the quantum state description of the measuring apparatus is an objective 
representation of the setup. Anton Zeilinger, for example, writes that  
 
If we accept that the quantum state is no more than a representation of the information we have, then 
the spontaneous change of the state upon observation, the so-called collapse or reduction of the wave 
packet, is just a very natural consequence of the fact that, upon observation, our information changes 
and therefore we have to change our representation of the information, that is, the quantum state. 23 
 
If it is true that the quantum state is just a ‘representation of information’ in 
Zeilinger’s sense, i.e., just a state of knowledge rather than a state of reality, then state 
collapse does not require a physical explanation, and the problem of measurement is 
reduced to the seemingly much more pedestrian problem of accounting for rational 
                                                        
23 Zeilinger [1999], p. S291. 

a
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2
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belief change in the context of information acquisition. An obvious candidate for 
modeling rational belief revision in this context is Bayesian conditionalization. I will 
now consider two related but distinct recent proposals for addressing the 
measurement problem explicitly in a subjective Bayesian framework, the first due to 
Jeff Bub, the second due to Chris Fuchs.24 
 
Bub on the ‘Two Dogmas of Quantum Mechanics’ 
 
Jeff Bub argues that the measurement problem is an artifact of what he and Itamar 
Pitowsky have identified as ‘two dogmas of quantum mechanics’.25The first dogma, 
defended by John S.  Bell, is that the concept of measurement should not be introduced 
as a primitive into the formulation of our most fundamental physical theories. Instead, 
measurement processes should be describable in terms of the dynamical laws of the 
theory, if only in principle.26The second dogma is quantum state realism: the view that 
the quantum state is a representation of physical reality. The second dogma leads to 
what Pitowsky has called the ‘big measurement problem’, which I have outlined 
above, namely the problem of reconciling determinate measurement outcomes with 
                                                        
24See Fuchs [2003], [2008] and Bub [2007]. See also Bub and Pitowsky [2010] and Pitowsky [2002]. 
25 See Bub [2007], Bub and Pitowsky [2010]. 
26 For a discussion of the problems raised by the word ‘measurement’ in discussions of quantum 
mechanics see Bell [1990]. 
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the fundamental dynamics of quantum theory.27As Bub points out, the von Neumann 
collapse postulate does not provide a solution to the measurement problem if such a 
solution is to be given in essentially dynamical terms while also respecting the first 
dogma, prohibiting a split between accounts of  measurement and non-measurement 
processes in the theory.28 
According to Bub, the first, ‘against measurement’, dogma is called into 
question by the no-cloning theorem.  
 
Now, the first dogma is called into question if, as a contingent matter of fact, there is a 
limitation on copying information-if the dynamical implementation of a universal 
cloning machine is in principle excluded by structural features of events. In a ‘no 
cloning’ world, as I will show below, no complete dynamical account of a measurement 
process is possible in general: ultimately, a measuring instrument in a quantum 
measurement process…produces a probability distribution over distinguishable 
measurement outcomes, and how the individual outcomes come about is not subject to 
further dynamical analysis.29 
 
                                                        
27 Pitowsky [2006] 
28 Examples of theories that respect both Dogmas include the Bohm theory and the GRW theory. Both 
theories furnish a dynamical account of the objective evolution of quantum states that is universal in 
scope, i.e., includes measurement processes. 
29 Bub [2007], p.236. 
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According to Bub, if it is impossible to implement a universal cloning machine for 
quantum states, then no ‘complete’ dynamical account of measurement processes can 
in principle be given. A measuring instrument acts as a source of classical information 
by producing a probability distribution over distinguishable measurement outcomes. 
Quantum mechanics does not furnish an account of how individual measurement 
outcomes come about, and therefore the measurement process is at this stage not 
amenable to further dynamical description; in this sense measurement processes are 
‘irreducibly statistical’.  
 Two comments are immediately in order. The first is that, according to Bub, the 
unavailability of a dynamical implementation of a universal cloning machine is 
already enough to rule out the first dogma, that measurement should not be 
introduced as a primitive into quantum theory. The second comment concerns the 
notion of a ‘complete’ dynamical account. If the unavailability of such an account turns 
on the irreducibly statistical character of measurement events, as Bub suggests, then a 
dynamical account is incomplete just in case it fails to be deterministic. But this seems 
to leave open the possibility of a nondeterministic dynamical account of 
measurement.30 I will return to this point shortly. 
                                                        
30 Note that I do not mean to suggest that moving to a stochastic dynamics that recovers the predictions 
of quantum mechanics might allow for the possibility of cloning unknown states. The point I wish to 
emphasize is that a dynamical account of measurement is not ruled out by the no-cloning theorem. 
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The no-cloning theorem is a result that forbids the creation of identical copies 
of an arbitrary unknown quantum state. Suppose that the initial state of a system we 
wish to copy is given by 
A
 .  In order to copy this system, we form a composite 
system
BA
r  , where  
B
r  is a second (independent) system with the same state 
space as 
A
 . We wish to perform a unitary operation on 
BA
r such that 
 
BABA
rU  
.
 
 
Suppose that the same unitary operation also clones a second vector 
A
  :  
 
  
BABA
rU  
.
 
 
for all possible states φ in the state space. Since U is unitary, it preserves inner 
products, and therefore  
 
BAABBAABBAAB
rUUrrr   †
.  (4) 
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On the assumption that the states in question are normalized, we have 
2
  , 
implying that the quantum states   and   are either identical or orthogonal. Hence 
performing a unitary operation cannot clone a general quantum state. 
As an example, consider a quantum controlled-not gate for qubits. The 
controlled-not gate is able to perform unitary transformations on a given set of input 
quantum states delivered by some information source. The quantum controlled-not 
gate is able to produce copies of orthogonal input states ∣0〉 and ∣1〉, but will in general 
fail to reproduce superpositions of these basis states. This is because a unitary 
transformation performed on a quantum state in a superposition will in general lead 
to an entangled state: 
 
    
 
Unless the  are equal to 0 or 1. 
 If quantum mechanics is taken to be both complete and correct, then it follows 
that no dynamical account of the measurement process is possible whereby the 
outcomes of measurements can be predicted with certainty. Bub concludes that ‘there 
must always be some system involved in the process, taken as the ultimate measuring 
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instrument, that functions simply as a classical information source in Shannon’s 
sense’.31 
 The argument runs as follows. Suppose that an information source produces a 
quantum state. Call this state the ‘source state’. Suppose further that there exists a 
device capable of unambiguously identifying the source state by means of some 
dynamical transformation. We can imagine a measurement device interacting with the 
source state to produce a distinguishable state that is itself a record of the source 
state. Call this latter state the ‘measurement state’. If we assume that any known state 
can be produced from  a (suitably chosen) reference state by means of some 
dynamical evolution, then we need only use the measuring device to identify the 
output of the information source, and perform a dynamical evolution on the resulting 
measurement state to clone the source state. The impossibility of such an unrestricted 
cloning device entails that it is impossible to produce an arbitrary measurement state 
by deterministic dynamical evolution, and therefore that a measurement device, 
understood as a device that produces distinguishable measurement outcomes, must 
do so stochastically.  
Bub draws the following moral from the no-cloning theorem: 
 
                                                        
31 Bub[2007], p. 242. 
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 To sum up: if ‘no cloning’ is accepted as a fundamental principle, then our world must 
be such that there is no dynamical account of the individual occurrence of the outcome 
of a quantum measurement, which is to say that the world is ‘irreducibly statistical’.32 
 
This quotation suggests that a dynamical account of measurement must be 
deterministic. If the only available dynamics is unitary Schrödinger evolution, then 
this assimilation of dynamics to determinism might seem justified. Indeed, that a 
purely dynamical account of the measurement process that takes as its starting point 
the completeness and correctness of quantum mechanics has to fail is perhaps not 
surprising.33 This state of affairs is precisely what led John Bell to famously remark 
that ‘either the wave function, as given by the Schrödinger equation, is not everything, 
or it is not right.’34Bub identifies the nexus of the difficulty not in the dynamics of the 
theory but in our attitude towards the dynamics. In particular, it is the dogmas of 
quantum state realism and the search for a dynamical explanation of all quantum 
mechanical phenomena, including the measurement process, that gets us into trouble 
with the ‘big measurement problem’. It is only if we insist on the possibility of cloning 
(i.e., that the wavefunction as given by the Schrödinger equation is both complete and 
                                                        
32 Ibid., p. 243. 
33 Except, perhaps, to an Everettian. 
34 Bell [2004], p. 201. 
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correct) that we are led to the impression of a foundational difficulty in the theory of 
quantum measurement. 
 Bub suggests that the first dogma, that measurement should never be 
introduced as a primitive into a fundamental physical theory, is called into question by 
the no-cloning theorem. If a dynamical account of measurement is in principle 
unavailable, then the concept of measurement must continue to occupy a privileged 
foundational role. Of course, one may accept this conditional statement while rejecting 
both antecedent and consequent. It can be interpreted as strong motivation to 
continue the search for a more adequate dynamical account of the measurement 
process.  
 The motivation for what Bub and Pitowsky call the ‘first dogma of quantum 
mechanics’ is not, at root, a predilection for dynamical explanations of all physical 
phenomena. One can accept the first dogma while also accepting that there are, for 
example, perfectly good examples of kinematical explanations. Rather, the goal is to 
try to find a formulation of our most fundamental dynamical theory which does not 
contain, within its own formulation, a privileged role for observers. Presumably the 
interactions between systems and observers are fundamentally amenable to a 
physical description, insofar as observers are themselves physical systems. But by 
introducing observation as a primitive concept into the formulation of the theory, we 
create a division of the world into ‘systems’ and ‘observers’ without providing a 
principled account of where this division is to be affected. This introduces an 
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uncomfortable arbitrariness into the theory with respect to the question of scope. The 
point is expressed succinctly in the following quotation from John Bell: 
 
The concepts ‘system’, ‘apparatus’, ‘environment’, immediately imply an artificial division of the world, 
and an intention to neglect, or take only schematic account of, the interaction across the split…Einstein 
said that it is theory that decides what is ‘observable’. I think he was right- ‘observation’ is a 
complicated and theory-laden business. Then that notion should not appear in the formulation of 
fundamental theory.35  
 
Chapter 4 of the present work is concerned to defend the ‘second dogma of 
quantum mechanics’, namely quantum state realism. There are two comments that 
can be made immediately with respect to Bub’s diagnosis of the measurement 
problem. The first is that Bub’s rejection of the first dogma does not so much solve the 
measurement problem as elevate it to the status of a constitutive principle. Rejecting 
this dogma is not simply a matter of giving up on the possibility of a complete 
dynamical account of measurement in terms of the linear Schrödinger dynamics. One 
can hold the view that measurement processes are stochastic while also maintaining a 
realist attitude with respect to the quantum state. This is achieved, for example, by 
dynamical collapse models. The important point is that it is possible to furnish a 
physical description of measurement processes within a realist framework if we allow 
for a slightly less restrictive notion of dynamics than simply ‘unitary Schrödinger 
                                                        
35 Bell [1989]. Reprinted in Bell [2004], p. 215. 
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evolution’. In other words, it is not the case that measurement processes are 
necessarily distinct from dynamical processes and must therefore be postulated 
separately. To accept the latter view  would be tantamount to biting off much more 
than simply ‘measurement processes are irreducibly statistical’. 
 Secondly, Bub compares the attempts to grapple with the measurement 
problem to the historical attempts to provide a dynamical account of length 
contraction in the context of special relativity. Bub writes: 
 
 Putting it differently, a solution to the big measurement problem, say along the lines of 
Bohm’s hidden variable theory, is simply an attempt to provide a dynamical explanation 
for ‘no cloning’. It is analogous to Lorentz’s attempt to provide a dynamical explanation 
for length contraction in terms of distortions that occur to bodies as they move through 
the ether.36 
 
Just as Lorentz sought to explain length contraction in terms of dynamical distortions 
in bodies moving through a mechanical ether, so contemporary quantum foundations 
‘dogmatists’ attempt to furnish a dynamical account of measurement.  But the analogy 
is not apt. In the case of the special theory of relativity, the combination of the light 
postulate, according to which the speed of light is independent of the source, and the 
principle of relativity, according to which the laws of physics are Lorentz invariant, is 
                                                        
36 Bub [2007], p. 242. 
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sufficient to explain the observed phenomena of time dilation and length contraction. 
What emerges from a conceptual analysis of these two postulates is that there is no 
need to postulate a relation of absolute simultaneity. It is not clear that the 
phenomena in question are explained on purely kinematical grounds, since the 
explanation draws upon, among other things, the behavior of light rays and the 
description of intermolecular forces within solid bodies. In any case, the theory is 
uncontroversially self-consistent; if the forces governing the behavior of solid bodies 
are Lorentz cavariant, then rods in motion relative to a given rest frame will contract. 
 By contrast, the attempts to find a solution to the measurement problem in 
quantum mechanics are motivated by an apparent inconsistency between the 
dynamics of the theory (unitary Schrödinger evolution) and observed determinate 
measurement outcomes. By making the apparatus part of the system and describing it 
quantum mechanically, we simply move the ‘cut’ between system and apparatus by 
subsuming the combined system+apparatus under a higher level of description. This 
is a state of affairs that requires interpretation; the presence of the cut in the 
formulation of the theory is problematic if we want to hold onto the idea that it is our 
fundamental theories themselves that determine what counts as a measurement 
event. If observation is not to be accorded a privileged status as a process not 
governed by the Schrödinger dynamics, then a dynamical account of measurement 
must be sought that addresses this apparent tension. None of these difficulties are 
present in the case of special relativity.  It is possible to give a rigorous and consistent 
account of measurement processes in special relativity that is lacking in the standard 
35 
 
 
 
formulation of quantum mechanics. It is clearly desirable to find a theory capable of 
accounting for both measurement processes and ordinary (unitary) dynamics, 
thereby providing a unified picture of the physical world. 
  
Fuchs on Quantum Measurement as Bayesian Updating 
 
Chris Fuchs also addresses the measurement problem explicitly in his “Quantum 
mechanics as quantum information (and only a little bit more)”. According to Fuchs’ 
account, quantum states represent the beliefs of agents interacting with quantum 
systems, and hence collapse is just a special case of belief updating: 
 
Up to an overall unitary ‘readjustment’ of one’s final probabilistic beliefs-the readjustment takes into 
account one’s initial state for the system as well as one’s description of the measurement interaction-
quantum collapse is precisely Bayesian conditionalization.37  
 
If it were true that quantum collapse is ‘precisely Bayesian conditionalization’, and 
nothing more, then the problem of measurement would seem to be banished 
                                                        
37 Fuchs [2002]. arXiv e-print quant-ph/0205039, p. 8. Later published as Fuchs [2003]. 
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altogether.38 Unfortunately, as Fuchs acknowledges, it is not. Fuchs writes about 
quantum measurement: 
 
A quantum measurement is any “I know not what” that generates an application of Bayes’ rule to one’s 
beliefs for the outcomes of a standard quantum measurement-that is, a decomposition of the initial 
state into a convex combination of other states and then a final “choice” (decided by the world, not the 
observer) within that set.39 
 
The decomposition of the initial state Fuchs refers to is a decomposition of the state ρ 
into a weighted sum of normalized density operators    :  
 
        (5) 
 
We are asked to imagine an observer refining his initial state of belief by choosing a 
term from this sum corresponding to the “data” collected. This is followed by a ‘mental 
readjustment’ of the observer’s beliefs which, according to Fuchs, ‘takes into account 
details both of the measurement interaction and the observer’s initial quantum state’. 
                                                        
38 Fuchs writes: ‘The formal similarities between Bayes’ rule and quantum collapse may be telling us 
how to finally cut the Gordian knot of the measurement problem. Namely, it may be telling us that it is 
simply not a problem at all! Indeed, drawing on the analogies between the two theories, one is left with 
a spark of insight: perhaps the better part of quantum mechanics is simply ‘law of thought’’. 
39 Ibid., p. 38. 
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This mental readjustment stage is unitary and hence information preserving, and 
leads to the post-measurement state : 
 
        (6) 
 
Where   is a unitary operation. 
 According to the standard treatment which Fuchs criticizes, mixed quantum 
states represent states of ensembles whose components are in different pure states, 
or states of individual systems about which we have only incomplete knowledge.  In 
the latter case, the weight attached to a given pure state reflects the epistemic 
probability assigned to the proposition that the given system is in that pure state. In 
the standard representation, a mixed state is therefore associated with both objective 
and epistemic probabilities. When a measurement is performed, the state collapses to 
an eigenstate of the associated observable, and information is gained about the nature 
of the state in question. Measurement processes therefore involve a combination of 
updating and collapse.  
 In the case where

  is a pure state, knowledge of the state is complete, and the 
process of measurement involves a pure disturbance of the system into a new pure 
state. Fuchs comments on this standard collapse picture for pure states: 
 
Let us take a moment to think about this special case in isolation. What is distinctive 
about it is that it captures in the extreme a common folklore associated with the 
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measurement process. For it tends to convey the image that measurement is a kind of 
gut-wrenching violence: In one moment the state is   , while in the very next it 
is iii  . Moreover, such a wild transition does not depend upon the details of 
and i ; in particular the two states may be almost orthogonal to one another. In density 
operator language, there is no sense in which Πi is contained in ρ; the two states are in 
distinct places of the operator space. That is, 
 
     
i
iiP )( .40 
 
Fuchs now contrasts this standard measurement ‘folklore’ with the general 
framework for information gathering in Bayesian probability theory. Suppose Alice’s 
initial state of belief is captured by

P(h)  for some hypothesis 

h . Suppose that Alice 
subsequently acquires some new piece of information 

d . We can capture the idea that 
Alice conditionalizes on the new evidence by expanding 

P(h)  in terms of the joint 
probability distribution 

P(h,d)  and choosing the term corresponding to the new 
evidence 

d: 
 
  

P(h)  P(h d)
di
 P(d) d P(h d)     (7) 
 
                                                        
40 Fuchs [2002], pp. 29-30. 
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The left side of equation (7) is just a partition of the event space, with 

P(h d)
representing the new state of belief in light of the acquired evidence

d . The 
decomposition of the initial state into a convex sum, combined with the picture of 
Bayesian updating as picking out the conditional probability from the sum, suggests a 
possible strategy for drawing a formal analogy between quantum measurement and 
Bayesian updating.  
Fuchs now asks:  
Why does quantum collapse not look more like Bayes’ rule? Is quantum collapse 
really a more violent kind of change, or might it be an artifact of a problematic 
representation?41  
 
As a first step toward answering this question, we might attempt to represent the 
initial quantum state as a convex sum of post measurement states : 
   
        (8) 
 
Performing a measurement on  would then yield an outcome m, allowing us to ‘pick 
off’ the post-measurement state of the system . Hence the transition from pre- to 
post-measurement state would take the form  in analogy with the transition 
from  in a classical Bayesian setting.  
                                                        
41 Ibid., p. 30 
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 Unfortunately the analogy with classical updating breaks down, because in 
general the initial state  cannot be represented in the form , where is 
the post-measurement state. However, it is possible to express  as a sum (though not 
generally of post-measurement states) by defining the state 
 
          (9) 
 
Where the  are effect operators.42 Using this definition, Fuchs rewrites  as 
 
          (10) 
 
Where we have used the fact that 
 
2/12/12/12/1  
m
mEI      (11) 
The picture of measurement that emerges from this framework is as follows. Suppose 
that Alice’s initial (pre-measurement) quantum state is given by . Upon 
                                                        
42 Here the positive operator valued measure (POVM) formalism is being used. Each effect operator  
is associated with a measurement outcome m, and satisfies the completeness condition that the set of 
such operators sums to the identity. Furthermore, according to the (generalized) Born rule, the 
probability of obtaining a measurement outcome m is given by .  
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measurement, Alice observes the outcome m. Alice updates her beliefs by selecting  
from the sum (10). In general  will not, however, equal any post-measurement 
states . This is where the analogy with classical conditioning breaks down.43In 
order to recover , Fuchs introduces a second step into the picture. At this stage, 
Alice must perform a ‘mental readjustment’ on her ‘refined belief’  in order to 
arrive at the post-measurement state . Fuchs represents this final adjustment by a 
unitary operator  such that 
 
        (12) 
 
Hence the overall picture that emerges of the measurement process consists of two 
parts. In the first stage, an agent refines their beliefs by selecting the state  from the 
sum given on the right side of (10). Next, the agent performs a unitary adjustment on 
, thereby transforming it into the post-measurement state . Fuchs writes that 
‘quantum measurement is nothing more, and nothing less, than a refinement and a 
readjustment of one's initial state of belief.’44 The latter mental readjustment is 
supposed to ‘take into account details both of the measurement interaction and of the 
observer’s initial quantum state’.45The justification given for this factorization of the 
                                                        
43 The discussion that follows is indebted to Palge and Konrad [2008]. 
44 Fuchs [2002], p. 22. 
45 Fuchs [2002], p.22. 
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measurement process is based on the observation that the input and output states are 
those of the standard quantum mechanical formalism.46 
 Does this picture succeed in demonstrating that the ‘gut-wrenching violence’ 
associated with collapse is an ‘artifact of a problematic represention’? Certainly Fuchs 
has dressed quantum measurement in formal garb that more closely resembles 
classical Bayesian updating. What is initially surprising is the apparent lack of a formal 
analog of von Neumann collapse in the formalism given in equations (8) through (12). 
What we have instead is Bayesian style belief refinement followed by a unitary 
evolution. But of course collapse is non-unitary. How then is Fuchs’ treatment able to 
recover the post-measurement state ? Formally, the trick is accomplished by 
associating a distinct unitary operator with every  associated with a belief 
refinement (see equation (9)). This association is mandated by the fact that unitary 
transformations are bijective; if the final state  is to be recovered from each distinct 
 for which the probability of  is non-zero, we will need a distinct  
corresponding to each of the possible  to accomplish the task. 
 What is it about the details of the measurement interaction that guides this 
unitary ‘mental readjustment’ in the second stage of measurement?  Since unitary 
transformations conserve the von Neumann entropy, there can be no increase in 
information at this stage.47 Instead, we are asked to imagine the measuring  device 
                                                        
46 Fuchs calls the factorization a ‘purely conceptual game’. (Fuchs [2002], p. 34). 
47 For a discussion of the von Neumann entropy, see Fuchs [2002], p. 31-32. 
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‘enforcing a further ‘back action’ or ‘feedback’ on the measured system’, although, 
since the factorization of measurement into refinement and readjustment is a purely 
conceptual game, nothing crucial is supposed to hang on this intuitive picture. 
Consider the special case where the observer’s state of belief is represented by a pure 
state   . In this case, no measurement can refine the state of belief, since for 
any dE , the terms in equation (11) simply reduce to 
 
 )(2/12/1 dPEd       (13) 
 
Since pure states are states of maximal information, measurements on such states are 
purely of the mental readjustment sort.  Fuchs writes: 
 
The only state change that can come about from a measurement [of a pure state] must 
be purely of the mental readjustment sort: We learn nothing new; we just change what 
we can predict as a consequence of the side effects of our experimental intervention. 
That is to say, there is a sense in which the measurement is solely disturbance.48 
 
It deserves to be said that in the pure state case, belief refinement drops out 
altogether. But the state change brought about by measurement on a pure state is in 
                                                        
48 Ibid., Pg. 34 
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general not unitary.49 On the other hand, on Fuchs’ account, a measurement on a pure 
state is entirely of the ‘mental readjustment’ sort, the essential consequence of the 
measurement interaction is to change the predictions that can be made about the 
system, and involves no information gain. The measurement disturbs the system into 
a new pure state, and the mechanism of this disturbance is governed by the von 
Neumann collapse postulate. Crucially, the disturbance in question cannot be the 
result of a dynamical interaction governed by the Schrödinger equation between the 
system and the measuring apparatus, since such an interaction would lead to an 
entangled state, and not to the state obtained by a ‘mental readjustment’. Nor can it be 
modeled as an instance of classical Bayesian belief refinement. Hence collapse has not 
been eliminated after all in Fuchs’ representation; it remains as an ‘uncontrollable 
disturbance’ that is not merely an ‘artifact of a problematic represention’, as is seen 
most clearly in the case of a pure state. For pure states, Fuchs’ ‘mental readjustment’ is 
precisely what is normally regarded as collapse. The collapse postulate captures 
formally what from a physical point of view appears to be a physical process not 
governed by the usual Schrödinger dynamics. 50 This is, of course, the measurement 
                                                        
49 Fuchs writes: ‘In Particular, when the POVM is an orthogonal set of projection operators 
}{ iii  and the state-change mechanism is the von Neumann collapse postulate, this simply 
corresponds to a readjustment according to the unitary operators iU i  .’ As Palge and Konrad 
[2008] point out, however, the latter operator is not unitary. 
50 I do not wish to beg the question against Everettian interpretations. 
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problem. Fuchs’ picture of mental readjustment suggests, misleadingly, that the state 
transition in question can be regarded as a mere change of belief.  
 Hence there is a basic philosophical worry associated with Fuchs’ picture. 
Fuchs introduces the above formalism, at least in part, to address the measurement 
problem in an antirealist setting.  Fuchs writes: 
  
The formal similarities between Bayes’ rule and quantum collapse may be telling us 
how to finally cut the Gordian knot of the measurement problem. Namely, it may be 
telling us that it is simply not a problem at all!   
 
Modulo a final readjustment, quantum collapse is supposed to be Bayesian updating, 
and this is supposed to alleviate our worries about accounting for the pre- and post-
measurement states of a quantum system, since ‘quantum collapse is something that 
happens in our description of the system, not to the system itself’.51 As we have seen, 
the problem with Fuchs’ picture is that the post-measurement state is not generally 
available in the form of a term in equation (8) above. Nor is there a way to recover the 
post-measurement state using the resources of Bayesian updating alone. In the case of 
pure states, belief refinement drops out altogether and we are left once again with a 
picture of uncontrollable disturbance. 
                                                        
51 Fuchs and Peres [2000], p. 71 
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Fuchs’ treatment of mixed states, involving information acquisition and 
corresponding belief refinement, is also problematic. If the post-measurement state 
were contained in (8), we would seem to be off to the races; quantum measurement 
could then be recovered as a special case of Bayesian ‘refinement’ of prior belief, 
updated in light of the new evidence associated with measurement outcomes. But 
since  is not in general a post-measurement state, it is difficult to see how it could 
be ‘decided by the world’, to use Fuchs’ phrase. The difficulty is only placed in sharper 
relief by consideration of the fact that the map taking  into  is nonlinear, and is 
therefore outside of the space of state transitions allowed by the standard 
Schrödinger evolution. If  is neither a post-measurement state nor a state reachable 
by the standard formalism, then in what sense can it be said to be decided by the 
world? There does not appear to be any physical motivation for invoking the 
intermediary belief refinement state . Furthermore, the final mental readjustment 
that takes us from  to   is left essentially unjustified. Since the relevant 
transformation is unitary it is also information-preserving, and so cannot be taken to 
contribute to learning. Instead we are invited to imagine a feedback mechanism in the 
measuring apparatus. Given the purely conceptual character of the factorization of the 
measurement process, it is doubtful that much weight can be attached to such a back-
reaction picture. 
 We must therefore conclude that Fuchs has not succeeded in addressing the 
measurement problem by recasting the projection postulate as a special case of 
Bayesian updating. Measurement events result in state transitions that do not appear 
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to be governed by the Schrödinger dynamics. This is a state of affairs that ought to 
trouble anyone who is convinced that measurement interactions, qua physical events, 
ought to be amenable to quantum mechanical description. Simply recasting quantum 
states as states of belief does not address the problem, since the agent who performs a 
measurement on a quantum system finds that the post-measurement state is, to use 
Fuchs’ phrase, ‘decided by the world’.52 The limiting case of measurement on a pure 
state brings this point into particularly sharp relief.  
In recent work (Fuchs [2010], [2009]), Fuchs describes the Born rule as an 
‘empirical addition to Bayesian coherence’, acknowledging explicitly that Born rule 
probabilities obtained from the quantum state are constrained by empirical 
conditions that go beyond the purely rational constraints imposed by Dutch book 
coherence. I will have more to say about Fuchs’ interpretation of the Born rule in 
chapter 3 below. 
 
2.2  Is Locality Incompatible with Quantum State Realism?  
 
Einstein’s Incompleteness argument and Quantum State Antirealism 
 
                                                        
52 I will have more to say about this point in chapter 3. 
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In Albert Einstein: Philosopher Scientist, Einstein presents an indirect argument for the 
incompleteness of quantum mechanics and the quantum state description of physical 
reality.53 Many contemporary authors have drawn inspiration from Einstein’s original 
argument, combined with the subsequently discovered ‘no-go’ theorems due to Bell, 
Kochen and Spekker, to conclude that the quantum state must be interpreted 
epistemically. Chris Fuchs identifies Einstein’s incompleteness argument as ‘the 
cleanest argument I know that the quantum state is solely an expression of subjective 
information-the information one has about a quantum system’.54 According to Fuchs, 
the argument demonstrates both the incompleteness of quantum mechanics and the 
subjectivity of the quantum state.55 In a recent paper, Nicholas Harrigan and Robert 
Spekkens build on this interpretation of the significance of Einstein’s argument. The 
authors write that ‘Einstein showed that not only is locality inconsistent with [the 
quantum state]  being a complete description of reality, it is also inconsistent with 
 being ontic.’ The purpose of the present section is to evaluate the claim made by 
                                                        
53 The argument presented in the Schilpp volume simplifies significantly the argument put forward 
originally in Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen [1935]. I will refer to the latter paper as the EPR paper in 
subsequent discussion. 
54 Fuchs [2003], p. 5. 
55 Although, as will become clear, Fuchs has in mind a different notion of completeness than the EPR 
criterion. See also chapter 3 of the present work. 

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these authors that locality is inconsistent with a realist or ontic interpretation of the 
quantum state. 
Einstein’s argument in the Schilpp volume attempts to derive a contradiction 
from the assumption of completeness and the claim that the state of a physical system 
S1 does not depend on the kind of measurement performed on a spatially separated 
system S2. Einstein asks us to imagine that S1 and S2 initially interact with one another 
and are subsequently separated:  
 
Now it appears to me that one may speak of the real state of the partial system S2. To begin with, 
before performing the measurement on S1, we know even less of this real state than we know of 
a system described by the  - function. But on one assumption we should, in my opinion, hold 
fast: The real situation (state) of system S2 is independent of what is done with system S1, which 
is spatially separated from the former. According to the type of measurement I perform on S1, I 
get, however, a very different 2 for the second partial system…But now the real state of S2 must 
be independent of what happens to S1. Thus, different  -functions can be found (depending on 
the choice of the measurement on S1) for the same real state of S2. (One can only avoid this 
conclusion either by assuming that the measurement on S1 changes (telepathically) the real state 
of S2, or by generally denying independent real states to things which are spatially separated 
from each other. Both alternatives appear to me entirely unacceptable.)56 
 
Einstein concludes that the -function cannot be a complete description of the 
physical situation, since different -functions are associated with system S2 
                                                        
56 Schilpp, A. (ed.), [1949] p. 84-85 
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depending on the sort of measurement carried out on S1. Einstein assumes that partial 
systems have real states, and that these states are amenable to physical description. It 
is clear that two distinct and correct quantum mechanical representations of the same 
physical state are implicated in the scenario Einstein describes depending on the type 
of measurement performed.57 This seems to entail that the quantum mechanical 
description associated with either measurement is at best incomplete.  
The incompleteness conclusion is not forced on us as a matter of logic, as 
Einstein acknowledges. We can avoid the incompleteness conclusion by assuming an 
instantaneous ‘telepathic’ influence of one system on the other upon measurement, or 
by denying ‘independent real existence’ to both systems insofar as they occupy 
different regions of space. In other words, in order to avoid the incompleteness 
conclusion, we must reject at least one of the following propositions: 
 
i)Subluminal causation: there cannot be a faster-than-light causal interaction 
between spatially separated regions S1 and S2; or 
  
ii) S1 and S2 can be regarded as having independent real states insofar as they 
occupy different regions of space.  
                                                        
57 Reacting to this consequence of the argument, Erwin Schrödinger writes: “It is rather discomforting 
that the theory should allow a system to be steered or piloted into one or the other type of state at the 
experimenter’s mercy in spite of his having no access to it.” (Schrödinger [1935], p. 555). 
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I will follow Howard (1985) in referring to (i) as the ‘locality principle’ and (ii) as the 
‘separability principle’. Einstein held that the rejection of either of these principles 
would involve a radical reformulation of physics as we know it, enforcing a 
reconsideration of basic suppositions about the formulation and testing of physical 
theory. Here is a quotation from a 1948 Dialectica article in which Einstein expresses 
serious reservations about abandoning separability: 
 
Without such an assumption of the mutually independent existence ... of spatially distant things, an 
assumption which originates in everyday thought, physical thought in the sense familiar to us would 
not be possible. Nor does one see how physical laws could be formulated and tested without such a 
clean separation.58 
 
At the time of Einstein’s writing, the available empirical evidence did not rule out a 
local hidden variable theory as the most obvious explanation of the statistical 
character of quantum mechanics. More crucially, it was not known at the time that the 
empirical predictions of quantum mechanics are in fact incompatible with such an 
explanation. Einstein therefore understandably chose to interpret quantum 
mechanics as an incomplete theory, awaiting supplementation by a hidden variable 
                                                        
58 Translation from Howard [1985], pp. 171-201. 
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framework that would explain the probabilities computed from the quantum state in 
terms of incompletely known degrees of freedom. 
It is worth emphasizing that the locality and separability principles are 
logically independent of one another. This implies that it is possible to construct a 
local, nonseparable physical theory. Theories that admit entanglement as a basic 
feature of the physical world but which deny the possibility of superluminal causation 
are in this category. The EPR scenario Einstein presents above is amenable to such a 
theoretical description.  If the quantum state is interpreted realistically, then 
entanglement between S1 and S2 implies nonseparability, even in the absence of a 
mechanical interaction between the two subsystems when a measurement is carried 
out on either.59  
 
The Bell Factorizability Condition and Locality 
 
The possibility of interpreting the phenomenon of quantum entanglement as an 
instance of nonseparability raises the question of whether nonseparable theories can 
                                                        
59 This may (or may not) be what Bohr [1935] has in mind when he writes: ‘Of course there is in a case 
like that just considered no question of a mechanical disturbance of the system under investigation 
during the last critical stage of the measuring procedure. But even at this stage there is essentially the 
question of an influence on the very conditions which define the possible types of predictions regarding 
the future behaviour of the system.’  
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be made relativistic. Bell’s theorem is often glossed as precluding the possibility of a 
‘local hidden variable theory’.60 This does not rule out a relativistic interpretation of 
quantum theory which is not of the hidden variable sort. The locality assumption in 
Bell’s Theorem can be expressed formally as the so-called ‘Bell factorizability 
condition’, which is a constraint on the probabilities associated with measurement 
outcomes performed at spacelike separation:61 
 
       (14) 
 
Where a and b are measurements performed on S1 and S2, respectively, s and t are the 
outcomes of those measurements, and m is the ‘complete state’, containing all of the 
properties of the pair (S1, S2). This factorization condition can be used to derive a Bell-
type inequality. What Bell’s theorem and subsequent empirical tests show is that any 
empirically viable theory must violate condition (14) by predicting correlations 
between distant measurement outcomes not attributable to common causes in the 
past light cones of S1 and S2. Jarrett [1984] has shown that condition (14) is equivalent 
to the conjunction of two logically independent conditions, most commonly labeled 
‘outcome independence’ and ‘parameter ‘independence’62. Outcome independence is 
                                                        
60 Cf. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bell-theorem/ 
61 Adapted from Shimony [2009]. 
62 This terminology is due to Shimony [1984]. 
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the condition that, once all common causes have been screened off, the experimental 
outcomes on S1 do not change the probabilities associated with those on S2:  
 
         (15) 
 
Parameter (or remote context) independence is the condition that the probabilities 
associated with outcomes on S1 do not depend on the setting of S2:  
 
  .        (16) 
 
The equivalence of these independence conditions with the BF condition (14) entails 
that any theory that recovers the empirical predictions of quantum mechanics must 
violate at least one of these conditions.   
 If one regards relativity as implying that events at spacelike separation must be 
statistically independent of one another, in the sense that the probabilities associated 
with joint outcomes at S1 and S2 are just the product of their individual occurrences, 
the empirically well-established violations of Bell’s inequality rule out a genuinely 
relativistic interpretation of quantum theory. It can be argued, however, that relativity 
does not entail such strong claims about separability. Instead, what is required for a 
genuinely relativistic theory is the imposition of a certain kind of spacetime structure, 
namely the structure of Minkowski space, along with the postulation of Lorentz 

Pm
s1 (sa,b,t)  Pm
s1 (sa,b)

Pm
s1 (sa) Pm
s1 (sa,b)
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invariant physical laws. Such a theory need not be separable, though it would have to 
obey Howard’s locality condition.  
 Ghirardi and Grassi [1994,1996] have shown that it is impossible to construct a 
fundamentally Lorentz invariant theory (that is, one that does not contain a hidden 
preferred reference frame) that exhibits parameter dependence in the nonrelativistic 
limit. This result is interesting because it shows that theories exhibiting parameter 
dependence, such as the Bohm theory, must be nonlocal in Howard’s sense. On the 
other hand, it is possible to show that a theory exhibiting only outcome dependence is 
incompatible with superluminal signaling.63  It can be shown that the GRW and other 
dynamical collapse models exhibit only outcome dependence. There is therefore 
grounds for optimism that a genuinely relativistic quantum theory that recovers the 
predictions of quantum mechanics in the nonrelativistic limit can be constructed.64 
Furthermore, Roderich Tumulka has recently constructed a variant of the GRW 
collapse theory that is fully relativistically invariant.65 In recent work, Daniel 
                                                        
63 See Eberhard [1978], Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber [1980]. For a general discussion of these results, 
see Ghirardi [2008]. 
64 Of course, what is ultimately required is a relativistic quantum field theory. For present purposes, 
however, we are concerned to show only that a realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics in the 
non-relativistic limit is compatible with special relativity. 
65 Tumulka [2006]. 
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Bedingham has developed a relativistic collapse model that incorporates interacting 
particles.66 
 Given that it is possible to write down a Lorentz invariant theory, in Minkowski 
space, that recovers the empirical predictions of quantum mechanics and therefore 
violates (14), it is not clear that Bell inequality violations rule out compatibility with 
the special theory of relativity. This remains true even if the quantum state is 
interpreted realistically as furnishing an objective description of nonseparable, 
entangled systems. The Bell inequality violations imply that any theory will violate 
outcome independence, or parameter independence, or both. This rules out the 
possibility of a local hidden variable model that furnishes a complete description of 
individual systems. What light do these results shed on Einstein’s incompleteness 
argument? Fuchs is persuaded by Einstein’s argument for the incompleteness of the 
quantum state description: 
 
Rejecting the rigid connection of all nature-that is to say, admitting that the very notion 
of separate systems has any meaning at all- one is led to the conclusion that the quantum 
state cannot be a complete specification of the system. It must be information, at least in 
part.67 
 
Fuchs goes on to draw the following lesson from the Bell inequality violations: 
                                                        
66 Bedingham [2011]. 
67 Fuchs [2003], p. 7. 
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The last 19 years have given confirmation after confirmation that the Bell inequality (and several 
variations of it) are indeed violated by the physical world. The Kochen-Specker no-go theorems 
have been meticulously clarified to the point where simple textbook pictures can be drawn of 
them. Incompleteness, it seems, is here to stay: the theory prescribes that no matter how much 
we know about a quantum system—even when we have maximal information about it—there 
will always be a statistical residue. 
 
In Fuchs’ view the chief lesson to be drawn from Bell’s theorem is that quantum 
mechanics is ‘necessarily incomplete’, in the sense that the theory is irreducibly 
statistical.  
For our purposes, there are two important points to be made with respect to 
Fuchs’ remarks. The first is that Fuchs’ use of the term ‘incompleteness’ is different 
than Einstein’s. In Einstein’s (EPR) sense of the term, a theory is complete just in case 
every element of reality is captured within the theory. If there are objective chances, 
perhaps encoded in the quantum state for a physical system, then a stochastic theory 
may be complete in the EPR sense while remaining incomplete in Fuchs’ sense. Hence 
the fact that quantum mechanics is irreducibly statistical does not by itself constitute 
an argument for the incompleteness of the quantum state description in the EPR 
sense, that there are elements of reality (hidden variables) not represented in the 
quantum state.  
The second point is that Fuchs does not distinguish clearly between the notions 
of separability and locality, at least in the quotation above. Rejecting the ‘rigid 
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connection of all nature’ would seem to suggest the impossibility of non-local 
interactions. On the other hand, ‘admitting that the very notion of separate systems 
has any meaning at all’ suggests the denial of nonseparability. 
Harrigan and Spekkens [2010], like Fuchs, see Einstein’s incompleteness 
argument as an argument from locality to an epistemic interpretation of the quantum 
state.68 While acknowledging the distinction between separability and locality, the 
authors explicitly state, in contradistinction to the view defended here, that 
separability is a necessary condition for locality.69 While stating without argument 
that separability is essential to ‘any sensible notion of locality’, the authors also point 
out that it is not sufficient. To the separability condition they add a local causality 
condition derived from Bell [1981]. According to Harrigan and Spekkens’ definition, a 
separable ontological model of the quantum state is ‘locally causal’ just in case the 
probabilities of events in a spacetime region B are independent of events in space-
                                                        
68 However, it should be emphasised that Harrigan and Spekkens, unlike Fuchs, do not view the 
argument as conclusive in favor of an epistemic interpretation. 
69 The authors write: ‘A necessary component of any sensible notion of locality is separability’. 
(Harrigan and Spekkens [2010], p. 140). The authors go on to provide a formal definition of separability 
in terms of a Cartesian product of distinct spatial regions, which is essentially equivalent to the 
informal definition due to Howard [1985]. 
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time region A, once one has ‘screened off’ common causes in the intersection of the 
backward light cones of A and B.70 This condition can be expressed formally as:  
 
 (17)  
     
where A and B are propositions about events occurring in regions A and B, and  is a 
complete specification of the properties of space-time region C. 
Harrigan and Spekkens now define ‘locality’ as the conjunction of their local 
causality and separability conditions. Any theory that fails either conjunct will 
therefore fail to be local according to the authors. For example, for an entangled state 
such as the singlet state, a factorization of the composite system into 
 cannot be achieved, implying a failure of separability, and hence also of 
locality according to Harrigan and Spekkens’ definition.  
It is easy to see that according to Harrigan and Spekkens’ definition, any theory 
that exhibits Bell inequality violations is necessarily ‘non-local’ (where ‘locality’ has 
been defined as the conjunction of separability and condition (17)) . This is true 
regardless of one’s attitude toward the nature of the quantum state. Since equation 
(17) implies the Bell factorizability condition as it is defined in equation (14), it is easy 
to show that any theory that recovers the predictions of quantum mechanics, whether 
                                                        
70 The term ‘locally causal’, as used by Harrigan and Spekkens, should not be confused with Howard’s 
locality condition. 

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realist or otherwise, will exhibit ‘nonlocality’ in Harrigan and Spekkens’ sense. The 
authors prove that ‘any -ontic ontological model that reproduces the quantum 
statistics (QSTAT) violates locality’,71 i.e,  
 
-ontic & QSTAT ~L. (18) 
 
But this conditional is trivially satisfied, since the second conjunct in the antecedent 
already implies the consequent.  Furthermore, the consequent is itself the negation of 
a conjunction one of whose conjuncts, local causality (as defined in (17)), implies the 
failure of QSTAT. Hence (18) can be rewritten: 
 
(-ontic & ~LC  ~(S and LC))( -ontic & ~LC  ~LC v ~S) (19) 
     
where ‘LC’ indicates local causality and ‘S’ is separability.  
Hence a failure of ‘locality’ in Harrigan and Spekkens’ sense is no argument 
against a realist or ontic interpretation of the quantum state. Since any empirically 
adequate interpretation of quantum mechanics is constrained to predict Bell 
inequality violations, it follows that any empirically adequate interpretation of the 
quantum state must also be non-local in Harrigan and Spekkens’ sense.  As the authors 
acknowledge, Bell locality is neutral with respect to the question of the status of the 
                                                        
71 This is theorem 11, ibid., p. 143. 
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quantum state; Bell inequality violations therefore cannot be harnessed to argue in 
favor of an epistemic interpretation. This shows that although the conditional  
 
L & QSTAT ~(-ontic) (20)   
 
is logically equivalent to (18), as indicated by by Harrigan and Spekkens, it is also 
trivially satisfied, since its antecedent is logically false.72 
Properly distinguishing between the logically independent concepts of locality, 
understood in the Einstein/Howard sense, and separability turns out to be very 
important if the task at hand is to try to formulate a relativistic theory that respects 
Bell’s theorem. Bell’s theorem does not demonstrate the incompatibility of relativity 
with any realistic (or ‘psi-ontic’) theory that recovers the empirical predictions of 
quantum mechanics. What is implied by the theorem is that any such theory must 
violate outcome independence or parameter independence, or both. Theories that 
violate outcome independence alone have been constructed; the GRW theory is an 
example of a such a theory. As has already been pointed out, the GRW theory does not 
require a preferred foliation, nor does it permit superluminal signaling. It is on this 
basis that John Bell remarks that the GRW theory ‘takes away the ground of my fear 
                                                        
72 Since L is the conjunction of separability and local causality, and the latter condition implies the 
negation of QSTAT.  
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that any exact formulation of quantum mechanics must conflict with fundamental 
Lorentz invariance.’73 
 
Local Beables and the Prospects for a Local, Realist Quantum Theory 
 
According to Chris Fuchs, interpreting the quantum state realistically is incompatible 
with locality.  Fuchs contends that any viable interpretation of the quantum state 
ought to ‘expel once and for all the fear that quantum mechanics leads to ‘spooky 
action at a distance’. One reason to fear spooky action at a distance is that it is prima 
facie unrelativistic. If one is inclined to hold the view, explicit in Harrigan and 
Spekkens [2010] and arguably implicit in Fuchs’ analysis, that ‘any sensible notion of 
locality presupposes separability’, then it might be supposed that separability is a 
necessary condition for us even to make sense of the principle that interactions are 
local.74 This would be problematic, since the requirement of local interaction is a 
cornerstone of quantum field theory.  If this is the worry of Fuchs, Harrigan and 
Spekkens, however, it is unfounded. It can be shown that the requirement of local 
                                                        
73 Bell [1987]. 
74  The view that a failure of separability entails nonlocality is also arguably implicit in Norsen [2009]. 
Norsen remarks that a failure of Jarrett’s ‘completeness’ condition (Jarrett [1984]; our ‘outcome 
independence’) ‘indicates the presence of some nonlocal causation…in the candidate theory in 
question.’ (288) 
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interaction does not presuppose separability for its formulation. Theories that contain 
both local and nonlocal beables can be constructed. If the theories in question can be 
made to satisfy the requirement of local interaction, and include fundamentally 
Lorentz covariant dynamics, then there is room for optimism that a realist 
interpretation of quantum mechanics compatible with the special theory of relativity 
can be found.  As we will see shortly, the key point is that the denial of ‘all beables are 
local beables’ does not entail ‘no beables are local beables’.75 
In a relativistic collapse theory, for example, it is possible to explicate the notion 
of a system’s possessing a local, intrinsic property in a natural way.76 For example, in 
the ‘mass density’ formulation of the GRW theory, the local beables of the theory are 
mass densities on the past light cone of a spacetime region.77 The GRW theory and 
related dynamical collapse models are both fundamentally Lorentz invariant and 
nonseparable. Such theories are also -ontic and complete in the EPR sense: the 
description of the physical world in terms of the wave function does not leave out any 
                                                        
75  The term ‘local beable’ is due to John Bell [1984]. I will have more to say about local beables below. 
76See Myrvold [2003], Ghirardi and Grassi [1994], and Ghirardi [2000]. It should be noted that I do not 
wish to presuppose that any realist interpretation that incorporates local beables will be a variant of 
the GRW collapse model. 
77The mass density ontology associates a field m(x,t) with every point x, given by the expectation value 
of the mass density operator M(x) at x. The mass density operator is obtained by multiplying the mass 
of every particle type by the number density operator for that particle, and then summing over all 
possible particle types. (See Ghirardi [2008]).  
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elements of reality. Given the completeness of the theory, the probabilities derived 
from the Born rule are taken to represent objective features of physical chance setups.  
To get a sense for how such a nonseparable, locally causal theory works, 
suppose that Alice and Bob each have a quantum system, located at spacetime points 
S1 and S2 respectively. Alice and Bob can each subject their systems to external fields. 
These fields are local in the sense that they can be represented by local operations, in 
a manner to be explained below. Alice and Bob can also couple their systems to 
devices that perform measurements. If we assume that the probabilities associated 
with measurement outcomes on each of S1 and S2 may be correlated, then we can 
consider the pair to be a spacelike-extended objective chance setup, with chances 
associated with local measurement outcomes on each member of the pair.  
Given that entanglement extends over arbitrary distances, chance setups may 
become arbitrarily large. An entangled quantum state is therefore associated with 
such a spacelike extended system. According to special relativity, there is a continuous 
infinity of possible foliations of an extended four-dimensional object. Whether or not a 
state is entangled will in general depend upon the specification of a spacelike 
hypersurface of simultaneity. To introduce measurement operations into this picture, 
we need only specify that for each foliation of spacetime, collapses occur along those 
hypersurfaces that intersect measurement events. This has the consequence that 
expectation values associated with measurements are themselves foliation-relative. In 
other words, to quote David Albert, we must ‘let go of the requirement that the 
situation associated with two intersecting space-like hypersurfaces in the Minkowski-
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space must agree with one another about the expectation values of local observables 
at points where the two surfaces coincide’.78 
Albert considers this picture to be artificial, demonstrating only the formal 
compatibility of collapse theories with the structure of Minkowski space. According to 
Albert, any theory which exhibits nonseparability is ‘metaphysically incompatible’ 
with the special theory of relativity, whether or not it is ‘dynamically compatible’, as 
the picture sketched above is. While Harrigan and Spekkens focus on the concept of 
local causality considered as a general condition, Albert is concerned with a somewhat 
different issue, what he calls the ‘nonnarratability’ of nonseparable collapse theories. 
Nonnarratability is the condition that, in a relativistic spacetime, the complete 
specification of the quantum state history along one foliation does not uniquely 
determine the state history along another foliation.79 A quantum mechanical state of 
the world at a time t is just a specification of the expectation values of all of the local 
and non-local observables at t. Nonnarratability arises from the fact that the entirety 
of what there is to say about a relativistic quantum mechanical world cannot be 
specified as a one-parameter family K of such instantaneous states of the world. In 
particular, it is not hard to show that such a specification will necessarily leave the 
                                                        
78Albert [2000], pp. 5-6. 
79 This was shown in Albert and Aharanov [1984], and generalized to non-measurement contexts in 
Myrvold [2002]. 
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expectation values of non-local quantum mechanical observables that are 
instantaneous along some other foliation K’ unspecified.80  
The issue, according to Albert, is that we have paid too dear a price in order to 
save Lorentz invariance in the relativistic collapse picture; we have ‘let go of the idea 
of the world’s having anything along the lines of a narratable story’,81since the history 
of the world according to one foliation does not uniquely determine the history along 
any other. Nevertheless, despite Albert’s worries, we can still tell a narratable story 
for any given spacelike region along a given foliation, and the story relative to one 
foliation can be obtained by means of local dynamical transformations from any other 
foliation. 
 The possibility of constructing an account of local causality in a quantum 
framework depends crucially on the role of what John Bell calls ‘local beables’.82 At the 
operational level, the description of measurement interactions ultimately reduces to 
the dispositions and behavior of objects located in space and time. Such an 
assumption of the localization of physical objects undergirds the operational meaning 
of such statements as ‘the pointer is oriented to the right (or left)’. We must be able to 
talk about the spatiotemporal dispositions of measurement devices in a systematic 
way in order to secure, at the experimental level, the evidentiary basis of quantum 
                                                        
80 Cf. Albert [2008]. 
81Ibid., p. 6. 
82Bell [1975]. 
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theory. An adequate theory will be able to furnish predictions, whether deterministic 
or probabilistic, about the behavior of measurement devices that can then be tested. 
In other words, the theory must be able to furnish an account of local beables. One 
reason to suppose that separability is a necessary condition for local causality is that 
local causality requires local beables. However, separability is not a requirement for 
the formulation of local causality. Once again, the key point is that the denial of ‘all 
beables are local beables’ does not entail ‘no beables are local beables’. 
As Myrvold [2003], Ghirardi and Grassi [1994], and Ghirardi [2000] have 
pointed out, in a nonseparable, foliation-relative collapse model, it is possible to 
construct a picture of the dynamical evolution of states in such a way that the 
transition from one foliation to another foliation is brought about by means of entirely 
local operations, in a manner that does not privilege any one foliation, and which 
preserves the concept of a narratable history of state evolution along any given 
foliation. 83 On this picture, the differences between state histories given with respect 
to different foliations are attributable entirely to the fact that these foliations join up 
points of spacetime in different ways. 
Suppose that the quantum state associated with some hypersurface 

 is given 
by the density operator

() .84 Kraus [1983] argues that any operation can be 
modeled as a completely positive linear mapping 

  of the set of trace-class operators 
                                                        
83See Myrvold [2003], Fleming [1989], and Woodcock [2007]. 
84 The following discussion follows that presented in Myrvold [2003]. 
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into itself, and shows that any such function can be represented by a countable set of 
operators 

{Ki}such that  
 

()  K i
i
 K it  with 

K i
t
i
 K i  I .         (19) 
 
Unitary evolution has a Kraus representation consisting of a single Kraus operator. An 
operation that takes pure states into pure states is called a pure operation. A mapping 

  which preserves the trace of 

  is said to be a nonselective operation, while an 
operation that is not trace preserving is said to be selective. Within this formalism, a 
typical measurement event can be thought of as a preparation of an ensemble 
followed by a selection of those members that yield a given outcome; if collapses are 
regarded as physical processes, they can be represented as pure, selective Kraus 
operations in which the selection is made by the system itself. Hence in this case the 
operation does not preserve the trace of the density operator; the post-collapse state 
is given by 

() /Tr(()) if the initial state is 

() .85 
Local evolution of a system is defined in terms of the notion of a local operation, 
by associating an algebra of trace-class operators having Kraus representation R(O) 
                                                        
85 The advantage of choosing a 

  that does not preserve norm is that the function can be linear. For a 
discussion of this point see Ghirardi et al [1993]. 
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with a bounded spacetime region O.86 The self-adjoint members of R(O) correspond to 
observables measurable via operations confined to O. An operation local to O will have 
a Kraus representation consisting of operators belonging to R(O). Suppose that the 
region O is bounded by two hypersurfaces 

 and 

', which are coextensive 
everywhere except in the region O. The local evolution condition demands that if 

' 
lies nowhere to the past of 

, then the state on 

' be obtainable from 

 via an 
operation local to the region O between 

 and 

'. This condition ensures that any 
differences in the states 

 and 

' be attributable to events in the region O. The local 
evolution condition is satisfied by the standard formulations of quantum field theory. 
Furthermore, a theory satisfying the local evolution condition has the property that 
state transitions between different hypersurfaces are attributable entirely to local 
operations. This makes it possible to describe the transition from the history of events 
along one foliation to that along another without picking out any preferred foliation, 
all the while against the backdrop of Minkowski spacetime. 
The local evolution condition, combined with the assumption that operators 
associated with spacelike observables commute, has important consequences. 
Myrvold [2003] has shown that for any two spacelike hypersurfaces 

 and 

', such 
that no part of 

' lies to the past of 

, and 

 and 

' coincide everywhere except in the 
region O, the eigenstates and eigenvalues of observables local to regions spacelike 
separated from O are shared completely by 

 and 

'. This in turn entails that if 

()  
                                                        
86 See Clifton and Halvorson [2001]. 
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and 

( ')  are both eigenstates of some observable 

 local to a region 

  disjoint 
from O, with eigenvalues 

  and 

', then 

 '.  
This result allows to us construct a notion of ‘property local to some spacetime 
region O’ in a natural way. Consider some four-dimensional object O and some 
spacelike slice  of O. Assuming that observables satisfy the usual eigenstate-
eigenvalue link, that is, the observable  has the definite value  if and only if 
, then define O to have the property  just in case, as of ,  
   
       (20)      
 
for the state taken with respect to any hypersurface  containing . This 
entails that a system at a given spacetime point P has the property  if the state on 
the past light cone is an eigenstate of .87 
The present consideration of dynamical collapse theories and the notion of local 
properties that such theories employ is intended to show that it is possible to 
construct a formally exact theory that recovers the predictions of quantum mechanics, 
                                                        
87 Myrvold [2003] shows that this condition is equivalent (assuming a local evolution condition along 
with the usual microcausality condition that operators representing spacelike separated observables 
commute) to the following formulation given in Ghirardi [2000], p. 1364:  ‘A system at a spacetime 
point P possesses the objective property  if and only if the state on the past light-cone is an 
eigenstate of  belonging to .’ 





k

  k 

k



() k ()

()





k



 k



k
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is compatible with the special theory of relativity in the sense that it is fundamentally 
Lorentz invariant and incorporates local beables at the operational level, and is realist 
with respect to the quantum state. Some commentators have objected to such theories 
on metaphysical grounds, arguing that they are not fully relativistic despite their 
formal compatibility with the special theory of relativity. Given that theories can be 
formulated in Minkowski space with a clear notion of local causality based on the 
attribution of local properties, it is not clear what further metaphysical demands could 
be placed on such theories in order to render them relativistic. The existence of 
quantum entanglement gives us good reason to believe that nonseparability is a basic 
feature of the physical world. This state of affairs necessitates, to borrow Einstein’s 
phrase, a ‘departure from physical thought in the sense familiar to us’. But 
nonseparability does not preclude the possibility of furnishing an exact definition of 
local, intrinsic properties. 
Neither Fuchs nor Harrigan and Spekkens explicitly argue that compatibility 
with special relativity, purely formal or otherwise, is a necessary feature of a viable 
interpretation of the quantum state. It may be that there are metaphysical intuitions 
motivating Fuchs’ remark that ‘admitting that the very notion of separate systems has 
any meaning at all, one is led to the conclusion that the quantum state…must be 
information’. The clear implication of this remark is that realism with respect to 
entangled states is incompatible with the meaningfulness of the concept of separate 
systems. Harrigan and Spekkens’ remark that ‘any sensible notion of locality 
presupposes separability’ seems to express the same thought more explicitly. The 
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consideration of hypersurface-dependent collapse theories illustrates that there is an 
important sense in which this statement is incorrect, or at least highly misleading, 
even in the context of a nonseparable theory. Fuchs’ remark that the meaningfulness 
of the notion of separate systems depends upon giving up a realist interpretation of 
entangled states is therefore too quick. It is possible to construct theories in which 
entangled systems in Minkowski space have intrinsic properties in an absolute 
(observer and frame-independent) sense. Indeed, any theory which violates outcome 
independence but does not violate parameter independence is a candidate for such an 
interpretation. The existence of such theories, even if they are only interpreted as toy 
theories illustrating the logical relationships between relativistic and quantum 
mechanical constraints, demonstrates the possibility of an exact formulation of 
quantum mechanics that is realist and fundamentally Lorentz invariant. Hence more 
needs to be said in order for the case against a realistic interpretation of entangled 
quantum states to be made compelling. 
 
Conclusion 
 
At first blush, quantum state antirealism is an attractive position. In principle, if one 
rejects the view that the quantum state is representative of physical reality, and can 
account for all quantum phenomena in an antirealist framework, then deep 
interpretive problems associated with the process of measurement and entanglement 
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become less mysterious. Nevertheless, it has been argued that simply rejecting an 
ontic interpretation of the quantum state does not by itself solve the measurement 
problem. I have examined two explicit attempts to address the problem of 
measurement in an antirealist framework. In Fuchs’ [2003] framework, the problem 
of accounting for the transition from pre- to post-measurement states remains. In 
Bub’s [2007] analysis, on the other hand, a special place is accorded to the 
measurement process in the formulation of the theory, which arguably leaves the 
most pressing philosophical worry surrounding measurement unaddressed.  
I have also argued that the phenomenon of quantum entanglement does not rule 
out an ontic interpretation of the quantum state in a relativistic framework. If there 
are good grounds for retaining a realist interpretation of the quantum state, and it will 
be argued in chapter 4 of the present work that there are such grounds, then one is 
faced with the problem of addressing the apparent tension between quantum 
nonseparability and the special theory of relativity. It has been argued that there is 
reason for optimism with respect to the prospects for a fundamentally realist and 
Lorentz invariant quantum theory. If such theories can be constructed, then much of 
the physical basis for worrying about ‘spooky action at a distance’ is arguably 
removed. 
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Chapter 3: Evidence, Explanation and the Quantum State  
 
[...]present quantum theory not only does not use – it does not even dare to mention – the 
notion of a “real physical situation.” Defenders of the theory say that this notion is 
philosophically naive, a throwback to outmoded ways of thinking, and that recognition of this 
constitutes deep new wisdom about the nature of human knowledge. I say that it constitutes a 
violent irrationality, that somewhere in this theory the distinction between reality and our 
knowledge of reality has become lost, and the result has more the character of medieval 
necromancy than of science. 
–E.T. Jaynes88 
 
Introduction: The Nature of Probabilities, Classical and Quantum 
 
The Dualistic Conception of Probability  
 
It has often been remarked that the concept of probability can be understood in at 
least two distinct ways. According to the subjectivist or epistemic conception, 
probabilities represent the degrees of belief of agents, acting in the face of uncertainty. 
On this conception, the probability accorded to a proposition P can be thought of as 
the degree of confirmation accorded to P, given one’s assessment of the available 
                                                        
88 Jaynes [1980]. 
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evidence. The second concept of probability is what Ian Hacking [1975] has called the 
‘aleatory’ conception of probability; this is the probability associated paradigmatically 
with games of chance, where one speaks of the chance of heads on a coin toss, or the 
chance of rolling three sixes on five rolls of a fair die.  
 The idea that these two conceptions of probability are not only compatible with 
each other, but actually complementary, is also not new. As long ago as 1837 Poisson 
remarked that ‘an event will have, by its nature, a greater or less chance, known or 
unknown; and its probability will be relative to the knowledge we have, in regard to 
it.’89 In the introduction to his classic Logical Foundations of Probability Carnap writes:  
 
We shall try to show that we have to distinguish chiefly two concepts of 
probability; the one is defined in terms of frequency and is applied empirically, 
the other is a logical concept and is the same as degree of confirmation. It will be 
shown that both are important for the method of science, and thus the 
controversy between the two "conceptions" of probability will be dissolved.90 
 
                                                        
89 Poisson [1837]. 
90 Carnap [1962], p. 2. 
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According to Carnap’s account,91 the two notions of probability play distinct but 
equally important and complementary roles in the confirmation of scientific theories. 
The first, epistemic or “subjective” sense of probability, which Carnap calls 
probability1, is a logical notion, representing the degree of confirmation of some 
hypothesis relative to some evidence. The second, factual or empirical concept of 
probability is derived from the observation of relative frequencies: 
 
(i) Probability1, is the degree of confirmation of a hypothesis h with respect to an 
evidence statement e, e.g., an observational report. This is a logical, semantical concept. 
A sentence about this concept is based, not on observation of facts, but on logical 
analysis; if it is true, it is L-true (analytic). 
 
(ii) Probability2, is the relative frequency (in the long run) of one property of events or 
things with respect to another. A sentence about this concept is factual, empirical.92  
 
For Carnap, the objective-subjective dichotomy is actually something of a misnomer 
for what is essentially a contrast between logical and empirical notions. Just as 
deductive logic and mathematics have a perfectly objective role to play in the 
                                                        
91 Carnap speaks here of frequencies rather than objective chances. For our purposes, however, the 
relevant point is that relative frequencies provide factual evidence affecting the degree of confirmation 
accorded to some relevant class of propositions. This may include propositions about chances. 
92 Ibid., p. 19 
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methodology of science, so too does the inductive logical concept probability1. 
Nevertheless, the degree of confirmation accorded to some hypothesis is clearly an 
epistemic notion. 
 The connection between the epistemic and objective notions of probability can 
be illustrated by considering the simple example of a coin toss. Suppose that Alice 
wishes to decide whether or not a given coin is fair. We will also assume that she has 
little to no prior knowledge of the properties of the coin, and that she is non-dogmatic 
in the sense that she is willing to change her beliefs about the properties of the coin in 
light of new evidence. The most obvious way for Alice to sharpen her beliefs about the 
probability h of heads on any toss is to repeatedly toss the coin, observing the results 
and updating her beliefs in accordance with the observed relative frequency of 
heads.93 This procedure presupposes that Alice has subjective beliefs about the 
properties of the coin, that her credences about these properties can evolve in light of 
frequency data, and that the frequency data in question is evidentiary with respect to 
Alice’s beliefs about the coin. 
 A natural gloss to put on all of this is that Alice is using relative frequency data 
to learn about the chance of heads on any given trial.94 If Bob, who has different 
background beliefs about the coin, performs a similar sequence of experiments, he too 
                                                        
93 I will have more to say about the mechanics of belief revision in light of new evidence below. 
94 See Myrvold [2011]. 
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will come to have a posterior credence function that is sharply peaked around h.95 In a 
situation like this, in which the dynamics of a system permits any rational agent with 
reasonable credences about the properties of the system to arrive at essentially the 
same probability h for some proposition P about the system, we seem to be justified in 
speaking of the common probability h as the chance of P.96 The process of learning 
about chances builds in the distinct but closely connected notions of subjective degree 
of belief (credence), relative frequency and objective chance; we may have degrees of 
belief about chances, which are subject to revision on the basis of observed 
frequencies. 
 Despite its obvious explanatory value, it has sometimes been argued that the 
concept of objective chance is dispensable, or even incoherent. It is certainly possible 
to give an account of the sort of example outlined above, in which agents 
systematically adjust their beliefs about physical setups in light of frequency data, 
without recourse to the notion of objective chance. I turn now to Bruno de Finetti’s 
classic treatment of this problem. 
 
                                                        
95 Assuming that his prior beliefs are also reasonable and non-dogmatic. 
96 I think that this is in fact the correct way to think about this scenario. Cf. Myrvold [2011]. I say ‘seem 
to be justified’ because this inference is not forced upon us as a matter of logic, and is in fact explicitly 
rejected by de Finetti and his followers.   
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The Subjectivist Interpretation of Probability and Quantum State Tomography 
 
In his foundational essay “Foresight: its Logical Laws, its subjective sources”, Bruno de 
Finetti famously articulates a radically subjectivist interpretation of probability. On de 
Finetti’s account, all probabilities are personal, subjective degrees of belief rather than 
states of nature, allowing individuals to make quantitative judgments in the face of 
uncertainty. In the “Foresight” paper, published in 1937, de Finetti notes what 
Leonard Savage [1954] describes as a ‘close mathematical parallelism’ between the 
axioms of probability theory, on the one hand, and the notion of personal probability 
that can be constructed by analyzing rational decision making in the face of 
uncertainty.9798 If the set of all events can be partitioned into an arbitrarily large 
number of subsets, then the degree of probability assigned by a person to a given 
event is possible to define with arbitrary precision. The notion of personal probability 
is defined operationally, by making mathematically precise the ‘trivial and obvious 
                                                        
97 As Savage notes, the existence of this parallelism does not imply the possibility of assigning an 
unambiguous probability to every event. See Savage [1972], p. 33. 
98 The text of de Finetti [1937] is an English transcription of a lecture originally delivered in French at 
the Institut Henri Poincare in 1935. At the time, de Finetti was not aware of the work of F.P. Ramsey 
[1926] which also develops an account of personal probability in terms of decisions made in the face of 
uncertainty. 
 
80 
 
 
 
idea’ that the conditions under which someone would be disposed to bet on an event 
reveal the degree of probability assigned to the event by that individual. 
 A typical problem arising in statistical analysis is to estimate from a series of 
observations of some repeatable experiment the probability p associated with a 
particular outcome. Such a procedure is usually couched in language that already 
presupposes an objectivist interpretation of probable events. For example, if an 
experimenter wishes to estimate the probability p(H) that a coin toss will come up 
heads, a series of trials is performed, and the relative frequency of heads is then used 
to estimate p(H). From the point of view that p(H) is a property of the coin, this 
procedure is necessary to hone in on p(H), the unknown probability associated with 
the coin. 
 According to the subjectivist account, probabilities can be determined only by 
interrogating the agents who believe them, rather than by investigating the properties 
of objects. Accordingly, the phrase ‘unknown probability’ is an oxymoron in this 
framework. The de Finetti representation theorem shows that it is possible to 
represent the coin toss example and other examples like it without making reference 
to unknown probabilities. The key to eliminating talk of unknown probabilities is to 
assume the equivalence of repeated trials with respect to probabilistic predictions, or 
equivalently, to judge that sequences of trials are permutation symmetric, a condition 
which de Finetti labels ‘exchangeability’. Taking the coin-toss example, the 
exchangeability criterion implies that every sequence of M coin tosses with N heads is 
equiprobable. De Finetti shows that on the basis of this exchangeability assumption, 
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an agent who performs a series of trials such as a coin toss will act as though there is 
some probability distribution over the outcomes to which her degrees of belief will 
converge, so long as she updates her beliefs in a coherent and non-dogmatic manner. 
Furthermore, our agent will expect that any other rational and non-dogmatic agents 
starting with exchangeable priors will likewise converge on this same probability 
distribution. In general, given the assumption of exchangeability, agents will behave as 
if there is some unknown objective probability distribution to which their beliefs will 
converge. Hence from a subjectivist point of view, ‘unknown’ probabilities can be 
defined operationally in terms of the (subjectively well-defined) notion of an 
exchangeable sequence of events.  
 According to many physicists working in the field of quantum information 
theory, the probabilities associated with experimental outcomes in quantum 
mechanics are themselves subjective or epistemic in character.99 According to these 
authors, quantum states are states of knowledge, rather than states of reality. A prima 
facie problem presents itself for these authors with respect to the status of unknown 
quantum states that is analogous to the challenge posed to subjectivists by ‘unknown 
probabilities’ in probability theory. If quantum states are states of knowledge or 
belief, then they must be known or believed by someone; the question is whether or 
not talk of unknown quantum states can in principle be eliminated. A result known as 
                                                        
99 Cf. Fuchs [2003], Caves, Fuchs and Schack [2002a, 2002b], Fuchs and Peres [2000], and Spekkens 
[2007]. 
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the ‘quantum de Finetti representation theorem’ shows that, given certain reasonable 
restrictions on prior beliefs and a sufficiently informative series of measurements on a 
quantum system, different agents will converge in their quantum state assignments 
for the system in question. 
 There are at least two important senses in which Born rule probabilities 
defined by the quantum state might be regarded as subjective. According to the first 
sense, articulated and defended by Chris Fuchs, probabilities derived from the Born 
rule are to be thought of as subjective representations of the attitudes of 
experimenters toward possible measurement outcomes, and nothing more. On this 
view, there is no ‘ontic state of the system’ to which quantum states refer, even in a 
statistical sense. In contrast to the Quantum Bayesian view, one might instead hold 
that systems actually do possess an ontic state, and that quantum mechanics is the 
statistical theory of such states in the same sense in which Liouville mechanics is the 
statistical theory of classical states. This latter view, which goes back to Einstein, is 
defended in Spekkens [2007]. The Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph (PBR) theorem, 
together with the earlier cluster of theorems due to Bell, Kochen and Specker, place 
serious constraints on the space of theories of this sort. One possible attitude to take 
towards these and other ‘no-go’ results, the attitude explicitly adopted by Chris Fuchs, 
is that the project of attempting to articulate a picture of preexisting dynamical states 
in a quantum mechanical framework is fundamentally misguided. If one adopts such 
an attitude, an obvious question presents itself: what is it that scientists are doing 
when they conduct experiments, if not learning about the properties of physical 
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systems? In this chapter I critically examine the sorts of answer to this question that 
the quantum Bayesian might offer. 
 In section 3.1, the subjectivist account of probability articulated by de Finetti 
and applied to quantum mechanics by the quantum Bayesians Caves, Fuchs and 
Schack is reviewed. In section 3.2, the quantum de Finetti representation theorem is 
examined. Chris Timpson has recently argued that adopting the quantum Bayesian 
attitude towards the quantum state leads to problems with explanation.100 According 
to Timpson, the quantum Bayesian is unable to give an adequate account of the role of 
data acquisition in grounding our beliefs about the outcomes of experiments. I will 
argue that there are indeed good grounds for worrying about an explanatory deficit in 
the quantum Bayesian account; however, I diagnose the source of the difficulty 
somewhat differently than Timpson does. Recently, Chris Fuchs has defended the idea 
that the Born rule is to be understood as an ‘empirical addition to Bayesian 
coherence’. I argue that Fuchs’ description of the Born rule is actually difficult to 
square with a radical subjectivist attitude toward quantum probabilities. 
 
3.1 The Subjectivist Interpretation of Probability and Quantum 
Bayesianism  
 
                                                        
100 I am referring in particular to what Timpson calls the ‘means-ends objection’. See Timpson [2008]. 
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Quantum Bayesianism and the Space of Epistemic Interpretations of the Quantum State 
 
Epistemic interpretations of the quantum state hold that there does not exist a one-
one mapping from quantum states to states of the world. One way to cash out this 
claim is to maintain that there are in fact ontic states of the world, defined in terms of 
physical properties, but that the quantum state is not among these properties. It may 
be that the same physical state of a system is compatible with more than one quantum 
state.101 In this case, it is appropriate to interpret the quantum state as providing a 
statistical representation of the physical state of a system in analogy with the 
statistical Liouville representation of classical states.102 On this view, the quantum 
state represents a state of incomplete knowledge. Characteristic of this view is the 
thesis of ontic state realism; while the quantum state is taken to be epistemic, it is 
nevertheless defined over a space of possible ontic states about which we have 
incomplete knowledge. This suggests that quantum mechanics might be supplanted 
by a more complete theory, and that the search for such a theory constitutes a 
worthwhile research program.  
 An epistemic interpretation that is nevertheless ontic state realist faces serious 
constraints. The Bell-Kochen Specker theorem implies that any such ontic model must 
                                                        
101See also chapter 4 of the present work for a discussion of this point, and the corresponding notion of 
‘physical state’. 
102 I will have more to say about the possible analogy with Liouville mechanics below. 
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be contextual. Furthermore, the recently discovered Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph 
(PBR) theorem places further constraints on the space of possible ontic models. In 
particular, in light of PBR, individual systems cannot have well-defined properties in 
an epistemic framework that assumes that probabilities assigned to properties 
depend only on the quantum state.103 
 The ‘QBist’ interpretation, which Chris Fuchs describes as ‘the perimeter of 
Quantum Bayesianism’, sidesteps these difficulties by denying the thesis of ontic state 
realism altogether.104 On this view, there is no ontic state of the system about which 
we have only incomplete knowledge. The probabilities associated with quantum state 
assignments are epistemic with respect to measurement outcomes rather than ontic 
states. We have incomplete knowledge not about the state of a system, but about the 
possible results of our interactions with such systems, i.e., measurement outcomes. 
Furthermore, it is an objective fact about the world that our interactions with 
quantum systems are necessarily unpredictable; the uncertainty associated with 
                                                        
103 See Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph [2011]. See also chapter 4 of the present work for a fuller discussion 
of the PBR result and its implications for the epistemic view of quantum states. 
104 Fuchs [2010] describes ‘QBism’ as a further development of Quantum Bayesianism: “Quantum 
Bayesianism, as it is called in the literature, usually refers to a point of view on quantum states 
originally developed by C. M. Caves, C. A. Fuchs, and R. Schack. The present work, however, goes far 
beyond those statements in the metaphysical conclusions it draws—so much so that the author cannot 
comfortably attribute the thoughts herein to the triumvirate as a whole.” 
86 
 
 
 
measurement outcomes cannot be eliminated even if we have maximal information 
about the systems in question.  
 It is with this objective uncertainty in mind that the quantum Bayesians write 
that quantum mechanics is not only incomplete, but necessarily so. According to Caves, 
Fuchs and Schack [2002b], a theory is ‘complete’ just in case it is dispersion-free, 
yielding definite yes or no answers to all questions that can be asked of a system.105 A 
theory is necessarily CFS-incomplete just in case it contains a ‘necessary statistical 
residue’. CFS completeness should therefore not be confused with the ‘completeness’ 
employed in the famous ‘EPR’ argument of Einstein, Podolski and Rosen [1935]. 
According to the latter authors, a theory is complete just in case every element of 
physical reality is captured by the theory. The EPR argument is intended to show that 
quantum mechanics is incomplete in the sense of providing only a partial description 
of reality within an ontic state realist framework. The quantum Bayesians reject the 
notion that the quantum state description is incomplete in this sense. Nevertheless, 
Caves, Fuchs and Schack take the EPR argument,106 combined with the Bell, Kochen 
and Specker (BKS) theorems to show that maximal information about a system is not 
complete information, and cannot be completed. This information-theoretic 
                                                        
105 Hereafter I will refer to such completeness as ‘CFS-completeness’. 
106 What the EPR argument in fact shows is that if quantum mechanics is taken to be complete in the 
sense that every element of physical reality is represented in the theory, then one cannot maintain both 
the separability principle and the locality principle. More on this in chapter 2 of the present work. 
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incompleteness is characteristic of quantum theories as distinct from classical 
theories such as Liouville mechanics. 
 Given the irreducibly statistical character of quantum mechanics, we live in a 
world of objective uncertainty, but nevertheless, if the quantum Bayesians are right, 
not a world of objective chance. Instead, the quantum Bayesians represent idealized 
agents as having subjective numerical degrees of belief satisfying the axioms of 
probability theory. These include beliefs about the possible consequences of an 
agent’s interactions with a quantum system. Where the quantum Bayesian departs 
from many other Bayesians, and indeed from other epistemic interpretations of the 
quantum state, is in his attitude towards quantum uncertainty. As we have seen, 
probabilities are not to be understood as measures of ignorance or imperfect 
knowledge, as evidenced by the following quotation from Chris Fuchs’ ‘QBism, The 
Perimeter of Quantum Bayesianism’: 
 
Imperfect knowledge? It sounds like something that, at least in imagination, could 
be perfected, making all probabilities go to zero or one- one uses probabilities 
only because one does not know the true, preexisting state of affairs...QBism finds 
its happiest spot in an unflinching combination of “subjective probability” with 
“objective indeterminism.”107 
 
                                                        
107 Fuchs [2010], p. 8 n. 
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This objective indeterminism is rooted in the uncertainty associated with agent-
system interactions. When an agent performs a measurement, something new comes 
into the world in an inherently unpredictable way: 
 
QBism says when an agent reaches out and touches a quantum system- when he 
performs a quantum measurement- that process gives rise to birth in a nearly 
literal sense.108 
 
On this view, there is no ‘true, preexisting state of affairs’ of which the quantum state 
is a  representation, whether complete or incomplete.109  
 A key pillar of Fuchs’ analysis is his interpretation of the significance of the 
Born rule. Quantum states are used to calculate probabilities via the Born rule, and 
conversely, if one assigns probabilities to a well-selected set of measurements, this is 
mathematically equivalent to defining a quantum state. According to the QBist 
analysis, there is no sense in which the quantum state represents even a part of the 
external world. What then are we to make of the role of the Born rule? The correct 
way to think about Born rule probabilities according to Fuchs is that they represent an 
empirical addition to probability theory, imposing further normative constraints or 
                                                        
108 ibid. 
109 It is in this sense, according to Fuchs’ account, that necessary information-theoretic incompleteness 
is characteristically quantum: the quantum state does not encode subjective probabilities in the sense 
of Liouville mechanics, associating multiple statistical states to a given (imperfectly known) ontic state. 
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rules of consistency that an agent should strive to satisfy. I will return to Fuch’s 
interpretation of the Born rule below.  Before considering Fuchs’ interpretation of the 
Born rule in further detail, I will turn to a brief discussion of the de Finetti 
representation theorem and its quantum analog. The viability of the Quantum 
Bayesian interpretation of quantum mechanics ultimately rests on whether the view 
can do justice to the evidentiary basis of the theory within a subjectivist framework. 
The quantum de Finetti theorem shows that the notion of an ‘unknown quantum state’ 
can be accommodated within an operational framework that does not presuppose 
objective probabilities.  
  
The de Finetti Representation Theorem 
 
Suppose that an agent is about to toss a coin, which may or may not be fair.110 The 
agent wishes to know what probability to assign to any given outcome a, given what 
she knows about the properties of the coin, and the overall physical setup. In an 
objectivist framework it is typically assumed that, in addition to the agent’s personal 
probability function P for the outcomes of tosses, there exists a set of probability 
measures Pr some member of which represents the actual probability of heads or tails. 
Tosses are assumed to be independent, so that if p is the probability of tossing heads 
                                                        
110 The following discussion of the general framework of subjective probability is indebted to Jeffrey 
[1983], [1996], Brathwaite [1957], and de Finetti [1937]. 
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on the nth toss, then the probability that i tosses result in heads and j tosses result in 
tails is given by   . The real probability of heads is assumed to be some 
unknown number between 0 and 1. 
 If one adopts the dualistic framework in which subjective probabilities are 
assigned to objective chances, then our agent’s personal probability P will be a 
weighted average over Pr, weighted according to her assessment of the likelihood that 
the objective probability falls within any given interval on [0,1]. The adjudged 
probability for any given hypothesis P(H), such as the hypothesis that the next four 
tosses of the coin will come up heads, will be the expectation value associated with the 
weighted average of possible probability measures associated with this hypothesis: 
 
     (1) 
 
Where  is a weighted average of possible objective functions Pr. Assuming 
that there is some unknown probability associated with each possible outcome, then it 
can be shown that the strong law of large numbers holds, i.e., ‘almost certainly’,  
 
P(limiting frequency of heads = the probability of heads) = 1.  
 
The fact that the limiting frequency of heads converges to a definite value, the 
‘unknown probability’ of heads, suggests that there is a property of the coin, namely 
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the chance that any given toss will yield heads, that is discovered given enough time to 
experiment with it.  
 De Finetti rejects this interpretation of the sequence of events, and the 
corresponding assumption that coin tosses represent independent events of equal but 
unknown probability. In the place of this latter notion, de Finetti introduces the 
concept of exchangeability. A set n of events is exchangeable with respect to some 
property A  if, for every m less than or equal to n, the probability of any m members of 
n having property A is independent of which members of n are chosen. 
Exchangeability is a weaker notion than independence; independence implies 
exchangeability, but also entails that the probability of m events having the property A 
is equal to the mth power of the probability for a single event’s having that property. 
 In a subjectivist framework like de Finetti’s, there is no objective probability 
measure associated with outcomes of die tosses, and hence no family of possible 
measures to which the actual objective measure belongs. Instead, agents adopt a set of 
measures relative to which all tosses of the die are exchangeable. De Finetti rejects the 
parallel that a frequentist or propensity theorist might draw between tossing a coin 
and drawing balls from an urn with replacement. There is a readily accessible 
objective fact about the urn, namely the proportion of balls of any given color 
contained within it, upon which to build conditional probability judgments. In this 
case, according to de Finetti, we are sufficiently familiar with the physical setup to be 
able to make meaningful attributions of probability: 
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 If we consider the case of an urn whose composition is unknown, we can 
doubtless speak of the probability of different compositions and of probabilities 
relative to one such composition; indeed the assertion that there are as many 
white balls as black balls in the urn expresses an objective fact which can be 
directly verified, and the conditional probability, relative to a given event, has 
been well defined.111  
 
The conditional probability is ‘well defined’ provided some actual event occurs. 
Furthermore, a probability assignment reflects the judgment, subject to 
straightforward inspection, that there are a certain number of white or black balls in 
the urn. No such procedure of direct verification is available for judgments of 
probability regarding coin tosses. In the case of the coin toss,  
 
 […] one does not have the right to consider as distinct hypotheses the 
suppositions that this imperfection has a more or less noticeable influence on 
the ‘unknown probability’, for this ‘unknown probability’ cannot be defined, and 
the hypotheses that one would like to introduce in this way have no objective 
meaning.112 
 
                                                        
111 de Finetti [1937], p. 141. 
112 Ibid., 141-142. 
93 
 
 
 
The introduction of the concept of exchangeability allows de Finetti to consider the 
elements common to the urn example and the coin tossing example, without 
presupposing that coin tosses constitute independent events of equal but unknown 
probability. Exchangeability is perfectly well defined within a subjectivist framework 
in terms of events and betting rates on them, with no need to refer to the ‘nebulous 
and inexact’ notion of an unknown probability. Exchangeability means that, for a set of 
n events (with respect to a property A), for every m less than or equal to n, an agent’s 
betting rate on any m events will be the same, regardless of the order in which the 
events occur. Although weaker than independence, exchangeability is sufficient to 
ensure that with n repetitions of a coin toss, the cumulative probability distribution 
function P(H) of (1) will approach a unique limiting function. In particular, de Finetti 
shows that if an agent’s personal probability function P is exchangeable with respect 
to a given set of events, then P is expressible as  for some hypothesis 
H, where   is the personal probability measure for some limiting relative 
frequency S of heads. This condition, known as the de Finetti representation theorem, 
shows that exchangeability together with the law of large numbers entails that the 
probability distribution function Pn for n tosses of a coin will approach, with 
increasing n, a unique limiting function Ps. 
 The probability distribution function Ps is perfectly well defined within a 
subjectivist framework as a betting rate approached by conditioning on observable 
events taken to be exchangeable. This ensures that ‘a rich enough experience leads us 
always to consider as probable future frequencies or distributions close to those 
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which have been observed.’113 The assumption of exchangeability ensures that the 
observation of relative frequencies enforces a convergence of belief among different 
agents towards a limiting distribution close to the observed relative frequency of 
events.  
 The de Finetti representation theorem guarantees that an agent who judges a 
sequence of coin tosses to be exchangeable will bet on the outcomes of future coin 
tosses as if the coin has an objective but unknown probability of heads. Furthermore, 
the agent’s degrees of belief concerning the value of this chance will mesh with her 
betting rates on the outcomes of subsequent coin tosses in the manner prescribed by 
Lewis’ Principal Principle.114 An agent who judges such a sequence to be exchangeable 
will also update their beliefs diachronically as if they believe that they are learning 
about objective chances. De Finetti interprets this result as showing that the concept 
of objective but unknown chances is eliminable: 
 
The essential question, and the only one which is a little less elementary, is the 
justification and the explanation of the reasons for which in the prediction of a 
frequency one is generally guided, or at least influenced, by the observation of 
past frequencies. It is a question showing that there is no need to admit, as it is 
currently held, that the probability of a phenomenon has a determinate value and 
                                                        
113 Ibid., 142. 
114 See Lewis [1980]. See also Greaves and Myrvold [2008]. 
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that it suffices to get to know it. On the contrary, the question can be posed in a 
way which has a perfectly clear sense from the subjectivistic point of view.115   
 
An objectivist may grant that it is possible to furnish an account of belief revision 
guided by the observation of past frequencies in a purely subjectivist framework, 
without adopting that framework. It is also possible to interpret the de Finetti 
representation theorem in an objectivist framework, by interpreting the agent’s 
degrees of belief about coin tosses as beliefs about chances. Then the limiting function 
Ps is just the chance distribution in which the chance of heads is equal to  , and 
 is equivalent to  , a representation of the agent’s 
degrees of belief about which of the functions  gives the actual chances. 
Nevertheless, de Finetti’s result is important for our purposes because it shows how 
one can make sense of repeatable experiments involving relative frequencies in an 
operational framework that does not presuppose the existence of objective chances. 
Caves, Fuchs and Schack, building on the work of Hudson and Moody, have provided a 
mathematically elementary quantum analog of the de Finetti representation 
theorem.116 The authors show that the concept of an ‘unknown quantum state’ can be 
dealt with in a framework in which quantum states are taken to be states of 
knowledge rather than states of belief. The result is analogous to de Finetti’s result for 
                                                        
115 De Finetti [1937], p. 152. 
116 Caves, Fuchs and Schack [2002]. See also Hudson and Moody [1976]. 
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unknown probabilities. Furthermore, the authors draw the same moral for the 
concept of an ‘unknown quantum state’ that de Finetti originally drew for unknown 
probabilities: the concept is dispensable. I turn now to a brief consideration of the 
quantum de Finetti representation theorem, before assessing its importance for the 
quantum Bayesian interpretation of the quantum state. 
 
The Quantum de Finetti Representation Theorem and Quantum State Tomography 
 
Given that Caves, Fuchs and Schack hold that quantum states are states of belief rather 
than states of knowledge, the term ‘unknown quantum state’ has no place in the 
quantum Bayesian vocabulary. Nevertheless, the concept of an unknown quantum 
state is ubiquitous in foundational discussions, and in particular in the field of 
quantum information theory. In their paper ‘Unknown Quantum States: The Quantum 
de Finetti Representation’, Caves, Fuchs and Schack are concerned to analyze a 
particular measurement technique known as quantum state tomography. In a typical 
quantum tomographic procedure, a device of some sort prepares several copies of a 
quantum system in some fixed but ‘unknown’ quantum state . The state  may be 
either pure or mixed. The goal of the procedure is to perform enough measurements 
on a large enough number of copies of   to be able to ‘reconstruct’ the identity of the 
state.  It may happen that the experimenter is able to access the systems prepared by 
the device more easily than the mechanisms governing the device, so that he may 
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learn something about the operation of the preparation device by investigating the 
states it prepares. In any case, the most important point is that the process of 
performing measurements on the systems prepared, including carrying out the same 
measurement in series as well as different kinds of measurements, allows the 
experimenter to narrow in on the unknown quantum state associated with 
preparations. 
 The procedure of reconstructing the state by performing quantum state 
tomography seems to presuppose that there is in fact an unknown quantum state the 
identity of which is eventually revealed by experiment. Such a description of the 
procedure is anathema to the quantum Bayesian interpretation of quantum states. CFS 
therefore aim to provide a description of quantum state tomography that makes no 
reference to unknown quantum states. In quantum Bayesian terms, the end product of 
a tomographic procedure is a single quantum state that ‘captures the describer’s state 
of knowledge’.117This state of knowledge will include a description of the entire 
‘procedure that uses the idea of an unknown quantum state in its description’ in the 
sense that the resultant state will incorporate the history of interactions with the 
system and measuring device without presupposing that the interactions in question 
constitute measurements of preexisting properties of the system. 
 CFS take their cue from de Finetti and his treatment of the concept of a definite 
but unknown probability. We have already seen that de Finetti was able to treat the 
                                                        
117 Ibid., p. 4538. 
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classical example of a repeated experiment involving coin tosses within a subjectivist 
framework. The assumption of exchangeability is sufficient to guarantee that non-
dogmatic agents who update their beliefs via Bayes’ rule will eventually come to agree 
in their probability assignments given enough time to gather information, and 
exchangeability makes no reference to unobservable physical quantities.118 Within the 
context of quantum state tomography, the analogous judgment to that of 
exchangeability in the coin tossing case is that there is no distinction between the 
systems that a device is preparing. From an operational perspective, this amounts to 
the claim that ‘all the systems are and will be the same as far as observational 
predictions are concerned.’119 As CFS point out, it is possible to hold such a point of 
view regarding the states prepared by some preparation device without presupposing 
that the device is preparing definite unknown states.120 This is equivalent to the 
statement that if an experimenter judges a collection N of a device’s outputs to have an 
overall quantum state , he will make the same judgement regarding any 
permutation of the N output states, regardless of the size of N. 
                                                        
118 Although the assumption of exchangeability is both material and ‘psychological’ in the sense that it is 
neither confirmed nor infirmed by the evidence. 
119 Caves, Fuchs and Schack [2002], p. 4540. 
120 Although, as I will argue below, this assumption is substantial; there ought to be physical grounds 
for making it. 
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 From an objectivist point of view, the purpose of quantum state tomography is 
to try to determine the quantum state   as precisely as possible. Within the CFS 
framework, the ‘Bayesian experimenter’ assigns a prior quantum state to the joint 
system consisting of the N systems , representing the experimenter’s state of 
knowledge prior to performing any measurements. The experimenter judges that the 
entire sequence of states produced by a preparation device has the structure of 
permutation invariance. With this notion of permutation invariance for quantum 
states in place, CFS prove the quantum de Finetti representation theorem, which says 
that a sequence of states  is exchangeable just in case it can be written in the form 
  
       (2) 
 
where  is an N-fold tensor product of the state   with itself, and 
  is a cumulative probability distribution over the density operators. The theorem 
says that it is possible to represent an exchangeable quantum state assignment as a 
mixture characterized by the probability distribution  over the product states 
. Note the formal analogy between this equation and equation (1) above, involving 
a weighted average of possible objective probability measures.  
 The quantum de Finetti representation theorem guarantees that non-dogmatic 
experimenters who judge a sequence of quantum states   to be exchangeable will 
converge in their quantum state assignments given the outcomes of a sufficiently 
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informative set of measurements. The mechanism that allows this convergence to take 
place is just Bayes’ rule for updating probabilities applied to quantum measurements. 
If K measurements yield the results  then the state of additional systems is given by 
an updated probability on density operators: 
 
      (3) 
 
Here  is the probability of obtaining the measurement results , given the 
state  for the first K measured systems, and   is the 
unconditional probability for the measurement results. As more measurements are 
performed and K becomes large, the posterior probability distribution   
becomes highly peaked on a particular state  dictated by the measurement results. 
 CFS draw the following moral from the quantum de Finetti representation. 
With regard to the purpose of quantum state tomography, ‘it is not about uncovering 
some “unknown state of nature”, but rather about the various observers’ coming to 
agreement over future probabilistic predictions’.121 This result is significant because it 
ensures that the observation of relative frequency data which forms much of the 
evidentiary basis of quantum mechanics is sufficient to guarantee, given the 
assumption of exchangeability (permutation invariance of   ), that 
                                                        
121 Ibid., p. 4541. 
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different agents will converge in their quantum state assignments. The assumption of 
exchangeability is ‘modest’ in the sense that it can be defined operationally in terms of 
gambling commitments and does not make any reference to objective but unknown 
probabilities pertaining to physical setups.  
 Of course, it remains possible to interpret the agent’s judgments regarding the 
outcomes of coin tosses or quantum measurements as beliefs about objective chances. 
The Quantum de Finetti theorem does not settle the case in favor of a Quantum 
Bayesian interpretation of quantum states any more than the classical de Finetti 
theorem settles the question of the interpretation of general probability theory. But 
the result does show that the activity of investigating ‘unknown quantum states’ is 
consistent with a quantum Bayesian interpretation of such states. This provides part 
of the answer to the question: what is it that scientists are doing when they conduct 
experiments on quantum systems and thereby updating their quantum state 
assignments, if not learning about the properties of those systems? The answer 
provided by the Quantum Bayesians is that they are learning to adjust their beliefs 
about the future consequences of their interactions with quantum systems. 
 
3.2 The Means/Ends Objection and the Role of the Preparation Device 
 
The de Finetti representation theorem furnishes a subjectivist description of what 
from an objectivist standpoint would be described as the process of learning about 
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chances. The assumption of exchangeability, together with the assumption will 
conditionalize on observed data, is sufficient to explain our belief in the stability of a 
frequency, since the probability of a trial, given the observation of a certain frequency, 
tends to coincide with the value of that relative frequency.122 The quantum de Finetti 
representation shows that it is possible to tell a similar story in the context of 
quantum state tomography. Given enough time to experiment with quantum systems, 
different non-dogmatic observers with exchangeable beliefs will come to agree in 
their probability assignments for experimental outcomes, i.e., their quantum state 
assignments. De Finetti famously declared that the only criterion of admissibility for 
probability assignments is coherence. This implies that all coherent probability 
assignments are admissible; it should not be taken to imply the impossibility of a 
preference ordering on probabilities within a subjectivist framework. Writing about 
the process of learning from experience, de Finetti notes that  
 
[…] the prediction of a future frequency is generally based on the observation of 
those past; one says “we will correct” our initial opinions if “experience refutes 
them.” Then isn’t this instinctive and natural procedure justified? Yes; but the way 
in which it is formulated is not exact, or more precisely, is not meaningful. It is not 
a question of “correcting” some opinions which have been “refuted”: it is simply a 
                                                        
122 The existence of generalizations of exchangeability show that the condition is not necessary; more 
on this point below. 
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question of substituting for the initial evaluation of the probability the value of the 
probability which is conditioned on the occurrence of facts which have already 
been observed. 
 
Note that de Finetti explicitly acknowledges that the prediction of a future frequency 
is based on the observation of those past, and that the procedure of updating one’s 
beliefs about future events is justified by the observation of past ones. It is reasonable 
to expect that an agent who has observed a set of outcomes and adjusted her prior 
beliefs accordingly will not freely exchange her posterior probability assignment for 
her prior beliefs. Furthermore, unless our agent has zero degree of belief that learning 
the results of N runs of an experiment will change her probability distribution 
function for the result of trial N+1, coherence alone requires her to strictly prefer 
having knowledge of the first N trials in order to improve her betting situation. 
 Analogous considerations apply to the case of experiments involving an 
unknown quantum state. Experimenters will always behave as though there is some 
objective but unknown Born rule probability assignment toward which their beliefs 
will converge, given enough time to observe relative frequency data derived from 
tomographic analysis of identically prepared quantum systems. Furthermore, rational 
agents in the laboratory will value learning from experience whether or not their Born 
rule probability assignments are ultimately subjective in character. Indeed, Quantum 
Bayesian experimenters behave so much like agents who believe in objective chances 
that it is not surprising that the orthodox interpretation of quantum state tomography, 
104 
 
 
 
according to which the latter procedure is uncovering an objective but unknown 
quantum state, has dominated the literature on the subject. 
 Perhaps because of the close operational link between beliefs about chances 
and exchangeability, Chris Timpson has recently argued that if the Quantum Bayesian 
interpretation of quantum mechanics is correct, then there is an important disconnect 
between the means through which quantum mechanical experiments are conducted 
and the ends of those experiments. In putting forward his ‘means/ends objection, 
Timpson writes: 
 
The puzzle is this: if there are only subjective probabilities, if gathering data does 
not help us track the extent to which circumstances favour some event over 
another one (this is the denial of objective single case probability), then why does 
gathering data and updating our subjective probabilities help us do better in 
coping with the world (if, that is, it does so)? Moreover, why should it be expected 
to? Why, that is, should one even bother to look at the data at all?123 
 
The trouble that Timpson is alluding to is that we are learning something about the 
world when we do quantum mechanical experiments. This learning is reflected in 
the probabilities we associate with experimental outcomes; furthermore, those 
agents who conduct experiments seem to be better equipped to negotiate the world 
                                                        
123 Timpson [2008], 604. 
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because they have acquired data that causes their expectations to peak around 
certain probability distributions. If these distributions are not representative of the 
actual physical state of the world, but are instead purely subjective, then how do we 
explain the relative predictive power of agents who know quantum mechanics? 
What exactly is it that we are learning when we gather data? 
 The observation of relative frequencies of events and comparison of these 
frequencies with the probabilities predicted by quantum mechanics provides 
evidence that quantum mechanics is correct. If the observed pattern of data is much 
more probable on the assumption that quantum mechanics is correct than it is on the 
assumption that some other theory is correct, this provides evidence that quantum 
mechanics is indeed tracking objective features of the world. I share Timpson’s 
worry that these ideas are hard to square with the hard line subjectivism of the 
Quantum Bayesians. But the real source of the problem that Timpson is trying to 
pinpoint is not that it is impossible for the subjective Bayesian to explain why it is 
desirable to gather evidence in order to update our subjective probabilities. Rather, 
the problem is that the quantum Bayesian is unable to adequately explain why 
agents who perform quantum state tomography and use the Born rule ought to 
adopt any particular attitude at all toward the probabilities occurring in the theory.  
 Specifically, two important questions present themselves: i) Why should 
agents adopt a symmetry assumption such as (possibly generalized) exchangeability 
at all? ii) Why must agents who associate probabilities with some given experimental 
outcome restrict their probability assignments for other experiments, as demanded 
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by quantum mechanics? Objectivists have a ready answer to both questions. If one 
has prepared identical copies of a system, then exchangeability follows 
straightforwardly from independence. Furthermore, the relations between the 
probabilities associated with experimental outcomes are, from the objectivist point 
of view, simply discovered by experiment, and represent objective features of 
quantum systems. Neither of these answers is available to the Quantum Bayesian. 
 Some light can be shed on Timpson’s question, ‘why should we bother to look 
at data if the quantum state is subjective?’, by considering the case of Liouville 
mechanics, in which epistemic states associate subjective probabilities with ‘ontic’ 
states of a classical system. As alluded to in the introduction to this chapter, there are 
important disanalogies between the subjective probabilities associated with classical 
statistical mechanical states and the subjective Born rule probabilities in a quantum 
Bayesian framework. 
 Liouville mechanics is a dynamical theory describing states of knowledge of a 
classical system. Classical systems are assumed to be described by a phase space, 
and the real state of the system, i.e., its ontic state at any given time, is assumed to 
correspond to a point in the phase space. The phase space representation consists of 
possible configurations and momenta of the particles comprising the system and 
therefore represents the space of possible ontic states of the system. Assuming that 
we know the ontic state of the particles comprising a system, we can compute the 
state at another time using Newton’s equations.  
107 
 
 
 
 In practice, we are rarely able to ascertain the ontic state of a macroscopic 
system containing on the order of 1023 particles each with position and momentum 
degrees of freedom. We are more interested in tracking observable macroscopic 
features of the system, such as temperature and pressure. Our knowledge of the 
ontic state of the system is therefore incomplete, and represented by a probability 
distribution (sometimes called a ‘Liouville distribution’) over the possible ontic 
states of the system. This state is clearly epistemic in that it represents our 
knowledge of the ontic state of the system; multiple, and indeed infinitely many, 
epistemic states are compatible with the same ontic state. 
 For our purposes, the importance of considering Liouville mechanics is that it 
represents a concrete example of a physical scenario in which epistemic states are 
used to describe the physical or ontic state of a system about which we have 
incomplete knowledge. Agents interacting with such systems can be expected to 
update their epistemic states by performing measurements on them and observing 
the dynamical evolution of the systems. The epistemic states associated with a 
statistical mechanical description will evolve dynamically according to the Liouville 
equation, which is derived from the Hamiltonian evolution of the possible ontic 
states over which the Liouville distribution is defined.  
 Liouville mechanics thus provides a concrete example of a case in which 
epistemic states are used to describe real physical states of affairs, and in which the 
process of observing physical systems and gathering data will lead agents to update 
their subjective probability assignments. It may be that quantum mechanics is 
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analogous to Liouville mechanics, in the sense that the quantum state is an epistemic 
state defined over an ontic state space. On such an interpretation, in analogy with 
Liouville mechanics, different quantum states are compatible with the same ontic 
state, and the probabilities calculated via the Born rule are therefore subjective. In 
this case, it would be reasonable to expect that the process of performing 
experiments and gathering data would lead agents to update their subjective 
probability assignments in such a way that their posterior quantum state 
assignments for a system, though not determined uniquely, are at least highly 
peaked in certain regions of the ontic state space. 
 The trouble is that there are severe restrictions on the possible ontic models 
for quantum theory expressible in this sort of framework. The Bell and Kochen and 
Specker theorems imply that such models will be non-local and contextual.124 
Furthermore, the Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph (PBR) theorem places further 
important constraints on the space of such models.125 In any case, the Quantum 
Bayesians reject the notion that the quantum state represents a state of incomplete 
knowledge of ontic states. The issue is not that we do not have epistemic access, for 
whatever reason, to a complete description of the deeper (sub-quantum) ontic state 
of a system. Rather, there is no such sub-quantum state of reality: the quantum state 
                                                        
124 See Bell [1966] and Kochen and Specker [1967]. 
125 See chapter 4 of the present work for a fuller discussion of this point. 
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is a state of incomplete knowledge not about the ontic state of a system, but about 
the outcomes of future interventions on the system.  
 The exact answer to the question ‘knowledge about what?’ provided by the 
Quantum Bayesians, namely, ‘the results of interactions with systems’, adds new 
urgency to the question posed by Timpson, namely how it is that gathering data and 
updating our beliefs helps us to do better in coping with the world. Denying that the 
quantum state represents knowledge about dynamical properties of a quantum 
system, while maintaining, as the Quantum Bayesians do, that quantum mechanics is 
nevertheless the optimal ‘user’s manual’ for negotiating the world, amounts to 
denying that there is any deeper underlying reality about which agents have beliefs, 
subjective or otherwise. So what is it that agents are doing when they perform 
measurements? The Quantum Bayesian answer is that they are observing the 
consequences, for them, of interacting with systems and thereby bringing something 
entirely new into existence that was not there before the measurement took place. 
While the macroscopic world of tables and chairs and laboratory equipment is 
perfectly objective and observer-independent, when the lab equipment is put to the 
task of interacting with the world at the level where quantum mechanical effects 
become significant, the particular act of measurement itself takes on a new meaning, 
and comes to occupy center stage. It is not just that quantum systems do not have 
preexisting properties revealed by measurements, a point that realists may readily 
accept. Crucially, the ‘creation event’ resulting from a quantum measurement is not 
only undetermined by the macroscopic arrangement of the laboratory, but the 
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interaction cannot be modeled as a stochastic process (this is the denial of objective 
probability and quantum state realism). Nor are we licensed to infer that systems 
prepared in an eigenstate of some observable are in an ontic state corresponding to 
that eigenstate. 
 How does this picture fit with the picture of quantum state tomography 
provided by the quantum de Finetti theorem? Recall that according to the latter 
theorem, different agents are licensed to act as though each individual quantum 
system has some unknown quantum state, with a probability density   
representing his ignorance of what the state is. When the agent performs quantum 
state tomography, he is simply updating his quantum state assignment via Bayes’ 
theorem, with the expectation that as he gathers more data, his posterior state will 
converge on some   . The assumption of exchangeability is crucial to the 
derivation of this result. It says that any two systems that a ‘preparation device’ spits 
out could be interchanged without changing the statistics our agent expects for any 
measurement he might perform. What grounds might an agent have for making such 
an assumption?  
 Chris Fuchs calls the assumption of exchangeability a ‘very minimal belief’, 
suggesting that adopting it does not involve substantial physical assumptions. 
But exchangeability is not an unsubstantial assumption. Take the example of draws 
from an urn with replacement. What grounds do we have for judging the draws from 
the urn to be exchangeable? In the first place, we believe that there exists what John 
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Vickers calls a ‘foundation of stable causes’ from one draw to the next.126 These 
include such factors as the solidity, number and color of the balls and the constancy of 
the force due to gravity across trials. Furthermore, whatever variable and random 
causes exist must be independent of the trials themselves. An example of a repeated 
process in which exchangeability can be expected to fail is a basketball player 
practicing shooting baskets.127 Since the basketball player’s skill can reasonably be 
expected to improve over time, it would be rational to bet in favor of a sequence of 
shot attempts in which the successful attempts occur more frequently in later trials.  
 What grounds do we have to believe that the systems generated by a 
preparation device can be interchanged without changing the expected statistics? 
Given that such systems do not have underlying properties at all in a Quantum 
Bayesian picture, the attribution of exchangeability does not appear to be physically 
grounded. The trouble is that it is difficult to make sense of the operational role of the 
preparation device by the lights of Quantum Bayesianism. In more orthodox 
interpretations of quantum mechanics, the purpose of a preparation device (at least 
ideally) is to ‘prepare’ a system in a given, perhaps unknown, state. Under certain 
conditions, it is reasonable to speak as though we know what the actual state of the 
system is.  For example, I can prepare a quantum system in the ‘  state’ by running it 
through a Stern-Gerlach magnet oriented in the  direction and selecting the ‘+’ 
                                                        
126 See Vickers [2010]. 
127 The example is due to Persi Diaconis (see Vickers [2010]). 
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states. Such a preparation corresponds to the situation in which an experimenter is 
prepared to offer a probability of 1 to the proposition that the system in question will 
yield the result ‘+’ if it is subjected to a  experiment. Most experimenters would be 
inclined to view the state in question as having the property of being spin-up in the x-
direction. 
 Furthermore, if we regard the state preparation procedure in objectivist terms, 
as preparing systems in a given objective state, it is easy to make sense of the activity 
of quantum state tomography. In this case, experimenters have exchangeable beliefs 
precisely because they take the systems generated by a preparation device to be 
independent of one another, generating identical (perhaps unknown) quantum states. 
The convergence in belief for different experimenters is easy to understand on 
physical grounds. It represents the fact that the experimenters take the prepared 
states to have some objective but unknown properties giving rise to observed relative 
frequencies of measurement results. These relative frequencies can then be 
interpreted as evidence about chances.  
 On the other hand, if we follow Fuchs et al. in denying that preparation 
procedures yield systems with dynamical properties, let alone real quantum states, 
then the judgment of exchangeability seems somewhat arbitrary. Perhaps the 
Quantum Bayesians take their cue here from de Finetti, who regarded judgments of 
symmetry and the intersubjective agreement they engender as ultimately 
psychological: 
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Our point of view remains in all cases the same: to show that there are rather 
profound psychological reasons which make the exact or approximate agreement 
that is observed between the opinions of different individuals very natural, but 
that there are no reasons, rational, positive or metaphysical, that can give this fact 
any meaning beyond that of a simple agreement of subjective opinions.128  
 
If this is indeed the attitude one takes, then it seems that much of the agreement 
in the physics community over the attribution of states to systems is ultimately 
grounded in psychology.  
 Another possible subjectivist response is to point out that more general de 
Finetti representations exist that don’t assume exchangeability.129 Consider the 
following sequence: 0010010001010100010… This sequence does not appear to be 
random. Although every 0 is followed by a 0 or a 1, every 1 is followed by a 0. If this 
pattern persists over a sufficiently long period of time, then it would seem to be 
rational to assign a high credence to the occurrence of a 0, given that a 1 has been 
observed. If P is an exchangeable probability, the conditional probabilities 
 
  

P(Xn1  j X1  i1,X2  i2...Xn  in)   
 
                                                        
128 De Finetti [1937], p. 152. 
129 See Zabell [2005], pp. 11-13. 
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depend only on the number of 1’s, and not on their order in the sequence. Hence 
exchangeability is a plausible assumption only when the order in which outcomes 
occur can be ignored. The sort of dependence illustrated in the above sequence, 
known as Markov dependence, can nevertheless be incorporated into a weakened 
exchangeability condition known as Markov exchangeability. According to this 
condition, all sequences with the same initial member and the same number of 
Markov transitions (in the above example, the transition from ‘1’ to ‘0’) are assumed 
to be equiprobable. It is possible to prove a generalized de Finetti representation 
theorem incorporating only Markov exchangeability.130  
 Whether or not a generalization of the quantum de Finetti representation 
theorem analogous to the classical case exists is an important open question.131 Direct 
observation of a sequence of quantum states will certainly reveal any statistical 
dependencies between members of the sequence. The correct attitude to take is that 
whatever symmetry requirements are satisfied by a sequence of quantum states are 
revealed by experiment, or else derived from physically motivated assumptions. CFS’s 
quantum exchangeability assumption amounts to the claim that ‘all of the systems are 
and will be the same as far as observational predictions are concerned’. This 
assumption is easy to understand if quantum systems are taken to be prepared 
                                                        
130See Diaconis and Freedman [1980]. 
131 I would speculate that such representations can be found; I hope to explore this question in future 
work. 
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independently in identical states. Given that Caves, Fuchs and Schack do not have 
recourse to such an account, the grounds for imposing an (perhaps generalized) 
exchangeability requirement remains mysterious. 
 But a further explanatory gap alluded to in the Timpson quotation above 
also presents itself. If there is no such thing as a correct probability assignment 
or a an objective quantum state, then why are those experimenters who use 
quantum mechanics better able to negotiate the world than those who do not? It 
may be that agents who use quantum mechanics are more successful than agents 
who do not because the theory places empirical constraints on the means 
through which probabilities are updated, rather than determining right and true 
probability assignments. This is the view that Chris Fuchs has adopted in his 
most recent work. On Fuchs’ view, the Born rule is to be understood as an 
‘empirical addition to Bayesian coherence’. I turn now to a consideration of 
Fuchs’ interpretation of the Born rule and the notion that quantum mechanics is 
in some sense a ‘user’s manual’ for agents negotiating the physical world. 
 
The Born Rule as an Empirical Addition to Bayesian Coherence 
 
From the point of view of the QBist, quantum mechanics constitutes an extra tool in 
addition to Bayesian coherence with which to navigate an unpredictable world. The 
theory is fundamentally different than any theory that has come before it; rather than 
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being a picture or representation of the world as it is, it is an ‘addition to probability 
theory itself’.132 Like probability theory, quantum mechanics on this view is 
essentially normative in character. Rather than prescribing beliefs, it offers rules of 
consistency that agents ought to satisfy with respect to their beliefs. These rules go 
beyond bare consistency, in the sense that the possible probability assignments 
allowed by quantum mechanics are a proper subset of those satisfying the axioms of 
classical probability theory. It is in this sense that quantum mechanics is an ‘empirical 
addition to Bayesian coherence’. This interpretation of quantum mechanics as an 
empirical refinement of Bayesian coherence raises an obvious question: what is it that 
we have learned about the world when we learn that the allowable probabilities for 
experimental outcomes belong to a certain restricted set? 
 To try to get a sense for how a Quantum Bayesian might attempt to answer this 
question, it is worth looking at Fuchs’ analysis of the Born rule in some detail. As 
Fuchs notes, ‘if quantum mechanics is a user’s manual, one cannot forget that the 
world is its author.’133 If one takes the view that quantum mechanics is intimately 
linked to probability theory, an obvious technical question presents itself: can the 
textbook formulation of the theory, with its states, complex amplitudes, Hilbert 
spaces, and so on, be re-written in terms of ‘probabilities in and probabilities out?’134 
                                                        
132 Fuchs [2010], p. 9. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Ibid, p. 12. 
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In fact it can.135The novelty of the Quantum Bayesian approach to this question is that 
it starts from the mathematical framework of ‘symmetric informationally complete 
positive-operator-valued measures’, or SIC POVM’s.136 
 To define a SIC POVM, we start with a set of d2 rank-1 projection operators 
 on a d-dimensional Hilbert space H such that 
 
  

 i  j
2

1
d 1
 whenever .  (4) 
 
Owing to the symmetry implied by condition (4), SIC POVM’s have several nice 
properties.137 Such operators are positive semi-definite, form a basis for the space of 
operators on H, and after rescaling they become a resolution of the identity operator  
 
  .     (5) 
 
The set of operators in this resolution of the identity forms a Symmetric 
Informationally Complete Positive Operator-valued Measure, or SIC POVM. It turns 
                                                        
135 Cf. Ferrie and Emerson [2009], Wooters [1986]. 
136 For a formal discussion of SIC’s and informationally complete measurements, see Fuchs and Schack 
[2009]. 
137 In what follows, I will sometimes use the term ‘SIC’ as shorthand for ‘SIC POVM’. 
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out that an arbitrary density operator  can be expressed as a linear combination of 
the . Because the operators are positive semi-definite and form a resolution of the 
identity, they can be interpreted as labeling the potential outcomes of a quantum 
measurement device. The measurement device in question does not correspond to a 
standard von Neumann measurement whose outcomes are eigenvalues of some 
Hermitian operator. Instead, as we have seen,  SIC’s are examples of the more general 
positive operator-valued measures, or POVM’s.138 They can therefore be thought of as 
labeling the outcomes of a generalized quantum measurement device.139 
 Suppose that we think of a quantum state as a representation of an agent’s 
beliefs about the potential outcomes of a SIC measurement. It turns out that this SIC 
representation can be used to express the Born rule probabilities for any other 
quantum measurement. Fuchs asks us to consider a SIC measurement ‘in the sky’ with 
outcomes  along with any standard von Neumann measurement ‘on the ground’. 
Suppose that the latter measurement has outcomes  with the vectors j 
representing some orthonormal basis. We are asked to consider two paths to the 
measurement on the ground. ‘Path 1’ proceeds directly to the measurement on the 
ground. ‘Path 2’ proceeds first to the measurement in the sky, and subsequently to the 
measurement on the ground.  
                                                        
138 In what follows it is assumed that SIC’s exist in all finite dimensions. Whether or not this is true 
remains an open question (see Fuchs [2010]). It is known that they exist in dimensions 2-67. 
139 For a discussion of the POVM formalism, see Nielson and Chuang [2000]. 
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 We also assume that we are given the agent’s personal probabilities for 
the outcomes  of the measurement in the sky, along with her conditional 
probabilities for the outcomes on the ground, given the measurement in the 
sky. These are just the probabilities that the agent would assign on the assumption 
that the quantum system follows path 2. If our agent has coherent beliefs, then the law 
of total probability implies that she should assign the probabilities for the 
measurement on the ground given by  
 
     (6) 
 
How does this probability assignment relate to the probabilities for measurement 
outcomes on the ground, assuming that path 1 is followed instead of path 2? The Born 
rule implies that a direct measurement on the ground should have outcomes with 
probabilities given by  
 
      (7) 
 
for some quantum state .140 Clearly, we may have in general 
                                                        
140 Note that 

D j  is used to denote an outcome of an experiment and 

H j  to denote an operator in this 
equation. 
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      (8) 
 
given that path 2, involving a ‘measurement in the sky’, is not a unitary process. 
Nevertheless, given the SIC formalism, we can represent  as a linear function of 
. In particular, Fuchs and Schack [2009] are able to show that  
 
     (9) 
 
This is a particularly simple representation of the Born rule in terms of 
probabilities.141 Note that equation (9) is just a linear function of . Furthermore, 
(9) makes no direct reference to quantum states. The equation says that we can 
represent the probabilities for the outcomes of any experiment in terms of the 
potential consequences of an explicitly counterfactual action (the ‘measurement in the 
sky’). 
                                                        
141 Fuchs writes: ‘The Born Rule is nothing but a kind of Quantum Law of Total Probability! No complex 
amplitudes, no operators—only probabilities in, and probabilities out.’ (Fuchs [2010], p. 12). 
121 
 
 
 
 What exactly is the nature of the empirical constraint imposed by the Born 
rule? Fuchs interprets equation (9) as encoding the additional ‘impact of 
counterfactuality’, metered by the Hilbert space dimension of the system:  
 
Seemingly at the heart of quantum mechanics from the QBist view is a statement 
about the impact of counterfactuality. The impact parameter is metered by a 
single, significant number associated with each physical system—its Hilbert-
space dimension d. The larger the d associated with a system, the more Q(Dj) 
must deviate from P (Dj ). Of course this point must have been implicit in the 
usual form of the Born Rule, [Eq. (7)]. What is important from the QBist 
perspective, however, is how the new form puts the significant parameter front 
and center, displaying it in a way that one ought to nearly trip over.142 
 
From Fuchs’ perspective, the Born rule is to be seen as an addition to probability in 
the sense that it enforces certain relations between the possible probability 
assignments for different experiments. More specifically, Fuchs’ novel representation 
of the Born rule assumes that nontrivial algebraic relations must hold between the 
operators representing different quantum mechanical experiments. For example, the 
requirement that Q(Dj) take on values between 0 and 1 implies that  
 
                                                        
142 Ibid. 
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
1
d 1
 P(D j ) 
2
d 1
 .   (10) 
  
Since any positive operator can be written as a linear combination of effects, any 
quantum state can be represented uniquely in terms of the probabilities associated 
with some SIC measurement. From an operational standpoint, this entails that an 
agent’s probability assignments for actual experiments are constrained, as in equation 
(9), by her probability assignments for counterfactual experiments. 
 Let us take stock of where we are. If the program of rewriting the Born rule 
entirely in terms of ‘probabilities in and probabilities out’ is to be successful, then the 
demand that Q(Dj) be a proper probability distribution places necessary restrictions 
on P(Dj). What is it exactly that one is accepting when one accepts that these 
restrictions must hold? And why should a subjective Bayesian accept such restrictions 
on her probability assignments at all? The obvious answer is that we have done the 
experiments, and we know as a matter of experimental fact that the algebraic 
relations between operators that imply these restrictions on probability assignments 
do hold. The expectation values associated with different experiments exhibit the 
same algebraic relations as the corresponding operators. What kind of experimental 
fact is this? We have clearly learned something about the world by conducting these 
experiments. From a realist perspective, what we have learned is that the relations 
between the probabilities associated with different experiments reveal structural 
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features of the world, encoded in the quantum state. What would the Quantum 
Bayesian say we have learned? 
 In their recent paper “Quantum Bayesian Coherence”, Fuchs and Schack 
anticipate this sort of objectivist push. Under the subheading ‘Why “Coherence-Plus” 
Instead of Objective Quantum States?’ the authors write: 
 
Why would a personalist Bayesian accept any a priori restrictions on his probability 
assignments? And particularly, restrictions supposedly of empirical origin? The reply is 
this. It is true that through an axiom like [Eq. (9)] one gets a restriction on the ranges of 
the various probabilities one can contemplate holding. But that restriction in no way 
diminishes the functional role of prior beliefs in the makings of an agent’s particular 
assignments [P(Hi) and 

P(D j Hi) ].  
 
The authors go on to write that 
 
This is the key difference between the set of ideas being developed here and the dreams 
of the objectivists: added relations for probabilities, yes, but no one of those 
probabilities can be objective in the sense of being any less a pure function of the agent. 
A way to put it more prosaically is that these normative considerations may narrow the 
agent from the full probability simplex to the set of quantum states, but beyond that, the 
formal apparatus of quantum theory gives him no guidance on which quantum state he 
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should choose. Instead, the role of a normative reading of the Born Rule is as it is with 
usual Dutch book.143 
 
But the analogy with ‘usual Dutch book’ coherence is not apt. From a Bayesian 
perspective, the role of probability theory is to provide a framework for evaluating 
belief that allows agents reasoning on the basis of uncertainty to detect potential 
logical inconsistencies in their beliefs, and to correct those inconsistencies. This is an 
entirely a priori exercise; the theory offers no guidance with respect to the question of 
which factual beliefs to maintain, so long as they are consistent with one another. 
 But what of an agent whose probability assignments do not satisfy equation 
(9)? There is no necessary logical inconsistency involved in such probability 
assignments, although agents who hold such beliefs will of course find those beliefs to 
be inconsistent with the predictions of quantum mechanics. This shows that a 
perfectly rational agent who has no knowledge of quantum mechanics will find herself 
at a distinct disadvantage relative to those familiar with the predictions of the theory. 
The agent will be prone to probability assignments that the theory does not allow. Of 
course, given enough time to interact with quantum systems, our agent may come to 
learn that the restriction (9) holds, and will no doubt conclude that she has learned an 
interesting fact about the world. All parties to the debate would agree that we are 
learning about objective features of the world when we learn this fact. But what are 
                                                        
143 Fuchs and Schack [2009], pp. 25-26. 
125 
 
 
 
these objective features? Fuchs and Schack acknowledge that the task of  specifying 
the ‘undesirable consequences’ of ignoring restrictions like those in equation (9) 
remains unfinished in their framework:  
  
 [S]pecifying those “undesirable consequences” [of assigning personal probabilities that 
do not satisfy equation (9)] in terms independent of the present considerations is a 
significant part of the project of specifying the ontology underlying the quantum-
Bayesian position. But that is a goal we are not yet prepared to tackle head on.144 
 
But this is a goal that has already been tackled head on, and met, in a realist 
framework. On the latter view, the reason that our probabilities must fall within a 
certain restricted set is that the objective chances happen to fall within this set. One’s 
credences should be mixtures of candidate chances, i.e., the set of possible quantum 
states; if an agent’s credences aren’t in this set, then he or she will be certain that 
there is a better betting strategy that has a higher expectation value. 
 The Born rule can be viewed, in textbook terms, as a rule for computing 
probabilities for measurement outcomes from quantum states. If we wish to remove 
all mention of quantum states from the formalism, we can certainly do so. Ultimately, 
the evidentiary basis of quantum theory is derived from the analysis of repeatable 
experiments, and the formalism of the theory is answerable to these observations. If 
                                                        
144 Ibid., p. 27. 
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the predictions of the formalism are susceptible to confirmation, then the 
experimental data can be interpreted as providing evidence for the empirical 
adequacy of the theory. This evidence is checked against the probabilistic predictions 
of the theory, and so on the level of confirmation it is not surprising that the standard 
formalism can be rewritten without explicit reference to quantum states. This point is 
recognized by Bill Wooters, one of the early pioneers of efforts to provide a 
reformulation of quantum mechanics starting from probabilities: 
 
It is obviously possible to devise a formulation of quantum mechanics without 
probability amplitudes. One is never forced to use any quantities in one’s theory 
other than the raw results of measurements.145 
 
On the level of interpretation, the fact that we can rewrite the Born rule, as in equation 
(9), in terms of ‘probabilities in’ and ‘probabilities out’, thereby eliminating all 
reference to quantum states, does not constitute an argument for the eliminability of 
quantum states. Instead, it shows that whatever is objective about the quantum state 
representation can be transformed into a statement of the form of equation (9).  
 It is true that equation (9) does not impose a ‘right and true’ set of probability 
assignments for measurement outcomes, but only places additional empirical 
constraints on these outcomes beyond those implied by coherence alone. But different 
                                                        
145 Wooters [1986]. 
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agents with different expectations for measurement outcomes will eventually 
converge on a limiting probability assignment for the outcomes of any repeatable 
experiment, given enough trials and assuming that they take any sequence of 
outcomes to be exchangeable. This procedure looks for all the world like it is 
uncovering objective features of physical setups, and the availability of a formulation 
of the theory in terms that begin and end with probabilities will not convince the ‘

 -
ontologist’ to dispense with his interpretive commitments. 
 Furthermore, the great advantage of a realist interpretation of the quantum 
state, whether formulated in terms of probability amplitudes and Hilbert spaces or 
strictly in terms of probabilities via SIC measurements, is that it furnishes a 
compelling explanation of the activity of experimenting on quantum systems. If 
preparation devices really do prepare independent copies of identical quantum states, 
then the exchangeability assumption is trivially justified, and the widespread 
intersubjective agreement among scientists receives a straightforward explanation in 
terms of publicly accessible data. Furthermore, the observed restrictions on 
probability assignments implied by quantum mechanics receive a straightforward 
explanation as a structural feature of objective quantum states. More importantly, if 
the probabilities assigned to measurement outcomes are taken to be objective, then it 
becomes possible to explain many of the observed features of the physical world that 
would otherwise be mysterious, such as the organization of the periodic table and the 
lattice structure of crystals, as revealed by scattering experiments and 
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crystallography. These considerations are taken up in greater detail in the next 
chapter. 
 
Conclusion  
 
Quantum Bayesianism is a relatively well worked-out interpretation of quantum 
mechanics that starts from the premise that all probabilities, including Born rule 
probabilities, are inherently subjective. The Quantum Bayesians are able to address 
many of the obvious objections that have been raised against taking a subjectivist 
attitude toward quantum states. Not least among these objections is that the Quantum 
Bayesians are seemingly unable to make logical sense of quantum state tomography, 
involving experiments on ‘unknown quantum states’. Such experiments seem to 
presuppose that there are such objects, and include preparations of ‘identical copies’ 
of quantum systems in order to perform multiple experiments.  
 While the Quantum Bayesians are able to provide a consistent account of 
quantum state tomography, or of the process of learning about ‘unknown quantum 
states’ within a subjectivist framework, I have suggested that the existence of such an 
account does not tell in favor of a subjectivist interpretation of the quantum state. To 
be fair, the Quantum Bayesians have not argued that technical results such as the 
quantum de Finetti theorem and the SIC POVM reformulation of the Born rule are 
sufficient to rule out quantum state realism. Nevertheless, the picture that Caves, 
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Fuchs and Schack adopt can be evaluated on its own merits, and in comparison to rival 
interpretations. I have argued that such an evaluation already suggests looking 
elsewhere for an alternative interpretation of Born rule probabilities along realist 
lines. In Chapter 2 of the present work I have addressed two explicit arguments put 
forward in favor of an antirealist interpretation of the quantum state, and found these 
arguments wanting.  The purpose of chapter 4 will be to provide positive arguments 
for quantum state realism. It is hoped that the present chapter has provided some 
indication of the explanatory holes in the Quantum Bayesian account that will be 
addressed in some measure by the work to follow in chapter 4. 
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Chapter 4: The Case for Quantum State Realism 
 
A knowledge of  enables us to follow the course of a physical process insofar as it is  
quantum-mechanically determinate: not in a causal sense, but in a statistical one…These 
probabilities are thus dynamically determined.  (Max Born, ‘Physical Aspects of Quantum 
Mechanics’, 1927). 
 
Introduction 
 
In the following chapter I attempt to articulate and defend the case for quantum state 
realism. I begin with an introductory section designed to motivate the problem of 
accounting for the nature of the quantum state, and to clearly define the scope of the 
problematic as one of adequately accounting for the relation of quantum mechanical 
phenomena to the formalism of the theory. I then argue that the proper interpretation 
of the quantum state must respect the evidentiary basis of quantum mechanics, which 
includes physical phenomena that are systematically predicted and explained by the 
quantum state function. It is ultimately the evidentiary basis of the theory, which 
includes relative frequency data described by the quantum state, which gives us good 
grounds for accepting quantum mechanics. This relative frequency data provides 
evidence for the existence of objective chances, encoded in the quantum state. I 
therefore conclude that the wave function is indeed genuinely representational. 
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Nevertheless, the relation of the mathematical formalism of quantum theory to the 
physical world has no analog in classical physics. 
 
 
4.1  Yes, but… 
 
Any attempt to interpret quantum theory realistically must immediately confront the 
obvious question, ‘realism about what?’ It is hardly an exaggeration to suggest that the 
various interpretations of the theory can be categorized according to their answers to 
this question. From the perspective of the de Broglie-Bohm theory, for example, we 
ought to be realists both about quantum states and the existence of hidden variables 
ultimately responsible for the observed statistical quantum phenomena. In the 
Everettian picture, on the other hand, the slogan ‘nothing but the wavefunction’ 
encapsulates the notion that Everettian quantum theory, unlike any other 
interpretation, follows from taking the formalism of the theory to be literally true and 
complete. That ‘realism’ can be marshaled as a motivation for adopting either of these 
interpretations at least suggests that this concept may be too vague or ambiguous to 
be used decisively in addressing questions of interpretation in the theory. Most 
parties to the debate seem to agree that being ‘realistic’, or at least identifying those 
elements of the theory that are real, is a desideratum for any interpretation. The 
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conditions under which this desideratum can be met, however, seem to change 
according to which interpretation of the theory one is concerned to defend. 
 It should be stated from the outset that in advocating for a realist 
interpretation of the quantum state, I am not attempting to impose a diffuse realism 
desideratum on any interpretation of quantum theory. Nor am I attempting to defend 
the general thesis of scientific realism in the context of quantum theory. I am skeptical 
of the feasibility of such a project not only because of the unique difficulties posed by 
quantum mechanics, but also because it is not clear to me that the distinction between 
realism and instrumentalism is of general interest at the metatheoretical level. The 
goal of an interpretation of quantum theory, first and foremost, ought to be to furnish 
a correct and adequate account of the formalism of the theory in relation to the 
phenomena.146 I take it that this is a basic assumption shared by those commentators 
that argue for an epistemic or subjective interpretation of the quantum state.147 The 
characterization of the relationship between the formalism and the phenomena in 
quantum mechanics faces unique challenges not met in classical contexts, which may 
partially explain the widespread disagreement over the interpretation of the quantum 
                                                        
146 In Carnap’s terminology, having chosen a formal language, as embodied in the postulates of standard 
quantum theory, we ought to settle the internal questions posed by that particular choice of language. 
See Carnap [1950]. 
147 Cf. Fuchs [2010, 2002], Bub and Pitiwsky [2010], Bub [2007], Fuchs and Schack [2008], Spekkens 
[2007], Caves, Fuchs and Schack [2002a,b], Fuchs and Peres [2000], Zeilinger [1999]. 
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state. I will have more to say about these challenges and how they can be met in 
sections 4.3 and 4.4. 
 Empirical adequacy is an obvious regulative ideal for a scientific theory 
regardless of one’s scruples with respect to the realism/antirealism debate. Even the 
staunch instrumentalist will demand that her theoretical representation be adequate 
to the observed phenomena. What does it mean for a theory to be empirically 
adequate? Bas van Fraassen defines a theory to be empirically adequate if ‘what is 
says about the observable things and events in the world, is true-exactly if it ‘saves the 
phenomena’.148 Few philosophers of science would deny that according to this 
criterion quantum theory is highly successful. Yet the question of what the theory 
actually says about the world depends crucially upon how one interprets the quantum 
state. The latter question must be posed at the object level; it is a question of the 
physical content of the theory. Hence the status of the quantum state in quantum 
mechanics must ultimately be settled with reference to empirical methods. In 
particular, an examination of these methods will reveal whether the probabilities 
employed in the theory should be taken as evidence for the existence of objective 
chances, as the present work is concerned to argue, or whether they should be 
interpreted epistemically. 
 In what follows, therefore, I am not concerned with the question of how to 
evaluate the semantic status of scientific theories as such. I take it as given that 
                                                        
148 Van Fraassen [1980] 
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quantum theory is a paragon of successful physics. I do not intend to argue for or 
presuppose an attitude towards the metaphysical status of terms occurring in the 
theory. I do not know how one ought to address such concerns regarding the 
reference of theoretical terms.  
 Presumably the “scientific realist” may argue that an interpretation of the 
theory that does not address questions of reference is explanatorily inadequate, and 
that this referential inadequacy can be removed by requiring that the theory in 
question not only furnish adequate representations of the phenomena, but also be 
“true”. I would respond to such an argument, which I consider only to distinguish it 
from my own project, with a rhetorical question: confronted with two theories that 
correctly describe the phenomena, one of which is false and the other true, how are 
we to judge between them? I align myself with a long tradition in the philosophy of 
science that contends that this sort of question exposes a confusion regarding the 
relation between theories and the phenomena they describe.149 Carnap’s ‘Empiricism, 
Semantics and Ontology’ argues persuasively that questions like ‘how do I know that 
the properties of phenomena actually inhere in substances?’ are in fact pseudo-
questions.150 (Of course, in Carnap’s view, we are always free to adopt a ‘thing 
                                                        
149 Cf. Stein [1989], Carnap [1950]. This general attitude can be traced back at least as far as Kant, who 
argued that we must clearly distinguish between questions of empirical reality (the purview of 
scientific enquiry) and those of transcendental reality (the purview of dogmatic metaphysics). 
150 Carnap, [1950]. 
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language’ or a ‘phenomenal language’ according to convenience). Within a given 
theoretical framework, internal questions can be posed and answered by means of 
logico-mathematical and empirical methods. These sorts of questions concern the 
existence of certain entities within a given theoretical framework.  An example of such 
an internal question, germane to the present work, is ‘are the probabilities occurring 
in the theory of the logical or empirical variety?’ Of course we can also ask about the 
existence or non-existence of a system of entities taken as a whole, but the framework 
within which these entities are described will be powerless to adjudicate such 
external questions. As Carnap puts it, ‘to be real in the scientific sense means to be an 
element of the system; hence this concept cannot be meaningfully applied to the 
system itself.’151  
 The basic point has its roots in the Kantian distinction between empirical 
reality and transcendental reality, which was originally marshaled against early 
modern dogmatic metaphysics. Given that, according to Kant, we have access only to 
the world of empirical phenomena, as described within a given conceptual framework, 
and given that this framework, in conjunction with experience, is the context of 
justification of all of our knowledge claims, it is useless to hypostatize entities (the 
‘objects of reference’) that are beyond our capacity to experience. Such noumenal 
objects are by definition outside the bounds of human knowledge. What we can do is 
employ the conceptual resources at our disposal to better understand the phenomena 
                                                        
151 Carnap [1950], 28. 
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themselves. I do not wish to presuppose that any attempt to utilize scientific concepts 
to justify metaphysical claims amounts to Kantian subreption; rather, I wish to argue 
that the theoretical framework within which the quantum state is defined in relation 
to physical phenomena, involving repeatable experiments that reveal relative 
frequencies predicted by the quantum wave function,  strongly supports an objective 
interpretation of the quantum state.152 
 In articulating the case for quantum state realism, therefore, I am not 
attempting to reify or hypostatize the quantum state. In the Carnapian language, I am 
attempting to formulate and answer an internal question concerning the relationship 
between a certain mathematical structure and the phenomena that this structure 
allows us to make quantitative predictions about. Part of the task involves getting 
clear about how the theory generates probabilistic predictions, what constitutes our 
grounds for accepting the theory as empirically adequate, and in light of our answers 
to these questions, what attitude we should adopt towards the probabilities occurring 
in the theory. Part of what is ‘non-classical’ about the quantum theoretical description 
of nature is the manner by which the mathematical apparatus of the theory is 
interpreted in relation to observable experimental events. In a classical framework, 
one attempts to measure the attributes of entities like particles and fields whose 
properties are taken to inhere in the entities themselves regardless of whether a 
                                                        
152 In the Kantian language, the quantum state is ‘empirically real’, whether or not it or any other aspect 
of physical theory is also ‘transcendentally real’. Cf. CPR A373-374, 
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measurement is carried out. Even if the system in question is too complex to be 
modeled directly, it is still possible to draw conclusions about the average behavior of 
the system.  
 This picture of property measurement is highly dubious in the case of the 
quantum theory of measurement. To borrow another Carnapian turn of phrase, the 
‘thing language’ is arguably appropriate to classical descriptions of phenomena, but 
less so in regimes where Planck’s constant becomes significant. Nevertheless, the 
quantum state does contain genuinely physical information about the system it 
describes. While the description is in general probabilistic in character, these 
probabilities are (at least sometimes) perfectly objective. It is this latter claim that I 
have labeled ‘quantum state realism’, and which I wish to describe and defend in more 
detail in this chapter. 
 
 
4.2 What is Quantum State Realism? 
 
Having settled on the scope of the question as an internal question regarding quantum 
theory and its relation to phenomena, we may now ask: what exactly is affirmed by 
the proposition that the quantum state is real or objective? As a first step toward an 
answer, I will sketch a preliminary definition of quantum state realism due to 
Harrigan and Spekkens [2010]. In order to forestall misinterpretations of the 
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definition, I will also briefly canvass a set of possible interpretations of quantum state 
realism that I do not have in mind. 
 Harrigan and Spekkens [2010] provides a convenient definition of minimal 
quantum state realism, which the authors characterize as a ‘

 -ontic’ interpretation of 
the quantum state. At a minimum, any ontological model of a quantum system, 
whether realist or antirealist, should assign properties to the system.153 In an 
operational framework, we assume that a preparation procedure prepares a system in 
a particular ontic state, understood as a complete assignment of values to various 
physical parameters associated with the system. A point in the space of possible ontic 
states will then represent the actual ontic state of a system. With this definition in 
hand, we can ask about the relationship between the ontic state of a system and the 
quantum state used to represent it.  
 The simplest possible relation between the ontic state and the quantum state is 
an isomorphic relation. In such a model, the quantum state provides a complete 
description of the ontic state of a system. A 

 -complete model is obviously 

 -ontic or 
                                                        
153 At this point we assume very little about these properties. For example, they may be relational in 
character. I will have more to say about what these properties might be below. Certain psi-epistemic 
interpretations, such as that defended in Spekkens [2007] and Spekkens and Harrigan [2010] are 
willing to grant properties to systems that are nevertheless associated with multiple wavefunctions. 
Chris Fuchs’ QBist interpretation is not willing to attribute dynamical properties to quantum systems, 
and therefore rejects the framework of ontological models for quantum states. For a criticism of the 
QBist framework, see chapter 3 of the present work as well as section 4.4 below. 
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realist. Another possibility is that a complete description of the physical state of a 
system requires supplementing the quantum state with additional variables. Such 
variables are usually described as ‘hidden’ because their value is unknown to 
someone who knows the quantum state. In such models, the quantum state provides 
only an incomplete description of reality. The complete ontic state is given by the 
quantum state 

  together with supplemental variables 

 . The de Broglie Bohm 
theory is an example of such a  

 -supplemented model. The Bohm theory is 

 -ontic, 
since distinct 

 ’s describe distinct physical states in that theory. Nevertheless, there is 
more than one ontic state corresponding to a given 

 , parameterized by the 
supplementary ‘hidden’ variables 

 . 
 A third possibility investigated by Harrigan and Spekkens is that 

  is not only 
an incomplete description of the ontic state, but actually represents an epistemic state 
of knowledge. Whereas in the Bohm theory different states correspond to different 
states of reality, on this view, 

  is not a variable in the ontic state space at all. Instead, 

  represents a probability distribution over the ontic states. Variations in 

  therefore 
represent different states of knowledge of the ontic states rather than different states 
of reality. Crucially, different  

 ’s may have overlapping support, so that the same 
ontic state may be associated with multiple (indeed, infinitely many) quantum states.  
 This last situation is analogous to the situation encountered in classical 
statistical mechanics. In the latter theory, it often happens that we know some 
properties of a large collection of systems, such as mean kinetic energy or pressure. In 
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such cases we are interested in how these properties vary dynamically, and many 
different microscopic trajectories are compatible with the macroscopic behavior of 
the system. If we associate a phase space with the possible states of the system, then 
our knowledge of the system is represented by a probability distribution over 
possible states of the system. Any given state of the system, represented by a point in 
phase space, will be compatible with multiple probability distributions. Similarly, it 
may be that the probabilities associated with quantum states are epistemic in 
character. 
 I will adopt the Harrigan and Spekkens taxonomy by categorizing 

 -complete 
and 

 -supplemented models as ‘

 -ontic’, or realist interpretations of the quantum 
state. What the two classes of models have in common is that they associate different 
quantum states with different states of reality. It should be stressed from the outset, 
however, that the space of 

 -epistemic interpretations is not exhausted by those 
interpretations that attribute properties to systems compatible with multiple 
quantum states. There is an important result, due to Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph 
(PBR), that shows that an ignorance interpretation that attributes definite, intrinsic 
properties to quantum systems prepared independently of one another is 
incompatible with the predictions of quantum mechanics. One can escape this 
conclusion by denying that quantum systems have definite properties prior to 
measurement, or by rejecting the idea that quantum systems can in principle be 
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prepared in isolation (or in near isolation) from one another.154 The former route is 
taken by the so-called quantum Bayesian school of Schack, Caves, Fuchs and Appleby. 
Quantum Bayesianism is epistemic about experimental outcomes rather than ontic 
states. The 

 -epistemic view adopted by Rob Spekkens, on the other hand, is 
epistemic about ontic states, but denies that they can be prepared in isolation from 
one another.  
 I will have more to say about the scope and significance of the PBR theorem 
below. The theorem is important because it makes clear, by means of a remarkably 
simple argument, what assumptions one has to give up in order to endorse an 
epistemic view of the quantum state. To the knowledge of the present author, all of 
the 

 -epistemic views that are currently represented in the literature reject one or 
more of these assumptions explicitly, independently of the PBR result. If the case for 
quantum state realism is to be made compelling, therefore, additional arguments are 
needed. The arguments against quantum state realism put forward in the present 
work are intended to weigh against all antirealist or 

 -epistemic interpretations on 
general philosophical grounds. 
 Before proceeding to the positive arguments, and in order to forestall possible 
misconceptions, I will briefly canvass a set of possible ‘realist interpretations’ of the 
quantum state that I do not wish to defend. 
                                                        
154 A further escape route is offered by the possibility of retrocausation. I will not consider this 
possibility here. 
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i) The quantum state is not a local beable. It is clear that the quantum state is not a 
‘local beable’ in John Bell’s [1975] sense of the term. The state transition associated 
with measurement, if it is regarded as a real physical process, occurs instantaneously 
over arbitrarily large spatial distances, and is therefore manifestly non-local. But the 
problem with attributing local beable status to the wavefunction runs deeper than 
this. The problem is that the wavefunction does not exist in spacetime; it does not 
have values at particular spacetime points. Rather the wavefunction exists in 
configuration space, with each point in the configuration space corresponding to a 
possible spacetime configuration of the system of interest.  
 Whether the wavefunction is some sort of non-local beable is perhaps less 
clear. Bell himself characterizes beables as objects which can be described in classical 
terms, and out of which observables are comprised. Examples include settings on 
pointer dials, instrument readings, etc. Bell also harnesses the beable concept to 
distinguish those elements of a theoretical formalism which are physical from those 
which are merely artifacts of gauge freedom. For example, the Lorenz and Coulomb 
gauges in classical electrodynamics exploit the fact that the E and H fields are 
unchanged if we take the vector and scalar fields A and  and transform them 
simultaneously according to  
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
AA 
  

t
     
where  is any function of x and t.155 The E and H fields are ‘physical’ in the sense that 
they contain only physical degrees of freedom; a particular choice of  vector and scalar 
potentials is a gauge. Therefore we are not overly concerned if, for example, the 
potentials fail to propagate locally in one or another gauge; imposition of the Coulomb 
or Lorenz gauges merely facilitates the description of the real dynamical evolution of 
electromagnetic fields. 
 For similar reasons, the instantaneous state transition over arbitrary distances 
need not bother us if we regard the wave function, in analogy with the scalar 
potential, as essentially a mathematical tool for correlating the results of experimental 
outcomes. However, the analogy with the Coulomb gauge in Maxwell’s theory should 
not be pushed too far. In the case of gauge invariance, we possess some freedom to set 
the values of the potentials for ease of calculation without influencing the local 
beables of the theory, in particular the values of the E and H fields. The same cannot 
be said of the wavefunction; different values for the wavefunction correspond, in 
general, to different physical situations.  
 The wavefunction is an abstract mathematical object living in an 3N-
dimensional configuration space which exhibits surprisingly non-local behavior when 
                                                        
155 See http://au.arxiv.org/abs/physics/0204034 
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projected down onto real space. As Bell points out, in contrast to the E and H fields, it 
only makes sense to ask for the amplitude of the wavefunction once several points in 
physical space have been specified.156 Restricting attention to non-relativistic 
quantum mechanics, the wavefunction (x, t) is typically thought of as a time-
dependent ‘field’ on configuration space, defining a probability density on physical 
space. The integral of (x, t)2 over a given volume V gives the probability that a 
particle will be found within the volume V. However, once a measurement is carried 
out, (x, t) undergoes a non-unitary transformation, and if the particle is found to be 
within V, the probability that it will be found anywhere else vanishes instantaneously.  
 When one attempts to incorporate relativistic considerations into this account, 
further complications are introduced.157 One can meaningfully ask about the quantum 
state in a given region of spacetime only after a given Cauchy surface has been 
specified. If one wishes to provide a complete description of the evolution of the state 
of a spatially extended region, (and not merely of some extensionless point within it), 
it is necessary to first define a foliation consisting of spacelike hypersurfaces along 
which this state history is defined. This is true of any relativistic description of an 
extended region of space. But if one is prepared to entertain the possibility that the 
quantum state at a given point in spacetime constitutes part of the complete 
description of that point, then a complete description of points in space, and not 
                                                        
156 See Bell [1987]. Reprinted in Bell [2004], p. 204. 
157 For a detailed discussion of this point, see, chapter 2 of the present thesis. 
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merely of extended regions, becomes foliation-relative.158 The expectation values of 
an observable at a given point in spacetime will in general depend on the foliation 
chosen, and for each point there will be an uncountable infinity of possible foliations. 
What qualifies as a complete physical description of a given spatiotemporal point 
therefore hinges on whether beable status is granted to manifestly non-local 
structures like the quantum state in a physical theory. The claim that the quantum 
state is an objective representation of the physical state of a system necessarily 
involves a rejection of the so-called ‘separability principle’, according to which 
spatially separated systems can be regarded as having independent real states.159  
 If this account is correct, then it is not the case, to quote David Albert [2000], 
that ‘the situation associated with two intersecting space-like hypersurfaces in the 
Minkowski-space must agree with one another about the expectation values of local 
observables at points where the two surfaces coincide’.160 In what follows I will 
attempt to defend an interpretation of the quantum state that entails giving up on an 
ontology consisting entirely of local beables.161 Nevertheless, the presence of non-
                                                        
158 For a discussion of this point see Myrvold [2003]. See also Albert [2000]. 
159 See Howard [1985] for a useful discussion of the distinction between locality and separability. 
160 Albert [2000], p. 6.  
161 The question of what such an ontology might look like, and what its implications are for the 
compatibility of quantum theory with relativity, are discussed in chapter 2, where I discuss the so 
called ‘steering argument’. 
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local beables does not entail the non-existence of local beables; this is a point taken up 
in detail in chapter 2 of the present work.  
 ii) The wave function is not a physical object. Taken at face value, the 
interpretation of the wavefunction as a physical object, or a representation of a 
physical object, is indefensible. Quantum state realism entails that the wave function 
is genuinely representational. However, the physical interpretation of this 
representational structure requires a sophisticated set of correspondence rules that 
are part of the non-classical structure of quantum theory. For example, the wave 
function of the four outer electrons in the ground state of the carbon atom produces a 
tetrahedral structure that undergirds the actual observed tetrahedral structure of the 
diamond crystal. However, the wave function associated with this system is 12-
dimensional. This example shows that the physical interpretation of the wavefunction 
involves some degree of subtlety. The twelve-dimensional wave function must be 
projected down onto physical space, and the probability of finding an electronic 
charge in a given volume must be evaluated in accordance with the Born rule.  
 Higher dimensional representations are already familiar in the classical 
regime. I have already mentioned the example of classical gauge freedom. The 
classical Hamiltonian framework provides an example of such a scheme. In this 
framework, the state of a closed classical system is represented by a 6N-dimensional 
phase space in which each of the N particles in the system possesses 3 position and 3 
momentum degrees of freedom. The dimensionality of the phase space representation 
obviously does not correspond to the dimensionality of the system it represents. 
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Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to argue that this dimensionality is without 
physical significance. 
 In the case of the classical Hamiltonian framework, specifying the values of 
each of the position and momentum variables captures the state of a system at any 
given time. The Hamiltonian function then determines all subsequent states of the 
system. In the case of quantum mechanics, the Schrödinger equation governs the 
evolution of the state evolving in Hilbert space. Complete certainty with respect to 
both position and momentum parameters is in principle unattainable. Complete 
knowledge of the state in general yields only probabilities for measurement outcomes. 
The shape of the probability distribution in the 12-dimensional Hilbert space 
representation of the valence electrons of diamond crystal contains information about 
the expected charge density in the carbon atom when projected onto 3-dimensional 
physical space. The phase of the wave function in turn determines how this 
probability density changes with time. The fact that the wave function predicts the 
observed tetrahedral structure of the carbon atom is itself physically significant; I will 
argue that this predictive power cannot be adequately accounted for by the quantum 
Bayesian or any other antirealist interpretation of the quantum state. I will return to 
this example shortly. 
 iii) The quantum state is not a relation between token observers and physical 
systems. It is a minimal requirement for quantum state realism that the quantum state 
be understood as a representation of the state of a system, and not merely of 
someone’s knowledge or beliefs about a system. This requirement clearly rules out 
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Quantum Bayesian interpretations. It might be wondered whether this minimal 
requirement is also incompatible with more moderately ‘non-absolutist’ programs 
such as the relational interpretation of Carlo Rovelli [Rovelli 1996]. Rovelli rejects the 
idea that there exist absolute or observer-independent quantum states. The crucial 
observation in support of this claim is that different observers may give different 
maximally complete accounts of the same sequence of events. The word ‘observer’ is 
used here in the same way that it is used in the description of Galilean relativity, 
where one speaks of velocities ‘relative to some observer’. In a Galilean spacetime it 
makes no sense to speak of the absolute velocity of a body. Instead we speak of 
velocities relative to some observer.  For analogous reasons, according to Rovelli, it 
makes no sense to speak of the quantum state of a system without first specifying a 
framework within which to define the state in question relative to some observer. The 
observer need not be a human being with a PhD, or even a computer or a cat, but 
could be any physical system capable of recording information, i.e., with more than 
one possible state.  
 Rovelli argues that there exist no observer-independent quantum states by 
invoking what he calls the ‘third person problem’. We are asked to consider an 
observer O (any sort of macroscopic measuring apparatus will do) that makes a 
measurement on (or interacts with) a system S. Rovelli assumes that the quantity q 
being measured by O can take on the two values 1 and 2. The states of S are described 
in the standard way by rays in a 2-D Hilbert space Hs. Let the two eigenstates of the 
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operator corresponding to a q measurement be 

1  and

2 . In general, at time t=t1 
prior to measurement, S will be in a state  
 
    

  = 

 1   2      
 
with 

, complex and 

 2  2 1. O can measure either of the two values 1 or 2, with 
respective probabilities 

 2  and

2 . 
 If we assume that the result of a given measurement made by O is 1, then at 
time t=t2 after the measurement the state of the system is 

1 . Now suppose that a 
second observer P describes the interacting system formed by S and O. We assume 
that P does not perform any measurements before t2, but that P knows the initial 
states of both S and O. P describes S by means of a Hilbert space Hs and O by means of 
a Hilbert space Ho. The S-O system is then described by the tensor product state 

Hso HsHo . We assume, following convention, that P labels the state of the 
observer O before the measurement as

init . O’s measurement of S implies an 
interaction event between O and S. This interaction brings about a change in the state 
of O. The initial state of the O-S system is 
 
    

  init   1   2  init  
 
Linearity then implies that, after measurement, we have 
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
  init   1   2  init

 1  O1   2  O2  
 
Where O1 and O2 correspond to ‘the measuring apparatus points to 1(or 2)’. At t2  the 
system is in the state 

 1  O1   2  O2 . Thus, depending on where we draw the 
line between system and observer, we get a different description of the same 
sequence of events, although P is assumed not to interact with the O-S system prior to 
measurement. At t2 the system is in state 

1  according to O, i.e., the quantity q has 
value 1. According to P, the quantity is in a superposition 

 1  O1   2  O2 . 
These are two distinct, correct descriptions of the same events. Notice that the 
correlation between the q variable of S and the pointer variable of O expresses the fact 
that the pointer variable has information about S. 
 Hence the framework within which any quantum state ascription is made is 
determined by the data or information available to the observer. For any given system 
S there is a definite probability that a given question q will yield a yes or no answer. 
What is really absolute or observer-independent is the probability of a sequence 
A1…An of property ascriptions, given a measurement framework. After observer O 
observes measurement outcome 1, he or she is no longer free to adopt a framework in 
which q is not 1. Furthermore, there is an important sense in which P’s description of 
the O-S system contains the information that O has performed a measurement on S; 
this information is contained in the correlations 

 1  O1   2  O2 . Here the four 
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possible configurations that the q variable and the pointer variable can take have been 
reduced to two. Rovelli expresses the idea that the system S has a definite value 
relative to observer O with the locution: O has the “information” that q=1. 
 Information is a perfectly objective property of a physical system. Roughly 
speaking, it quantifies the relationship between the total number of possible 
configurations of a system and the system’s actual configuration. Intuitively, the 
greater the total number of possible configurations, the more informative the actual 
configuration of a system becomes. The concept of information expresses the fact that 
the configurations of different physical systems can be correlated. It is on this basis 
that Rovelli is able to define a physically possible ‘observer’ quite generally as any 
physical system capable of assuming more than one state or configuration. Two 
observers O1 and O2 will assign the same quantum state to a system S provided that O1 
and O2 are themselves systems of the same type, i.e., belonging to the same 
equivalence class of possible configurations. These configurations determine the set of 
questions that O can ask of S. Nevertheless, the information capacity of S is intrinsic to 
S and does not depend on any observers. This information capacity is not only discrete 
but also finite. Hence it is possible to completely characterize a system by means of a 
finite string of yes/no experimental questions.  
 Such a binary string is essentially an alternative representation of the quantum 
state of a system. What is novel about Rovelli’s characterization is that it places the 
emphasis on the questions that can be asked of a system, and thereby on the 
observers asking the questions. Two observers may furnish different descriptions of 
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the same set of events because they have different data (frameworks) for the same 
events. Once the data are specified, however, all probabilities are well defined and 
perfectly objective. Hence there is no conflict with the ascription of an objective 
quantum state, given some measurement context or observer type.  
 
 I have argued that the proper scope of the problem of interpreting the 
quantum state should be limited to questions of adequacy to the phenomena. In this 
context, I have suggested that the quantum wave function is a mathematical 
representation of quantum systems whose exact mathematical structure is physically 
significant, in the sense that different wavefunction representations correspond to 
different states of reality. I have also suggested that the quantum state is some sort of 
non-local beable, furnishing objective probabilities for measurement outcomes. I will 
now turn to the task of fleshing out these claims.  
 I first consider the scope and significance of a result due to Pusey, Barrett and 
Rudolph that rules out a certain class of antirealist interpretations. It will be seen that 
none of the antirealist views considered in the present work, including the quantum 
Bayesian approach favored by Caves, Fuchs, Schack, and Appleby, as well the 
framework defended in Spekkens and Harrigan [2010], are directly undermined by 
the PBR theorem. Nevertheless, the theorem clarifies the assumptions made in order 
to maintain an antirealist interpretation of the quantum state. It is these latter 
assumptions that I hope to call into question by means of specific examples drawn 
from the evidentiary basis of quantum theory. 
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4.3 The Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph Theorem 
 
In their important paper ‘The quantum state cannot be interpreted statistically’, 
Matthew Pusey, Jonathan Barrett, and Terry Rudolph show that a certain class of 
epistemic interpretations of the quantum state is incompatible with quantum 
mechanics.162 The sort of view in question is gleaned from some of the later writings 
of Albert Einstein, who believed that the wave function could be interpreted as an 
incomplete description of physical reality: 
 
I incline to the opinion that the wave function does not (completely) describe 
what is real, but only a to us empirically accessible maximal knowledge regarding 
that which really exists […] this is what I mean when I advance the view that 
quantum mechanics gives an incomplete description of the real state of affairs.163 
 
The case for a statistical interpretation of the quantum state is perhaps best seen by 
means of a classical analogy. Consider the Newtonian description of a simple system, 
such as a particle on a wire. The behavior of the particle can be determined by the 
initial conditions (in this case, the initial position of the particle and its initial 
                                                        
162 Pusey, Barret and Rudolph [2011]. 
163 Letter to P.S Epstein, 1945. Reprinted in Howard [1990], p. 103. 
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momentum) together with knowledge of all of the forces acting on it. These two pieces 
of information together suffice to determine the subsequent behavior of the system. 
We can model this system using a simple 2-dimensional phase space representation. 
Each point in the phase space corresponds to a particular position and momentum, 
and every point can be thought of as a possible instantaneous state of the system. 
Given the framework of Newtonian mechanics, the position and momentum of the 
particle will change deterministically with time, and this dynamics will be represented 
in the phase space by a trajectory through different points in the space.  
 The phase space representation can easily be generalized to systems with 
arbitrary degrees of freedom by moving to higher dimensional representations. In 
practice, it is impossible to model the evolution of a classical system with a 
macroscopic number of degrees of freedom by tracking each particle. Fortunately, for 
most systems, we are interested in the dynamical evolution of empirically accessible 
macroscopic properties such as temperature and pressure. The evolution of such 
macroscopic states is compatible with many different microscopic particle 
trajectories. We assign a probability distribution over phase space, representing our 
uncertainty about the actual position in phase space occupied by the system, and 
weighted according to how likely it is that any given microconfiguration will give rise 
to the observed macroscopic properties of the system. This probability distribution is 
constrained to evolve in time in a manner that respects the macroscopic properties of 
the system accessible to the experimenter. 
155 
 
 
 
 It is clear that in the classical case the state assigned to the system is epistemic; 
the state represents our knowledge of the actual point in phase space occupied by the 
system. Crucially, the same ontic state of the system (the actual positions and 
momenta of all of the particles comprising the system) is compatible with more than 
one, and indeed infinitely many, epistemic states. Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph ask 
whether this conception of an epistemic state can be used to interpret the quantum 
state and the probabilities it furnishes for macroscopic events. By means of a very 
simple argument, the authors are able to show that it cannot. 
 
The PBR Argument 
 
PBR assume from the outset that quantum systems exist, and that they at least 
sometimes have definite properties. These properties need not include things like 
definite position and momentum; PBR assume only that the properties in question are 
sufficient to distinguish systems from their environment such that measurements can 
be performed on them. Such systems are assumed to be amenable to preparation in 
the sense that they possess definite properties after being prepared in a given state; 
for example, when a preparation procedure is carried out that yields states that assign 
probability zero to some experimental outcome, this is taken to be a fact about the 
system in question. 
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 PBR first consider two different methods of preparing a quantum system. If the 
first method is used, the system is prepared in the state 

0 . If the system is prepared 
using the second method, the state is given by 

1 . 

0  and 

1  are assumed to be 
distinct, non-orthogonal states. The mathematical object 

  specifies completely the 
physical properties of the system after preparation. It need not be assumed that the 
preparation procedures yield pure states. The preparation may yield mixed states 

0
m and 

1 m that are sufficiently ‘close’ to being pure, in a sense to be described 
below. 
 PBR now adopt the taxonomy presented in Harrigan and Spekkens [2010]. If 
the quantum state is a physical property of the system, then either 

  is (close to) 
identical with 

0  or 

1  after preparation, in which case the quantum state furnishes 
a complete description of the system, or 

  consists of 

0  or 

1 , supplemented with 
some additional parameters. Crucially, the quantum state is determined uniquely by 

 , with or without additional variables.  
 If, on the other hand, the quantum state is epistemic in character, then a full 
specification of the properties 

  of a system need not determine the quantum state 
associated with the system.164 This situation is analogous to that found in classical 
                                                        
164 The authors use the term ‘statistical’, rather than ‘epistemic’, which is potentially misleading since it 
suggests that they are rejecting the probabilistic interpretation of the quantum state. In fact the 
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statistical mechanics, where the ontic state of the system is compatible with multiple 
epistemic (statistical mechanical) representations. A particular value of 

  will in this 
case be compatible with either preparation method, that corresponding to 

0  or to

1 . 
 PBR now show that this statistical interpretation of the quantum state is 
incompatible with quantum theory. First we choose a basis for the Hilbert space 
representation of 

0  and 

1  such that 

0  0  and 

1    ( 0  1 ) / 2 .165PBR 
immediately derive a contradiction from the assumption that the complete physical 
state 

  of the system is compatible with the preparation corresponding to 

0  as well 
as that corresponding to 

1 .  
 Assume that the probability that, given 

 , the preparation yields either 

0  or 

1  is at least 

q  0. We will also assume that two states can be prepared in isolation 
from one another, such that their physical states are distinguishable, and upper 
bounds can be placed on the correlations between these states.  Let the physical states 
associated with the two preparations be 

1 and 

2  respectively. It will happen that 

1  
                                                                                                                                                                         
opposite is true. The term ‘statistical’ should be thought of in connection with statistical mechanics, 
which assigns epistemic probabilities to ontic states. 
 
165 This entails that 

0 1 1/ 2 . We are here adopting the conventional qubit notation: 

0  (1,0)  and 

1  (0,1) . 
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and 

2  are compatible with both preparations 

0  and 

1  

q2  0 of the time if the 
states are pure and independent of one another. In other words, the physical state of 
the joint system comprised of 

1  and 

2  is compatible with all four possible quantum 
states 

0  0 , 

0   , 

    and

  0 . 
 The two systems are now brought together and measured. PBR assume that 
the performance of measurements on the joint system will give results with 
probabilities determined entirely by the disposition of the apparatus along with the 
physical state of the system. The following is a joint measurement of the two systems, 
which projects onto four orthogonal post-measurement states: 
 
   

1 
1
2
( 0  1  1  0 )
2 
1
2
( 0    1   )
3 
1
2
(   1    0 )
4 
1
2
(        )
    
 
Where 

  ( 0  1 ) / 2 . It is easily seen that

1  is orthogonal to 

0  0 , 

2  is 
orthogonal to 

0   , and similarly for the final two post-measurement states. This 
leads immediately to a contradiction with the assumption of an epistemic 
interpretation of the quantum state. At least 

q2  0 of the time, according to our 
assumptions, the measuring device will yield a post-measurement state compatible 
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with any of the four preparations 

0  0 , 

0   , 

    and 

  0 . But given 
the orthogonality relations between these preparations and the states 

i , this result 
is incompatible with the predictions of quantum mechanics. The result is 
straightforwardly generalized to arbitrary pairs of states 

0  and 

1 . 
 The contradiction derived above starts from the assumptions that the states 

0  and 

1  are pure, and that they are prepared independently of one another. In 
fact both of these assumptions, which are really idealizations, can be relaxed and the 
contradiction still obtained. Suppose that we relax the assumption of pure states, 
allowing instead that preparations may yield mixed states. PBR assume a non-zero 
probability q that the ontic state of the system is compatible with both preparation 
procedures 

0 m and 

1 m. If this assumption is relaxed, so that the prepared states 

0 m and 

1 m are mixed but ‘almost’ pure, then the value for q predicted by 
quantum mechanics can be made arbitrarily small by preparing states that are 
arbitrarily close to pure states. The independence assumption can be similarly 
relaxed. We need assume only that the probability that the preparation is compatible 
with any of the states 

0  0 , 

0   , 

    and

  0  is some real number r > 
0 with r not necessarily equal to q2. This is sufficient to derive the contradiction. 
 
 The PBR argument shows that the assumption that a given quantum state is 
compatible with more than one physical state 

 , along with a small set of auxiliary 
assumptions, leads immediately to a contradiction with the predictions of quantum 
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mechanics. This result forces any epistemic interpretation of the quantum state to 
clarify which, if any, of these assumptions should be rejected. In the spirit of John Bell, 
we might well wonder whether the fact that so much follows from such innocent 
assumptions should lead to us to question their innocence. 
 The authors identify three main background assumptions that go into their 
result. The first is that a quantum system can be prepared in isolation from the rest of 
the universe in a pure quantum state, and that such a system, on preparation, has a 
definite set of physical properties. We have already pointed out that these 
assumptions can be somewhat relaxed, and the result still obtained. That a system is 
capable of having definite physical properties is an assumption necessary to make 
sense of the central question addressed by the authors, namely whether or not the 
quantum state is among the physical properties possessed by a system. It is worth 
emphasizing that very little is assumed about the properties in question; they may be 
dispositional in character, and certainly they need not include such familiar properties 
as position and momentum, spin, etc. Indeed, what is crucial to the result is just that if 
a preparation procedure yields a probability of 0 for some experimental outcome, 
then this is a fact about the system. Nor do the authors assume that the quantum state 
exhausts the properties possessed by a system. 
 One might reject the assumption of property attribution on the grounds that 
individual prepared systems do not have well-defined properties. It may be that only 
relational properties are ontic. It is also clear that the quantum Bayesians Caves, 
Fuchs, and Schack would reject this assumption of property attribution. While the 
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latter authors defend an epistemic view of the quantum state, they maintain that the 
state encodes our beliefs about the outcomes of measurements rather than the 
intrinsic properties of physical systems, relational or otherwise. Consider the 
following quotation from Fuchs [2010]: 
 
QBism says when an agent reaches out and touches a quantum system—when he 
performs a quantum measurement—that process gives rise to birth in a nearly 
literal sense. With the action of the agent upon the system, the no-go theorems of 
Bell and Kochen-Specker assert that something new comes into the world that 
wasn’t there previously: It is the “outcome,” the unpredictable consequence for 
the very agent who took the action.166 
 
This quotation clearly suggests that Fuchs would reject the notion that systems have 
properties, even when they have been ‘prepared’ in certain states by preparation 
devices. The PBR framework does not presuppose that measured properties preexist 
measurements; nevertheless, the authors do assume that there are physical facts of 
the matter (‘physical properties’) that distinguish a system as having been prepared in 
a certain state. It is a virtue of the PBR result that it brings into sharper relief how 
heavy a price the Quantum Bayesian is willing to pay to hold onto an epistemic 
interpretation of the quantum state. Caves, Fuchs and Schack do not simply reject the 
                                                        
166 Fuchs [2010], p. 8. 
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idea that systems have properties revealed by measurement; this is an assumption 
that most realists would also reject. Crucially, the Quantum Bayesians also reject the 
basic assumption that whether or not a system has been prepared in a given state is 
really a fact about the system: 
 
[…] a quantum state prepared by some physical device always depends on an 
agent's prior beliefs, implying that the probability-1 predictions derived from that 
state also depend on the agent's prior beliefs. Quantum certainty is therefore 
always some agent's certainty. Conversely, if facts about an experimental setup 
could imply agent-independent certainty for a measurement outcome, as in many 
Copenhagen-like interpretations, that outcome would effectively correspond to a 
preexisting system property. The idea that measurement outcomes occurring 
with certainty correspond to preexisting system properties is, however, in conflict 
with locality.167  
 
In order for the PBR theorem to tell against a quantum Bayesian interpretation of the 
quantum state, the case must be made that systems really do possess physical 
properties after preparation. It is unlikely that any mathematical result analogous to 
the PBR theorem could make such a case. Therefore the case must be made on more 
general grounds.  
                                                        
167 Caves, Fuchs and Schack [2007]. For a criticism of the charge of nonlocality, see chapter 2 of the 
present work. 
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 A second assumption is that it is possible to prepare multiple copies of a 
system in such a way that the physical properties associated with each individual 
system are uncorrelated. As we have seen, this assumption can also be relaxed; what 
is crucial is that the n preparations are jointly compatible with the complete physical 
state . This ensures that there is a non-zero probability that the measuring device is 
unsure which of the preparation procedures was used, entailing that an outcome 
prohibited by quantum mechanics has a non-zero probability of occurring. 
 One motivation for rejecting the assumption of independence is apparently 
provided by the Bell-Kochen Spekker (BKS) theorem, which shows that a viable 
hidden variables theory must exhibit nonlocality and contextuality. The properties 
associated with such theories will themselves be nonlocal and contextual. It is worth 
stressing, however, that the BKS theorem does not rule out the attribution of ‘local 
beables’ to quantum systems, a point taken up in chapter 2 of the present work. 
Furthermore, there are good grounds for thinking that quantum systems do indeed 
have localized properties at least some of the time. The existence of such properties 
helps to explain and undergird, among other things, the science of crystallography and 
the organization of the periodic table. If such local, independent properties do exist, 
then a defender of the 

 -epistemic interpretation must reject some other premise of 
the PBR argument.168 I turn now to an examination of two case studies designed to 
                                                        
168 A third assumption for the PBR theorem is that measuring devices respond solely to the system they 
measure. Such devices respond solely to the complete physical state of the systems they measure in a 
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motivate the idea that the quantum state does indeed track objective properties of 
physical systems. 
 
4.4  Two Case Studies in Support of Quantum State Realism 
 
Example: The Two-Slit Experiment 
 
In the simplest version of the classic two-slit experiment, a series of electrons are sent 
one-by-one through a system consisting of a barrier with two slits and a detection 
screen to the right of the barrier.169 If we keep track of which slit each electron goes 
through as it encounters the barrier, a pattern is observed on the detector screen 
which suggests that the electrons are behaving like particles. However, when we do 
not track the path of each electron through the barrier, but simply observe detection 
events on the screen, an interference pattern is observed. This pattern suggests that 
the electron is wavelike, with a wave front passing through both slits and interfering 
with itself beyond the barrier. This interference effect is described quantitatively by 
means of the wave function 

(x, t) . According to quantum theory, each individual 
                                                                                                                                                                         
manner dependent only on the physical disposition of the measuring device. Since anyone who rejects 
the first two assumptions will also reject this assumption, I do not consider it explicitly here. 
169 The following discussion is indebted to Bohm [1951]. 
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electron’s wave function at either slit determines the value of the function anywhere 
to the right of the slit. Furthermore, the probability of finding any given electron at a 
given location to the right of the barrier is proportional to 

*(x,t)(x,t). 
 After many electrons have passed through the barrier, the probability of 
finding an electron at any point to the right of the barrier is proportional to 

(x,t)
2
. In 
the two-slit experiment, all contributions to the wave function come from one of the 
two slits, which we can label ‘slit A’ and ‘slit B’. Hence, 
 
    

(x) A (x)B (x)     (1) 
 
Where the subscript indices represent the contributions to the wave function at a 
point x coming from slits A and B, respectively.170If only one of the two slits were 
open, we would expect (1) to imply that the probability of finding an electron in any 
location is proportional to the absolute value squared of the wave function at the slit. 
What happens when both slits are open is much more interesting, and illustrates the 
seemingly ‘wavelike’ behavior of the electron. In this case, the probability function is 
given by 
 
                                                        
170 I have implicitly assumed that the wave function obeys the Huyghens-Fresnel principle. See Bohm 
[1951], 121. 
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
P(x)  A (x)B (x)
2
 PA (x) PB (x)A
* (x)B (x)B
* (x)A (x)  (2) 
 
The final two terms of equation (2) represent interference effects that would not be 
present if the electrons were behaving as an ensemble of classical particles. Suppose 
now that we decide to carry out a measurement of the position of the electron as it 
passes through the slit system. Such a measurement interaction changes the electron 
wave function in an unpredictable and uncontrollable way by introducing phase 
factors:  
 
    

 A(x)e
iA B(x)e
iB     (3) 
 
Here 

Aand 

Bare definite but unknown phase constants whose uncertainty is at 
least 2, corresponding to complete uncertainty in the phase. There is no 
deterministic relation between the phase before and after the measurement 
interaction, nor are there any physical constraints on the phase difference 

A B .  
 The phase factors

A  and

B  affect the interference terms but not the separate 
slit terms in equation (2). Since equation (2) is a probability equation describing the 
expected behavior of an ensemble of electrons, it has meaning only insofar as it 
characterizes the expected results of a set of similar experiments carried out under 
equivalent initial conditions. Since the interference terms fluctuate in a random way, 
we would expect that these random effects would average out, so that only the first 
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two terms in (2), corresponding to the contributions from each of the separate slits, 
remain. In other words, if we perform a measurement of the position of the electron as 
it passes through the slit system, the probability that a particle can be found at a point 
x to the right of the slits just becomes 
  
    

P(x)  PA (x)PB(x)     (4) 
 
which is just what we would expect for a distribution of classical particles coming 
through each slit separately. This fact illustrates part of the subtlety involved in 
interpreting the quantum formalism in relation to the phenomena. If a position 
measuring device is placed at the slits, the electron subsequently behaves, for all 
practical purposes, as though it went through either slit A or slit B with probabilities 
 
    

PA  A
* (x)A (x)dx     (5) 
and 
    

PB  B
* (x)B (x)dx     (6) 
respectively.  
 From an operational standpoint, it is impossible to distinguish physical 
processes governed by equation (3) from physical processes governed entirely by 

 A (x)e
iAor 

 B (x)e
iBwith probabilities PA and PB that each of these equations 
is the correct wave function. When an observer checks to see which slit the electron 
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actually went through, equation (3) is replaced by one of these reduced wave 
functions, depending on the result of the experiment. Given the initial measurement 
interaction, which changes the wave function from the form (2) to form (3), it is 
possible to interpret the subsequent measurement of the reduced wave function as 
revelatory of a pre-existing but unknown value, rather than as a physical disturbance 
that changes the state of the electron. Hence the probabilities (5) and (6) can be 
treated as classical probability functions representing incomplete information. The 
measurement interaction appears to transform the electron from a ‘wavelike’ object 
to a ‘particle-like’ object by eliminating the interference effects that would be 
expected were no measurement made.171 
 The insertion of a measurement device at the slits immediately transforms the 
mathematical representation of the probabilities associated with subsequent 
measurement outcomes, and does so in a discontinuous fashion. It is tempting to 
conclude that the probabilities involved are subjective, or perhaps represent 
incomplete information about the actual behavior of the electron. We routinely update 
probability assignments in light of new information at the classical level of 
description. For example, an agent’s subjective probability that a race horse will win 
tomorrow’s derby is changed immediately, and presumably decreased, if it is learned 
that the horse has in fact never won a race. Such a sudden change in the description of 
                                                        
171 For a detailed treatment of the physical process through which interference is destroyed by 
measurement processes, see Bohm [1951], 588-608. 
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the horse’s race record obviously does not reflect a change in the horse, but merely an 
improvement in our information about it.  
 Can something similar be said about changes in the wave function? It is 
certainly true that the insertion of a photographic plate or other detection device at 
the slits makes it possible to interpret the subsequent behavior of the electron as 
particle-like. The probability that the electron will be found anywhere to the right of 
slit A, given that it was initially detected at that slit, is given by 

 A (x)e
iA . If we 
choose to actually locate the electron to the right of the slits, this probability 
immediately collapses to 1 wherever the electron is found and 0 everywhere else. This 
discontinuous change is indeed analogous to the horse race case, except that the 
resultant probability distribution is infinitely peaked due to the presence of complete 
information. 
 Nevertheless, the analogy with a classical probability distribution function 
cannot be extended in the absence of a measurement interaction, which destroys 
interference effects and causes the electron to behave subsequently as if it were a 
particle. The final two terms in equation (2), corresponding to these interference 
effects, have consequences for our predictions regarding the subsequent behavior of 
the system. While the amplitude of the wave function determines the probabilities of 
measurement outcomes, the phase relations between the various parts of the wave 
function are responsible for the evolution of this amplitude, and in particular they 
predict the interference effects obtained on the screen to the right of the slits. As long 
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as definite phase relations exist between 

A (x) and 

B (x), the possibility of 
interference effects remains, and the electron behaves as though it went through both 
slits simultaneously and interfered with itself to the right of the slits. 
 Since the electron is capable of demonstrating interference effects as long as 
phase relations exist between the parts of the wave function associated with it, it is 
appropriate to interpret these phase relations as encoding information regarding the 
behavior of the electron. Once the photographic plate at either slit detects the 
electron, the wave function immediately transforms into an interference-free 
representation. If this transformation in the wave function represented a mere 
updating of information, not accompanied by a physical disturbance in the system, 
then the physical state of the electron would be identical before and after the 
placement of the photographic plate. Yet once the plates are placed at the slits, a 
different pattern is observed on the scintillation screen. The presence of these plates 
obviously affects the pattern on the scintillation screen whether or not the plates are 
actually consulted to determine the initial trajectory of the electron. Of course the 
observer may choose not to consult the plates and thereby determine the paths of the 
electrons. In this case, the subsequent behavior of the electrons will be governed by 
equations (5) and (6), corresponding to a particle-like distribution on the screen.  
 If the photographic plates are not placed at the screen, however, the electrons 
behave as through they went through both slits simultaneously. A subsequent 
transformation of the wavefunction therefore seems to represent a genuinely physical 
transformation of the system. The subjectivist who denies that the wavefunction 
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encodes genuinely physical information is placed in the difficult position of having to 
justify the presence of the interference terms in equation (2) at all172, prior to a 
measurement event, or of asserting that, in principle, equations (2) and (3) are just 
alternative representations of the same physical situation. This is possible only if we 
are prepared to deny the physical significance of the phase relations between the 
interference terms in (2). But to ignore these phase relations is to ignore much of the 
predictive and explanatory power of quantum mechanics, and much of the evidentiary 
basis upon which the theory is built.173 The phase relations between 

A (x) and 

B (x) 
contain information, which we might characterize, following Bohm [1951], by saying 
that the wave function (2) is in closer correspondence with the actual state of the 
electron than a classical probability distribution, specifying the probabilities that the 
electron will pass through either slit, would be. This information furnishes an account 
of the evolution of quantum probabilities that would be lost if all of the information 
regarding a system were limited to probability amplitudes alone. 
 How might a subjectivist account for the observed phenomena? The Quantum 
Bayesian might point out that the above discussion seems to presuppose that the 
electron is in some physical state or other, which the wave function is supposed to 
                                                        
172 The hidden variable theorist may be able to do so. HVT’s agree that the physical situation before the 
interaction is different than the physical situation immediately following, and are realist with respect to 
the quantum state in this sense. 
173 I will have more to say about this evidentiary basis in the next section. 
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describe. Chris Fuchs, in particular, denies that quantum systems have ontic states, 
even when they have been prepared in a given quantum state, and so would argue 
that it is inappropriate to characterize the electron passing through the slits as having 
a physical state at all. Hence, the spontaneous state change associated with 
measurement, on the QBist view, represents a mere change in the beliefs of the 
observer, rather than a change in the system itself. How then would the QBist account 
for the change in the quantum state description before and after measurement? It 
seems that the only account available to the QBist is to acknowledge that, over time, 
experimenters have learned to expect that the consequences of their interventions on 
physical systems will take on a certain form described by the wave function.  This 
form changes depending on the overall macroscopic physical setup, for example in 
response to whether or not a detector is placed at the slits in the two-slit experiment.
 Nevertheless, the intersubjective agreement that exists regarding the exact 
form of the wavefunction is, according to the Quantum Bayesian account, just a brute 
psychological fact about physicists who conduct experiments and the kind of 
assumptions, such as exchangeability defined over sequences of quantum state 
preparations, which they make about experimental setups; it receives no physical 
explanation.174  While logically consistent, this interpretation of the existing 
intersubjective agreement appears to strain credibility. 
                                                        
174 For a further discussion of the this point, see chapter 3 of the present work. 
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 On the other hand, a subjectivist who holds that quantum states are states of 
knowledge about hidden variables can accommodate the picture of physical 
disturbance described above, since such interpreters do not deny that the quantum 
state describes (statistically) an underlying ontic state, which may interact with a 
measurement device. For such authors, such as Spekkens [2007], a direct 
measurement is not purely Bayesian updating, but is always accompanied by a 
physical disturbance.  
The trouble with adopting such an epistemic account is that we know, in light 
of the Bell, Kochen and Specker and PBR ‘no go’ theorems, that there exist serious 
constraints on the space of possible ontic models compatible with the predictions of 
quantum mechanics that nevertheless interpret the quantum state epistemically. The 
epistemicist would likely deny that individually prepared quantum states have 
isolable properties susceptible of measurement, even when the prepared states are 
product states. This means that a device that detects an electron at either slit in the 
two-slit experiment is not registering properties that can be localized at the slit, even 
when there is no entanglement with environmental degrees of freedom. Perhaps the 
underlying properties associated with the ontic states of the system are relational and 
therefore nonlocal in character, preventing the attribution of independent properties 
to such systems and thereby circumventing the PBR result. But in the absence of 
evidence to suggest that product states actually fail to satisfy the independence 
condition in the PBR result, it seems more reasonable to take the experimental results, 
which suggest that the systems in question do have localized properties, at face value. 
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Example: Crystallography and the Periodic Table 
 
Much of the evidentiary basis of quantum mechanics comes from the field of quantum 
chemistry. The configuration and spatial distribution of electrons around atomic 
nuclei, which determines the chemical properties of atoms and molecules, is predicted 
and explained by quantum mechanics. The Schrödinger equation of the hydrogen 
atom can be solved analytically to obtain energy eigenstates corresponding to the 
allowable orbitals of the hydrogen electron. The wave function 

  governing the 
electron contains both spatial and spin degrees of freedom, with the probability of 
locating the electron at any point in space given by 

2d , where 

d  is the volume 
element. It is well known that the energy eigenstates obtained from the Hamiltonian 
operator for hydrogen predict and explain the existence of the Balmer series of atomic 
spectra in spectacular fashion.  From the perspective of the quantum state realist, this 
empirical success already strongly suggests that the eigenstates of the hydrogen atom 
represent real features of the systems in question. But it is the combination of 
degeneracy in the allowable eigenstates of an electron along with the Pauli exclusion 
principle that is able to provide a basis for attributing a ‘shell structure’ to the 
electronic configurations of all of the atoms in the periodic table, and through these 
configurations the observed chemical properties of the elements.  
 Owing to the spherical symmetry of the electrostatic field surrounding the 
hydrogen atom, the operators used to characterize the state of a single electron, H, L2, 
LZ, and SZ, form a commuting set so that the state of the hydrogen electron is specified 
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completely in terms of the four eigenvalues (quantum numbers) n, l, ml, and ms, 
respectively.175 By employing the central field approximation, which assumes that 
each electron feels an isotropic electrostatic field, it is possible to extend this model to 
atoms containing more than one valence electron and obtain approximate solutions to 
the Schrödinger equation for more complicated atomic systems. 
 According to the Pauli exclusion principle, the wavefunction for a system of 
identical fermions is antisymmetric. Consider a system of two electrons given by 

(1,2). If we label the position and spin of each electron r1, s1 and r2, s2, respectively, 
then the Pauli principle entails that  
 
    

(r1,S1;r2,S2)  (r2,S2;r1,S1)    (7) 
 
If both particles have the same coordinates, we have 
 
    

(r1,S1;r1,S1)  (r1,S1;r1,S1)     (8) 
 
which is satisfied if and only if 

(r1,S1;r1,S1) 0 . In other words, there is zero 
probability of finding two electrons at the same point in space with the same spin. 
                                                        
175 These four operators are the Hamiltonian operator H, the angular momentum operator L, (the axial 
projection Lz commutes with L2) and the spin operator Sz. 
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This entails that a system of two electrons orbiting an atomic nucleus is precluded 
from assigning the same set of atomic numbers n, l, ml, and ms to each electron.  
 For each principle quantum number n, there are 2n2 wavefunctions 
corresponding to a given allowable energy.176 Hence for n=1 there are two wave 
functions which give the same energy, entailing that the two available electron states 
must have opposite spin. In general, the exclusion principle forces electrons to occupy 
higher energy states further from the nucleus when the available lower energy states 
have been filled, which in turn is responsible for the fact that atoms containing three 
or more electrons exhibit spatially extended charge densities arranged periodically in 
‘shell’ structures. 
 The electronic Hamiltonian and the associated wave function are able to 
predict observed atomic and molecular structure, which provides direct evidence for 
the correctness of the quantum mechanical description of chemical elements in terms 
of wave functions. In particular, the molecular structure, which is susceptible to direct 
observation, is encoded in the wave function representation. The wave function is able 
to predict and explain the shape of the electronic charge density associated with an 
atom or molecule in a systematic way. While analytic solutions of the wavefunction 
are available only in the special case of the hydrogen atom, approximate many-body 
solutions can be obtained for more complicated systems by means of numerical 
                                                        
176 For a detailed justification of this claim, see for example Liboff [1998], p.620. 
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methods and physically reasonable approximations.177These solutions can then be 
tested directly by means of scattering experiments and crystallography. 
 The most common techniques for determining the arrangements of atoms in 
solids include x-ray, neutron and electron diffraction crystallography. All three 
techniques exploit the fact that incident particles interact with the spatial distribution 
of valence electrons.178The periodic arrangement of crystalline structures acts as a 
diffraction grating, scattering incident x-rays or electrons in a predictable manner. 
The observed diffraction patterns are typically subjected to a Fourier analysis which 
yields information about the spatial distribution of charge density in valence 
electrons. The development of sophisticated experimental techniques such as electron 
lensing has allowed experimenters to systematically vary the geometry of diffraction 
experiments, allowing for more robust observations of crystalline structure. 
 Observation of the crystalline structure of diamond using x-ray crystallography 
reveals that diamond crystals exhibit a face-centered cubic, tetrahedral structure. 
Each of the four valence electrons of the carbon atoms forms a covalent bond with a 
single valence electron of a neighboring atom, with the four bond angles defining the 
                                                        
177 Examples of such approximations include the Born-Oppenheimer approximation, which exploits the 
high ratio between nuclear and electron masses, and the Harmonic approximation. 
178 Each of these techniques is useful for different kinds of crystallographic study. Incident photons 
interact exclusively with valence electrons; electrons, being charged particles, also interact with atomic 
nuclei and have wavelengths shorter than those available in the EM bandwidth, while neutrons feel 
both nuclear forces and magnetic fields due to their non-zero magnetic moment. 
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vertices of a tetrahedron. This observed crystal structure is explained by the charge 
density of the valence electrons of carbon, the geometry of which characterizes the 
possible crystal configurations of carbon atoms. This geometry in turn is described by 
the higher dimensional wave function of the valence electrons when projected down 
onto three dimensions. The structure of a crystal is responsible for various observable 
macroscopic properties of solids, such as hardness and melting point. Since this 
structure is determined by the wavefunction, it follows that these macroscopic 
properties of solids ultimately have a quantum mechanical explanation in terms of the 
wavefunction of orbital electrons. 
 How might an antirealist account for these phenomena? In their paper 
‘Quantum Theory Needs No interpretation’ Chris Fuchs and Asher Peres argue that 
the wave function is not objective. In a reply to this article, Stanley Sobotka writes:  
 
 The wavefunction of the four outer electrons in the ground state of the carbon atom  
 produces a tetrahedral structure in Euclidean three-dimensional space that undergirds  
 the observed tetrahedral structure of the diamond crystal. This is an objective fact about the 
 physical world . . .179  
 
This comment is in line with the point made above, that the wave function of the 
valence electrons essentially determines the chemical properties of the elements of 
                                                        
179Sobottka et al. [2000]. 
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the periodic table. Furthermore, the quotation clearly implies that Sobotka takes the 
three-dimensional charge density to be real, and representative of the physical 
arrangement of atoms in a crystal. Fuchs and Peres’ reply to Sobotka’s objection is 
instructive. The authors write: 
 
 The truth is that the wavefunction of the four outer electrons lives in a 12-dimensional  
 space, while our tangible physical world has only three dimensions. This example  
 (contrary to its intended purpose) is an excellent one for showing that the wavefunction  
 is a mathematical tool, not a physical object.180 
 
Several comments are in order:  
 First, the purpose of the example is not to show that the wavefunction is a 
physical object living in physical space. I have already suggested that it is not 
necessary to construe the quantum state as a physical object in order to endorse 
quantum state realism. All parties to the debate would readily concede that the wave 
function is a mathematical object living in a higher dimensional Hilbert space. What is 
at stake is the representational capacity of this abstract object.  
 Nor is the point to be able to describe quantum phenomena using concepts 
derived from the ‘tangible physical world’. The electronic charge density defined by 
the wave function should not be construed as an ‘electron cloud’ or some other 
                                                        
180 Fuchs and Peres [2000]. 
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physical phenomenon readily susceptible to a description in terms borrowed from our 
experience of more familiar macroscopic phenomena. Indeed the phrase ‘charge 
density’ is itself potentially misleading, since it suggests localized particles distributed 
in a volume of space. But the electronic wavefunctions responsible for the ‘charge 
density’ are not classical waves. What is true is that the probability of finding an 
electron in a given region of space is equal to the amplitude squared of the 
wavefunction, and that this probability evolves in time according to a wave-
mechanical mathematical formalism. In the words of John Bell,  
  
It is the mathematics of this wave motion, which somehow controls the electron, that is 
developed in a precise way in quantum mechanics. Indeed the most simple and natural of 
the various equivalent ways in which quantum mechanics can be presented is called just 
‘wave mechanics’. What is it that ‘waves’ in wave mechanics? In the case of water waves it 
is the surface of the water that waves…In the case of wave mechanics we have no idea 
what is waving…and do not ask the question. What we do have is a mathematical recipe 
for the propagation of the waves, and the rule that the probability of an electron being 
seen at a particular place when looked for there (e,g, by introducing a scintillation screen) 
is related to the intensity there of the wave motion.181 
 
                                                        
181 Bell [1986]. Reprinted in Bell [2004], p. 187. 
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What the carbon example is intended to illustrate is that the relationship of the 
mathematical formalism to the physical phenomena is one of genuine representation; 
this mathematical representation in turn requires interpretation via the Born rule. 
 Finally, the fact that a 3-dimensional charge distribution requires a 12-
dimensional representation does not show that the representation contains excess 
structure beyond what is physically significant. This would follow if it were true that 
every functional representation that yields the same charge density when projected 
down to 3-space has the same physical content. But the Pauli exclusion principle 
implies that different electrons occupying the same orbital shell (such as the electrons 
orbiting a helium atom) must occupy different quantum states. This in turn shows that 
the same physical charge distribution may be associated with different quantum 
states. These differences are reflected in the different quantum numbers assigned to 
the orbital electrons, which in turn determine the possible physical interactions of the 
charge density with, for example, an inhomogeneous magnetic field.  
 Denying the reality of the quantum state introduces new questions about the 
phenomena that the quantum state is able to predict and explain. Is the charge density 
surrounding an atom real? Are the projections onto 3-dimensional space themselves 
real? Fuchs and Peres do not explicitly address the status of charge densities in 
relation to the wave function.  
 If pressed, Fuchs in particular might argue that it doesn’t make sense to talk 
about the atomic structure of diamonds at all. Such talk seems to presuppose that the 
systems in question possess underlying ontic states, which the QBist denies. Instead, a 
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Quantum Bayesian might tell the following kind of story. Carbon atoms, like all 
quantum systems, are studied by means of experimental interventions whose 
consequences are inherently unpredictable. Nevertheless, agents who have 
experience interacting with diamond crystals (whether through crystallography 
experiments or otherwise) may come to be confident that performing certain kinds of 
experimental interventions, such as bombarding crystals with x-rays, will elicit certain 
kinds of results (like observable diffraction patterns). Over time, agents may come to 
believe that they have discovered properties of the diamond crystal, such as charge 
densities, that are useful for modeling and predicting the outcomes of future 
experiments. Nevertheless, these beliefs are never anything more than that; and the 
wave function is nothing more than a representation of these beliefs.  
 This sort of picture suggests that crystallographic experiments, which give rise 
to observable diffraction patterns, do not amount to observations of underlying 
atomic structure. It is true that the structures in question are not observed directly, 
but are reconstructed on the basis of a mathematical analysis of the observed data, 
which are obtained with the aid of highly sophisticated laboratory equipment. There 
is room to argue on this basis that the inference to atomic structure is not forced upon 
us as a matter of logic by the available evidence. If one is inclined to view the 
possibility of direct observation, unmediated by instruments and mathematical 
reconstruction, as a necessary condition for property attribution, this may seem like a 
reasonable stance to take. 
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 While there is no inconsistency involved in maintaining such an attitude, I 
think the case for a realist interpretation of the quantum state is far more compelling. 
If the wave function is real, then the task of interpreting the charge densities, spin 
properties, and so on of atoms is relatively straightforward. These properties of atoms 
are publicly accessible and subject to experimental verification. It may be possible to 
admit these facts while still making the case for a subjective interpretation of the wave 
function, perhaps in line with the attitude adopted in Spekkens [2007].  I am not 
aware of such a case having yet been made, and the local structure of crystal 
configurations at least suggests a tension with the sorts of constraints on hidden 
variable interpretations implied by the PBR and Bell-Kochen Spekker theorems. But to 
deny the reality of charge densities altogether is an option that seems too heavy a 
price to pay for any interpretation.  
  
 
 In his article ‘Yes, but…Some Skeptical Remarks on Realism and Anti-Realism’ 
Howard Stein remarks: 
 
I do not claim to have a definitive formulation of the metaphysics of quantum 
mechanics; but I believe rather strongly that the difficulties it presents arise from 
the fact that the mode in which this theory ‘represents’ phenomena is a radically 
novel one. In other words, I think the live problems concern the relation of the 
forms- indeed, if you like, of the instrument- to phenomena, rather than the 
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relation of (putative) attributes to (putative) entities, and that the ideological 
motives of ‘realism’ have here served as a kind of scholastic distraction, turning 
attention away from what is ‘real’ in the subject.182 (author’s italics) 
 
 
The Carbon atom example illustrates concretely Stein’s point that the mode in which 
quantum theory represents phenomena is a radically novel one. It is novel because the 
representation does not have a direct analog in classical physics. Interpreting the 
formalism is not simply a matter of separating out the gauge or artifactual elements of 
the formalism from those elements which are physically significant. Nor is the novelty 
of quantum theory to be found in the high degree of abstractness in its mathematical 
formulation. The classical Hamiltonian framework, out of which the Schrödinger 
picture was historically developed, is already highly abstract. So too is the Lagrangian 
framework out of which Feynman’s path integral formulation of the theory was 
developed. 
 A complete account of the means through which quantum theory represents 
phenomena will ultimately have to confront the measurement problem. If an 
experimental apparatus is treated as a quantum system, then a typical quantum state 
at the end of an experiment will be a sum of terms corresponding to different 
experimental outcomes. If the quantum state description is taken to be complete and 
                                                        
182 Stein [1989], 59. 
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correct, then it seems that there are no definite experimental outcomes, which is 
problematic. I do not claim to offer a solution to the measurement problem. 
Nevertheless, I claim that the solution does not lie in an epistemic interpretation of 
the quantum state. My task in the present chapter, and the point to which my 
examples have been directed, is to argue that the correct interpretation of the 
quantum state must respect the evidentiary basis of quantum theory.  It is true that 
we do not observe superpositions of measurement outcomes. Nevertheless, the 
probabilities (or branch weights) assigned to different outcomes can be confirmed or 
disconfirmed by experimental comparison with relative frequency data. The 
amplitude and phase of the wavefunction determine probability densities and 
currents, respectively, that can be tested against empirical observations. Any 
interpretation of the theory will ultimately have to confront this representational 
character, which constitutes part of what Stein describes as ‘what is real in the 
subject’. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In the present chapter I have attempted to articulate and defend the case for quantum 
state realism. Along the way, I have tried to articulate what I take to be, following 
Howard Stein, the most important issue regarding the interpretation of the quantum 
state: the relationship of the mathematical formalism to the phenomena it describes.  
186 
 
 
 
Borrowing examples from electron diffraction experiments and quantum chemistry, I 
have suggested that the correct interpretation of this relationship is that it is one of 
genuine representation, in the sense that different quantum states correspond to 
different states of reality. I have also attempted to anticipate and accommodate 
certain obvious objections that might be leveled against this program, both on a 
physical and a philosophical level. While the measurement problem remains to be 
solved, I hope to have made the case for a treatment of this difficult issue of 
interpretation that sees quantum state realism as a point of departure rather than a 
point of controversy. 
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